-
9Connectionism, analogicity and mental contentActa Analytica 13 111-31. 1998.In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson (1996) argue that cognitive processes, pace classicism, are not governed by exceptionless, representation-level rules; they are instead the work of defeasible cognitive tendencies subserved by the non-linear dynamics of the brains neural networks. Many theorists are sympathetic with the dynamical characterisation of connectionism and the general (re)conception of cognition that it affords. But in all the excitement surround…Read more
-
284Notes toward a structuralist theory of mental representationIn Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation, Elsevier. pp. 1--20. 2004.Any creature that must move around in its environment to find nutrients and mates, in order to survive and reproduce, faces the problem of sensorimotor control. A solution to this problem requires an on-board control mechanism that can shape the creature’s behaviour so as to render it “appropriate” to the conditions that obtain. There are at least three ways in which such a control mechanism can work, and Nature has exploited them all. The first and most basic way is for a creature to bump into …Read more
-
205Distributed traces and the causal theory of constructive memoryIn John Sutton & Gerard O'Brien (eds.), Current Controversies in the Philosophy of Memory, Routledge. pp. 82-104. 2023.
-
15Digital computers versus dynamical systems: A conflation of distinctionsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5): 648-649. 1998.The distinction at the heart of van Gelder’s target article is one between digital computers and dynamical systems. But this distinction conflates two more fundamental distinctions in cognitive science that should be keep apart. When this conflation is undone, it becomes apparent that the “computational hypothesis” (CH) is not as dominant in contemporary cognitive science as van Gelder contends; nor has the “dynamical hypothesis” (DH) been neglected.
-
6A Defense of Cartesian MaterialismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4): 939-963. 1999.One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in Consciousness Explained is to demolish the Cartesian theater model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of Cartesian materialism: the idea that conscious experience is a process of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently wor…Read more
-
3Rehabilitating resemblance reduxIn T. Metzinger (ed.), Open MIND Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century. Volume 2, . 2016.Gerard O’Brien.
-
10Intentionality Lite or Analog Content?: A Response to Hutto and SatnePhilosophia 43 (3): 723-729. 2015.In their target article, Hutto and Satne eloquently articulate the failings of most current attempts to naturalize mental content. Furthermore, we think they are correct in their insistence that the only way forward is by drawing a distinction between two kinds of intentionality, one of which is considerably weaker than—and should be deployed to explain—the propositional variety most philosophers take for granted. The problem is that their own rendering of this weaker form of intentionality—cont…Read more
-
3The connectionist vindication of folk psychologyIn Scott M. Christensen & Dale R. Turner (eds.), Folk psychology and the philosophy of mind, L. Erlbaum. pp. 368--87. 1993.
-
Stich begins his paper "What is a Theory of Mental Representation?" (1992) by noting that while there is a dizzying range of theories of mental representation in today's philosophical market place, there is very little self-conscious reflection about what a theory of mental representation is supposed to do. This is quite remarkable, he thinks, because if we bother to engage in such reflection, some very surprising conclusions begin to emerge. The most surprising conclusion of all, according to S…Read more
-
21A schizophrenic defense of a vehicle theory of consciousnessIn Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 265-292. 2015.Gerard O’Brien and Jon Opie.
-
7How does mind matter? Solving the content causation problemIn Metzinger Thomas (ed.), Open MIND Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century. Volume 2,, Mit Press. pp. 1137-1150. 2016.Gerard O’Brien.
-
8Vehicle, process, and hybrid theories of consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2): 303-305. 2004.Martínez-Manrique contends that we overlook a possible nonconnectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. We argue that the position he develops is better understood as a hybrid vehicle/process theory. We assess this theory and in doing so clarify the commitments of both vehicle and process theories of consciousness.
-
3The last rites of the dynamic unconsciousPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (2): 161-166. 2002.© 2003 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
-
13Disunity defended: A reply to BayneAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2): 255-263. 2000.This Article does not have an abstract
-
731Notes toward a structuralist theory of mental representationIn Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation, Elsevier. pp. 1--20. 2004.Any creature that must move around in its environment to find nutrients and mates, in order to survive and reproduce, faces the problem of sensorimotor control. A solution to this problem requires an on-board control mechanism that can shape the creature’s behaviour so as to render it “appropriate” to the conditions that obtain. There are at least three ways in which such a control mechanism can work, and Nature has exploited them all. The first and most basic way is for a creature to bump into …Read more
-
3Sins of omission and commissionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5): 997-998. 2001.O'Regan & Noë (O&N) fail to address adequately the two most historically important reasons for seeking to explain visual experience in terms of internal representations. They are silent about the apparently inferential nature of perception, and mistaken about the significance of the phenomenology accompanying dreams, hallucinations, and mental imagery.
-
9Finding a place for experience in the physical-relational structure of the brainBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6): 966-967. 1999.In restricting his analysis to the causal relations of functionalism, on the one hand, and the neurophysiological realizers of biology, on the other, Palmer has overlooked an alternative conception of the relationship between color experience and the brain - one that liberalises the relation between mental phenomena and their physical implementation, without generating functionalism
-
6What's really doing the work here? Knowledge representation or the higher-order thought theory of consciousness?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5): 778-779. 1999.Dienes & Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise a large and diverse body of research in cognitive psychology. Their advertised strategy is to unpack this distinction in terms of explicit and implicit representation. But when one digs deeper one finds the “Higher-Order Thought” theory of consciousness doing much of the work. This reduces both the plausibility and usefulness of their account. We think their strategy is broadly correct, but that con…Read more
-
12The mind: Embodied, embedded, but not extendedMetascience 7 8-83. 1998.This commentry focuses on the one major ecumenical theme propounded in Andy Clark's Being There that I find difficult to accept; this is Clarks advocacy, especially in the third and final part of the book, of the extended nature of the embedded, embodied mind
-
2This issue brings together papers by Australasian philosophers on language, thought, and their relationship. Contributors were given complete freedom to treat these topics in any way they saw fit. The results reflect the diverse interests of Australasian philosophers, and, perhaps even more strikingly, the diversity of philosophical methods they employ to pursue these interests.
-
6Defending the semantic conception of computation in cognitive scienceJournal of Cognitive Science 12 (4): 381-99. 2011.Cognitive science is founded on the conjecture that natural intelligence can be explained in terms of computation. Yet, notoriously, there is no consensus among philosophers of cognitive science as to how computation should be characterised. While there are subtle differences between the various accounts of computation found in the literature, the largest fracture exists between those that unpack computation in semantic terms (and hence view computation as the processing of representations) and …Read more
-
4Distinctions: Subpersonal and subconsciousPsycoloquy. 1993.Puccetti argues that Dennett's views on split brains are defective. First, we criticise Puccetti's argument. Then we distinguish persons, minds, consciousnesses, selves and personalities. Then we introduce the concepts of part-persons and part-consciousnesses, and apply them to clarifying the situation. Finally, we criticise Dennett for some contribution to the confusion.
-
3The role of representation in computationCognitive Processing 10 (1): 53-62. 2009.Reformers urge that representation no longer earns its explanatory keep in cognitive science, and that it is time to discard this troublesome concept. In contrast, we hold that without representation cognitive science is utterly bereft of tools for explaining natural intelligence. In order to defend the latter position, we focus on the explanatory role of representation in computation. We examine how the methods of digital and analog computation are used to model a relatively simple target syste…Read more
-
15The computational baby, the classical bathwater, and the middle wayBehavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3): 348-349. 2002.We are sympathetic with the broad aims of Perruchet & Vinter's “mentalistic” framework. But it is implausible to claim, as they do, that human cognition can be understood without recourse to unconsciously represented information. In our view, this strategy forsakes the only available mechanistic understanding of intelligent behaviour. Our purpose here is to plot a course midway between the classical unconscious and Perruchet &Vinter's own noncomputational associationism.
-
6Functional resemblance and the internalization of rulesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4): 695-696. 2001.Kubovy and Epstein distinguish between systems that follow rules, and those that merely instantiate them. They regard compliance with the principles of kinematic geometry in apparent motion as a case of instantiation. There is, however, some reason to believe that the human visual system internalizes the principles of kinematic geometry, even if it does not explicitly represent them. We offer functional resemblance as a criterion for internal representation. [Kubovy & Epstein].
Adelaide, South Australia, Australia
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Physical Science |