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171Distributed traces and the causal theory of constructive memoryIn John Sutton & Gerard O'Brien (eds.), Current Controversies in the Philosophy of Memory, Routledge. pp. 82-104. 2023.
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101Digital computers versus dynamical systems: A conflation of distinctionsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5): 648-649. 1998.The distinction at the heart of van Gelder’s target article is one between digital computers and dynamical systems. But this distinction conflates two more fundamental distinctions in cognitive science that should be keep apart. When this conflation is undone, it becomes apparent that the “computational hypothesis” (CH) is not as dominant in contemporary cognitive science as van Gelder contends; nor has the “dynamical hypothesis” (DH) been neglected.
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22A Defense of Cartesian MaterialismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4): 939-963. 1999.One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in Consciousness Explained is to demolish the Cartesian theater model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of Cartesian materialism: the idea that conscious experience is a process of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently wor…Read more
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7Rehabilitating resemblance reduxIn T. Metzinger (ed.), Open MIND Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century. Volume 2, . 2016.Gerard O’Brien.
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53Intentionality Lite or Analog Content?: A Response to Hutto and SatnePhilosophia 43 (3): 723-729. 2015.In their target article, Hutto and Satne eloquently articulate the failings of most current attempts to naturalize mental content. Furthermore, we think they are correct in their insistence that the only way forward is by drawing a distinction between two kinds of intentionality, one of which is considerably weaker than—and should be deployed to explain—the propositional variety most philosophers take for granted. The problem is that their own rendering of this weaker form of intentionality—cont…Read more
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13The connectionist vindication of folk psychologyIn Scott M. Christensen & Dale R. Turner (eds.), Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind, L. Erlbaum. pp. 368--87. 1993.
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Stich begins his paper "What is a Theory of Mental Representation?" (1992) by noting that while there is a dizzying range of theories of mental representation in today's philosophical market place, there is very little self-conscious reflection about what a theory of mental representation is supposed to do. This is quite remarkable, he thinks, because if we bother to engage in such reflection, some very surprising conclusions begin to emerge. The most surprising conclusion of all, according to S…Read more
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21A schizophrenic defense of a vehicle theory of consciousnessIn R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 265-292. 2015.Gerard O’Brien and Jon Opie.
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50How does mind matter? Solving the content causation problemIn Metzinger Thomas (ed.), Open MIND Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century. Volume 2,, Mit Press. pp. 1137-1150. 2016.Gerard O’Brien.
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100Connectionist vehicles, structural resemblance, and the phenomenal mindCommunication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1-2): 13-38. 2001.We think the best prospect for a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal consciousness is to be found at the confluence of two influential ideas about the mind. The first is the _computational _ _theory of mind_: the theory that treats human cognitive processes as disciplined operations over neurally realised representing vehicles.1 The second is the _representationalist theory of _ _consciousness_: the theory that takes the phenomenal character of conscious experiences (the “what-it-is-likeness”…Read more
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175How do connectionist networks compute?Cognitive Processing 7 (1): 30-41. 2006.Although connectionism is advocated by its proponents as an alternative to the classical computational theory of mind, doubts persist about its _computational_ credentials. Our aim is to dispel these doubts by explaining how connectionist networks compute. We first develop a generic account of computation—no easy task, because computation, like almost every other foundational concept in cognitive science, has resisted canonical definition. We opt for a characterisation that does justice to the e…Read more
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28Gerard O’Brien and Jon Opie.
