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390Phenomenal intentionality and the brain in a vatIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. 2004.
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273_The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness, second edition_ examines and explains, from a philosophical standpoint, what mental disorder is: its reality, causes, consequences, and more. It is also an outstanding introduction to philosophy of mind from the perspective of mental disorder. Revised and updated throughout, this _second edition_ includes new discussions of grief and psychopathy, the problems of the psychophysical basis of disorder, the nature of sel…Read more
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180Melancholic epistemologySynthese 82 (3): 399-422. 1990.Too little attention has been paid by philosophers to the cognitive and epistemic dimensions of emotional disturbances such as depression, grief, and anxiety and to the possibility of justification or warrant for such conditions. The chief aim of the present paper is to help to remedy that deficiency with respect to depression. Taxonomy of depression reveals two distinct forms: depression (1) with intentionality and (2) without intentionality. Depression with intentionality can be justified or…Read more
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149Philosophy of Mind: An IntroductionWiley-Blackwell. 1993._Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction_ is a lively and accessible introduction to one of philosophy's most active and important areas of research
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143The phenomenology of first-person agencyIn Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation, Imprint Academic. pp. 323. 2003.
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132The Oxford handbook of philosophy and psychiatry (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2013.Philosophy has much to offer psychiatry, not least regarding ethical issues, but also issues regarding the mind, identity, values, and volition. This has become only more important as we have witnessed the growth and power of the pharmaceutical industry, accompanied by developments in the neurosciences. However, too few practising psychiatrists are familiar with the literature in this area. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry offers the most comprehensive reference resource for thi…Read more
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129Fuzzy fault lines: Selves in multiple personality disorderPhilosophical Explorations 2 (3): 159-174. 1999.This paper outlines a multidimensional conception of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of the content of its commitment to the reality of the self. Unlike the orthodox conception it recognizes that selves are fuzzy entities. By appreciating the possibility that selves are fuzzy entities, it is possible to rebut a form of fictionalism about the self which appeals to clinical data from MPD. Realism about self can be preserved in the face of mu…Read more
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119Consciousness and intentionalityIn Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Blackwell. pp. 468--484. 2007.
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114Self-consciousness, mental agency, and the clinical psychopathology of thought insertionPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (1): 1-10. 1994.
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97Self-Consciousness, Psychopathology, and Realism about the SelfAnthropology and Philosophy 3 (2). 1999.
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94Are the Deluded Believers? Are Philosophers Among the Deluded?Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4): 337-339. 2010.Are delusions best understood as a species of belief? Can I be deluded that p without believing that p? Because delusion is a clinical symptom, there are conflicting data at every turn. Perhaps it is best to think of delusions as beliefs not because they necessarily are beliefs, but because doing so helps patients. If one thinks that “denying that delusions are beliefs” means denying deluded patients “a voice in their own treatment” and that this would cut them off from alternative and healthier…Read more
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84Sensations and grain processesIn Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness, John Benjamins. 1998.
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78Probing for relevance: What metacognition tells us about the power of consciousnessConsciousness and Cognition 9 (2): 172-177. 2000.Metacognitive attitudes can affect behavior but do they do so, as Koriat claims, because they enhance voluntary control? This Commentary makes a case for saying that metacognitive consciousness may enhance not control but subjective predictability and may be best studied by examining not just healthy, well-integrated cognizers, but victims of multilevel mental disorders
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74Review of Ian Hacking: Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory (review)Ethics 106 (4): 845-848. 1996.
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74When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted ThoughtsMIT Press. 2000.An examination of verbal hallucinations and thought insertion as examples of "alienated self-consciousness."
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74How to be realistic about folk psychologyPhilosophical Psychology 1 (1): 69-81. 1988.Folk psychological realism is the view that folk psychology is true and that people really do have propositional attitudes, whereas anti-realism is the view that folk psychology is false and people really do not have propositional attitudes. We argue that anti-realism is not worthy of acceptance and that realism is eminently worthy of acceptance. However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or non-scientific. We argue that non-scientific …Read more
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71The origins of folk psychologyInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (December): 357-79. 1987.Folk psychology is the psychology deployed by ordinary folk and by scientists in ordinary life. At its most basic level, it consists of deploying the concept of mind to explain and predict behavior. This article (i) considers how folk psychology may have begun, by considering an imaginary race of primitive folk deploying the rudimentary nucleus of the psychology, or a rudimentary concept of mind, and (ii) examines one argument for the evolutionary emergence and adaptivity of folk psychology. The…Read more
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70Are qualia a pain in the neck for functionalists?American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1): 73-80. 1985.
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62Reconceiving Schizophrenia (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2006.Schizophrenia has been investigated predominately from psychological, psychiatric and neurobiological perspectives. This book is unique in examining it from a philosophical point of view. It should appeal to every reader who wants to better understand this major mental illness, providing unique insights into the 'experience' of schizophrenia.
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60Review of Stephen F. Braude: First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind. (review)Ethics 105 (3): 655-657. 1995.
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56Neural transplants are grey mattersBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (1): 46-47. 1995.The lesion and transplantation data cited by Sinden et al., when considered in tandem, seem to harbor an internal inconsistency, raising questions of false localization of function. The extrapolation of such data to cognitive impairment and potential treatment strategies in Alzheimer's disease is problematic. Patients with focal basal forebrain lesions (e.g., anterior communicating artery aneurysm rupture) might be a more appropriate target population.
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52A Companion to Cognitive Science (edited book)Blackwell. 1998.Part I: The Life of Cognitive Science:. William Bechtel, Adele Abrahamsen, and George Graham. Part II: Areas of Study in Cognitive Science:. 1. Analogy: Dedre Gentner. 2. Animal Cognition: Herbert L. Roitblat. 3. Attention: A.H.C. Van Der Heijden. 4. Brain Mapping: Jennifer Mundale. 5. Cognitive Anthropology: Charles W. Nuckolls. 6. Cognitive and Linguistic Development: Adele Abrahamsen. 7. Conceptual Change: Nancy J. Nersessian. 8. Conceptual Organization: Douglas Medin and Sandra R. Waxman. 9.…Read more
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51Doing Something Intentionally and Moral ResponsibilityCanadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (4). 1981.The basic idea motivating this paper is that something can be done intentionally even when it is not done with the intention of doing it. An implication of this idea is that the distinction between doing what one intends and doing something as a foreseen avoidable consequence of doing what one intends cannot be used to exonerate agents for misdeeds.My immediate purpose here is to illustrate these points and show how they pertain to the morally relevant difference between active and passive eutha…Read more
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Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |