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97Connectionism, analogicity and mental contentActa Analytica 13 111-31. 1998.In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson (1996) argue that cognitive processes, pace classicism, are not governed by exceptionless, representation-level rules; they are instead the work of defeasible cognitive tendencies subserved by the non-linear dynamics of the brains neural networks. Many theorists are sympathetic with the dynamical characterisation of connectionism and the general (re)conception of cognition that it affords. But in all the excitement surround…Read more
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285Notes toward a structuralist theory of mental representationIn Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation, Elsevier. pp. 1--20. 2004.Any creature that must move around in its environment to find nutrients and mates, in order to survive and reproduce, faces the problem of sensorimotor control. A solution to this problem requires an on-board control mechanism that can shape the creature’s behaviour so as to render it “appropriate” to the conditions that obtain. There are at least three ways in which such a control mechanism can work, and Nature has exploited them all. The first and most basic way is for a creature to bump into …Read more
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208Distributed traces and the causal theory of constructive memoryIn John Sutton & Gerard O'Brien (eds.), Current Controversies in the Philosophy of Memory, Routledge. pp. 82-104. 2023.
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93Digital computers versus dynamical systems: A conflation of distinctionsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5): 648-649. 1998.The distinction at the heart of van Gelder’s target article is one between digital computers and dynamical systems. But this distinction conflates two more fundamental distinctions in cognitive science that should be keep apart. When this conflation is undone, it becomes apparent that the “computational hypothesis” (CH) is not as dominant in contemporary cognitive science as van Gelder contends; nor has the “dynamical hypothesis” (DH) been neglected.
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27A Defense of Cartesian MaterialismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4): 939-963. 1999.One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in Consciousness Explained is to demolish the Cartesian theater model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of Cartesian materialism: the idea that conscious experience is a process of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently wor…Read more
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7Rehabilitating resemblance reduxIn T. Metzinger (ed.), Open MIND Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century. Volume 2, . 2016.Gerard O’Brien.
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56Intentionality Lite or Analog Content?: A Response to Hutto and SatnePhilosophia 43 (3): 723-729. 2015.In their target article, Hutto and Satne eloquently articulate the failings of most current attempts to naturalize mental content. Furthermore, we think they are correct in their insistence that the only way forward is by drawing a distinction between two kinds of intentionality, one of which is considerably weaker than—and should be deployed to explain—the propositional variety most philosophers take for granted. The problem is that their own rendering of this weaker form of intentionality—cont…Read more
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13The connectionist vindication of folk psychologyIn Scott M. Christensen & Dale R. Turner (eds.), Folk psychology and the philosophy of mind, L. Erlbaum. pp. 368--87. 1993.
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Stich begins his paper "What is a Theory of Mental Representation?" (1992) by noting that while there is a dizzying range of theories of mental representation in today's philosophical market place, there is very little self-conscious reflection about what a theory of mental representation is supposed to do. This is quite remarkable, he thinks, because if we bother to engage in such reflection, some very surprising conclusions begin to emerge. The most surprising conclusion of all, according to S…Read more
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50How does mind matter? Solving the content causation problemIn Metzinger Thomas (ed.), Open MIND Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century. Volume 2,, Mit Press. pp. 1137-1150. 2016.Gerard O’Brien.
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23A schizophrenic defense of a vehicle theory of consciousnessIn Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 265-292. 2015.Gerard O’Brien and Jon Opie.
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58The role of representation in computationCognitive Processing 10 (1): 53-62. 2009.Reformers urge that representation no longer earns its explanatory keep in cognitive science, and that it is time to discard this troublesome concept. In contrast, we hold that without representation cognitive science is utterly bereft of tools for explaining natural intelligence. In order to defend the latter position, we focus on the explanatory role of representation in computation. We examine how the methods of digital and analog computation are used to model a relatively simple target syste…Read more
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61The computational baby, the classical bathwater, and the middle wayBehavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3): 348-349. 2002.We are sympathetic with the broad aims of Perruchet & Vinter's “mentalistic” framework. But it is implausible to claim, as they do, that human cognition can be understood without recourse to unconsciously represented information. In our view, this strategy forsakes the only available mechanistic understanding of intelligent behaviour. Our purpose here is to plot a course midway between the classical unconscious and Perruchet &Vinter's own noncomputational associationism.
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37Functional resemblance and the internalization of rulesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4): 695-696. 2001.Kubovy and Epstein distinguish between systems that follow rules, and those that merely instantiate them. They regard compliance with the principles of kinematic geometry in apparent motion as a case of instantiation. There is, however, some reason to believe that the human visual system internalizes the principles of kinematic geometry, even if it does not explicitly represent them. We offer functional resemblance as a criterion for internal representation. [Kubovy & Epstein].
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165Cognitive science and phenomenal consciousness: A dilemma, and how to avoid itPhilosophical Psychology 10 (3): 269-86. 1997.When it comes to applying computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, cognitive scientists appear to face a dilemma. The only strategy that seems to be available is one that explains consciousness in terms of special kinds of computational processes. But such theories, while they dominate the field, have counter-intuitive consequences; in particular, they force one to accept that phenomenal experience is composed of information processing effects. For cognitive scientists, t…Read more
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279A connectionist theory of phenomenal experienceBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1): 127-148. 1999.When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches _vehicle_ and _process_ theories of consciousness, r…Read more
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102The multiplicity of consciousness and the emergence of the selfIn A.S. David & T. T. J. Kircher (eds.), The Self and Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective, Cambridge University Press. pp. 107-120. 2003.One of the most striking manifestations of schizophrenia is thought insertion. People suffering from this delusion believe they are not the author of thoughts which they nevertheless own as experiences. It seems that a person’s sense of agency and their sense of the boundary between mind and world can come apart. Schizophrenia thus vividly demonstrates that self awareness is a complex construction of the brain. This point is widely appreciated. What is not so widely appreciated is how radically …Read more
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178Putting content into a vehicle theory of consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1): 175-196. 1999.The connectionist vehicle theory of phenomenal experience in the target article identifies consciousness with the brain’s explicit representation of information in the form of stable patterns of neural activity. Commentators raise concerns about both the conceptual and empirical adequacy of this proposal. On the former front they worry about our reliance on vehicles, on representation, on stable patterns of activity, and on our identity claim. On the latter front their concerns range from the ge…Read more
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77Dispensing with the dynamic unconsciousPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (2): 141-153. 2002.In recent years, a number of contemporary proponents of psychoanalysis have sought to derive support for their conjectures about the _dynamic_ unconscious from the empirical evidence in favor of the _cognitive_ unconscious. It is our contention, however, that far from supporting the dynamic unconscious, recent work in cognitive science suggests that the time has come to dispense with this concept altogether. In this paper we defend this claim in two ways. First, we argue that any attempt to shor…Read more
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47Chris Mortensen, Graham Nerlich, Garrett Cullity and Gerard O'Brien.
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24Vehicles of consciousnessIn Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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195The disunity of consciousnessAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3): 378-95. 1998.It is commonplace for both philosophers and cognitive scientists to express their allegiance to the "unity of consciousness". This is the claim that a subjects phenomenal consciousness, at any one moment in time, is a single thing. This view has had a major influence on computational theories of consciousness. In particular, what we call single-track theories dominate the literature, theories which contend that our conscious experience is the result of a single consciousness-making process or m…Read more
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58Internalizing communicationBehavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6): 694-695. 2002.Carruthers presents evidence concerning the cross-modular integration of information in human subjects which appears to support the “cognitive conception of language.” According to this conception, language is not just a means of communication, but also a representational medium of thought. However, Carruthers overlooks the possibility that language, in both its communicative and cognitive roles, is a nonrepresentational system of conventional signals – that words are not a medium we think in, b…Read more
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90Connectionist vehicles, structural resemblance, and the phenomenal mindCommunication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1-2): 13-38. 2001.We think the best prospect for a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal consciousness is to be found at the confluence of two influential ideas about the mind. The first is the _computational _ _theory of mind_: the theory that treats human cognitive processes as disciplined operations over neurally realised representing vehicles.1 The second is the _representationalist theory of _ _consciousness_: the theory that takes the phenomenal character of conscious experiences (the “what-it-is-likeness”…Read more
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177How do connectionist networks compute?Cognitive Processing 7 (1): 30-41. 2006.Although connectionism is advocated by its proponents as an alternative to the classical computational theory of mind, doubts persist about its _computational_ credentials. Our aim is to dispel these doubts by explaining how connectionist networks compute. We first develop a generic account of computation—no easy task, because computation, like almost every other foundational concept in cognitive science, has resisted canonical definition. We opt for a characterisation that does justice to the e…Read more
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28Gerard O’Brien and Jon Opie.
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131Radical connectionism: Thinking with (not in) languageLanguage and Communication 22 (3): 313-329. 2002.In this paper we defend a position we call radical connectionism. Radical connectionism claims that cognition _never_ implicates an internal symbolic medium, not even when natural language plays a part in our thought processes. On the face of it, such a position renders the human capacity for abstract thought quite mysterious. However, we argue that connectionism is committed to an analog conception of neural computation, and that representation of the abstract is no more problematic for a syste…Read more
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129Eliminative materialism and our psychological self-knowledgePhilosophical Studies 52 (1): 49-70. 1987.The project of the paper is a critical examination of the "strong thesis of eliminative materialism" in the philosophy of mind--The claim that all the mental entities that constitute the framework of commonsense psychology are, In principle at least, Eliminable from our ontology. The central conclusion reached is that the traditional formulation of this thesis is demonstrably untenable as it rests on a mistaken view of the relationship between our psychological self-Knowledge and language
Adelaide, South Australia, Australia
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Physical Science |