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130Radical connectionism: Thinking with (not in) languageLanguage and Communication 22 (3): 313-329. 2002.In this paper we defend a position we call radical connectionism. Radical connectionism claims that cognition _never_ implicates an internal symbolic medium, not even when natural language plays a part in our thought processes. On the face of it, such a position renders the human capacity for abstract thought quite mysterious. However, we argue that connectionism is committed to an analog conception of neural computation, and that representation of the abstract is no more problematic for a syste…Read more
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127Eliminative materialism and our psychological self-knowledgePhilosophical Studies 52 (1): 49-70. 1987.The project of the paper is a critical examination of the "strong thesis of eliminative materialism" in the philosophy of mind--The claim that all the mental entities that constitute the framework of commonsense psychology are, In principle at least, Eliminable from our ontology. The central conclusion reached is that the traditional formulation of this thesis is demonstrably untenable as it rests on a mistaken view of the relationship between our psychological self-Knowledge and language
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40A conflation of folk psychologiesProspects for Intentionality Working Papers in Philosophy 3 42-51. 1993.Stich begins his paper "What is a Theory of Mental Representation?" by noting that while there is a dizzying range of theories of mental representation in today's philosophical market place, there is very little self-conscious reflection about what a theory of mental representation is supposed to do. This is quite remarkable, he thinks, because if we bother to engage in such reflection, some very surprising conclusions begin to emerge. The most surprising conclusion of all, according to Stich, i…Read more
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50Vehicle, process, and hybrid theories of consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2): 303-305. 2004.Martínez-Manrique contends that we overlook a possible nonconnectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. We argue that the position he develops is better understood as a hybrid vehicle/process theory. We assess this theory and in doing so clarify the commitments of both vehicle and process theories of consciousness.
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31The last rites of the dynamic unconsciousPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (2): 161-166. 2002.© 2003 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
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46Disunity defended: A reply to BayneAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2): 255-263. 2000.This Article does not have an abstract
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724Notes toward a structuralist theory of mental representationIn Hugh Clapin, Phillip Staines & Peter Slezak (eds.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation, Elsevier. pp. 1--20. 2004.Any creature that must move around in its environment to find nutrients and mates, in order to survive and reproduce, faces the problem of sensorimotor control. A solution to this problem requires an on-board control mechanism that can shape the creature’s behaviour so as to render it “appropriate” to the conditions that obtain. There are at least three ways in which such a control mechanism can work, and Nature has exploited them all. The first and most basic way is for a creature to bump into …Read more
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38Sins of omission and commissionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5): 997-998. 2001.O'Regan & Noë (O&N) fail to address adequately the two most historically important reasons for seeking to explain visual experience in terms of internal representations. They are silent about the apparently inferential nature of perception, and mistaken about the significance of the phenomenology accompanying dreams, hallucinations, and mental imagery.
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68Finding a place for experience in the physical-relational structure of the brainBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6): 966-967. 1999.In restricting his analysis to the causal relations of functionalism, on the one hand, and the neurophysiological realizers of biology, on the other, Palmer has overlooked an alternative conception of the relationship between color experience and the brain - one that liberalises the relation between mental phenomena and their physical implementation, without generating functionalism
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99What's really doing the work here? Knowledge representation or the higher-order thought theory of consciousness?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5): 778-779. 1999.Dienes & Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise a large and diverse body of research in cognitive psychology. Their advertised strategy is to unpack this distinction in terms of explicit and implicit representation. But when one digs deeper one finds the “Higher-Order Thought” theory of consciousness doing much of the work. This reduces both the plausibility and usefulness of their account. We think their strategy is broadly correct, but that con…Read more
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223The mind: Embodied, embedded, but not extendedMetascience 7 8-83. 1998.This commentry focuses on the one major ecumenical theme propounded in Andy Clark's Being There that I find difficult to accept; this is Clarks advocacy, especially in the third and final part of the book, of the extended nature of the embedded, embodied mind
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24This issue brings together papers by Australasian philosophers on language, thought, and their relationship. Contributors were given complete freedom to treat these topics in any way they saw fit. The results reflect the diverse interests of Australasian philosophers, and, perhaps even more strikingly, the diversity of philosophical methods they employ to pursue these interests.
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51Defending the semantic conception of computation in cognitive scienceJournal of Cognitive Science 12 (4): 381-99. 2011.Cognitive science is founded on the conjecture that natural intelligence can be explained in terms of computation. Yet, notoriously, there is no consensus among philosophers of cognitive science as to how computation should be characterised. While there are subtle differences between the various accounts of computation found in the literature, the largest fracture exists between those that unpack computation in semantic terms (and hence view computation as the processing of representations) and …Read more
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38Distinctions: Subpersonal and subconsciousPsycoloquy. 1993.Puccetti argues that Dennett's views on split brains are defective. First, we criticise Puccetti's argument. Then we distinguish persons, minds, consciousnesses, selves and personalities. Then we introduce the concepts of part-persons and part-consciousnesses, and apply them to clarifying the situation. Finally, we criticise Dennett for some contribution to the confusion.
Adelaide, South Australia, Australia
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Physical Science |