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97Connectionism, analogicity and mental contentActa Analytica 13 111-31. 1998.In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson (1996) argue that cognitive processes, pace classicism, are not governed by exceptionless, representation-level rules; they are instead the work of defeasible cognitive tendencies subserved by the non-linear dynamics of the brains neural networks. Many theorists are sympathetic with the dynamical characterisation of connectionism and the general (re)conception of cognition that it affords. But in all the excitement surround…Read more
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285Notes toward a structuralist theory of mental representationIn Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation, Elsevier. pp. 1--20. 2004.Any creature that must move around in its environment to find nutrients and mates, in order to survive and reproduce, faces the problem of sensorimotor control. A solution to this problem requires an on-board control mechanism that can shape the creature’s behaviour so as to render it “appropriate” to the conditions that obtain. There are at least three ways in which such a control mechanism can work, and Nature has exploited them all. The first and most basic way is for a creature to bump into …Read more
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208Distributed traces and the causal theory of constructive memoryIn John Sutton & Gerard O'Brien (eds.), Current Controversies in the Philosophy of Memory, Routledge. pp. 82-104. 2023.
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93Digital computers versus dynamical systems: A conflation of distinctionsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5): 648-649. 1998.The distinction at the heart of van Gelder’s target article is one between digital computers and dynamical systems. But this distinction conflates two more fundamental distinctions in cognitive science that should be keep apart. When this conflation is undone, it becomes apparent that the “computational hypothesis” (CH) is not as dominant in contemporary cognitive science as van Gelder contends; nor has the “dynamical hypothesis” (DH) been neglected.
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27A Defense of Cartesian MaterialismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4): 939-963. 1999.One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in Consciousness Explained is to demolish the Cartesian theater model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of Cartesian materialism: the idea that conscious experience is a process of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently wor…Read more
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7Rehabilitating resemblance reduxIn T. Metzinger (ed.), Open MIND Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century. Volume 2, . 2016.Gerard O’Brien.
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56Intentionality Lite or Analog Content?: A Response to Hutto and SatnePhilosophia 43 (3): 723-729. 2015.In their target article, Hutto and Satne eloquently articulate the failings of most current attempts to naturalize mental content. Furthermore, we think they are correct in their insistence that the only way forward is by drawing a distinction between two kinds of intentionality, one of which is considerably weaker than—and should be deployed to explain—the propositional variety most philosophers take for granted. The problem is that their own rendering of this weaker form of intentionality—cont…Read more
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13The connectionist vindication of folk psychologyIn Scott M. Christensen & Dale R. Turner (eds.), Folk psychology and the philosophy of mind, L. Erlbaum. pp. 368--87. 1993.
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Stich begins his paper "What is a Theory of Mental Representation?" (1992) by noting that while there is a dizzying range of theories of mental representation in today's philosophical market place, there is very little self-conscious reflection about what a theory of mental representation is supposed to do. This is quite remarkable, he thinks, because if we bother to engage in such reflection, some very surprising conclusions begin to emerge. The most surprising conclusion of all, according to S…Read more
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50How does mind matter? Solving the content causation problemIn Metzinger Thomas (ed.), Open MIND Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century. Volume 2,, Mit Press. pp. 1137-1150. 2016.Gerard O’Brien.
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23A schizophrenic defense of a vehicle theory of consciousnessIn Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 265-292. 2015.Gerard O’Brien and Jon Opie.
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47Chris Mortensen, Graham Nerlich, Garrett Cullity and Gerard O'Brien.
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24Vehicles of consciousnessIn Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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195The disunity of consciousnessAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3): 378-95. 1998.It is commonplace for both philosophers and cognitive scientists to express their allegiance to the "unity of consciousness". This is the claim that a subjects phenomenal consciousness, at any one moment in time, is a single thing. This view has had a major influence on computational theories of consciousness. In particular, what we call single-track theories dominate the literature, theories which contend that our conscious experience is the result of a single consciousness-making process or m…Read more
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58Internalizing communicationBehavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6): 694-695. 2002.Carruthers presents evidence concerning the cross-modular integration of information in human subjects which appears to support the “cognitive conception of language.” According to this conception, language is not just a means of communication, but also a representational medium of thought. However, Carruthers overlooks the possibility that language, in both its communicative and cognitive roles, is a nonrepresentational system of conventional signals – that words are not a medium we think in, b…Read more
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90Connectionist vehicles, structural resemblance, and the phenomenal mindCommunication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1-2): 13-38. 2001.We think the best prospect for a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal consciousness is to be found at the confluence of two influential ideas about the mind. The first is the _computational _ _theory of mind_: the theory that treats human cognitive processes as disciplined operations over neurally realised representing vehicles.1 The second is the _representationalist theory of _ _consciousness_: the theory that takes the phenomenal character of conscious experiences (the “what-it-is-likeness”…Read more
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177How do connectionist networks compute?Cognitive Processing 7 (1): 30-41. 2006.Although connectionism is advocated by its proponents as an alternative to the classical computational theory of mind, doubts persist about its _computational_ credentials. Our aim is to dispel these doubts by explaining how connectionist networks compute. We first develop a generic account of computation—no easy task, because computation, like almost every other foundational concept in cognitive science, has resisted canonical definition. We opt for a characterisation that does justice to the e…Read more
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28Gerard O’Brien and Jon Opie.
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131Radical connectionism: Thinking with (not in) languageLanguage and Communication 22 (3): 313-329. 2002.In this paper we defend a position we call radical connectionism. Radical connectionism claims that cognition _never_ implicates an internal symbolic medium, not even when natural language plays a part in our thought processes. On the face of it, such a position renders the human capacity for abstract thought quite mysterious. However, we argue that connectionism is committed to an analog conception of neural computation, and that representation of the abstract is no more problematic for a syste…Read more
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129Eliminative materialism and our psychological self-knowledgePhilosophical Studies 52 (1): 49-70. 1987.The project of the paper is a critical examination of the "strong thesis of eliminative materialism" in the philosophy of mind--The claim that all the mental entities that constitute the framework of commonsense psychology are, In principle at least, Eliminable from our ontology. The central conclusion reached is that the traditional formulation of this thesis is demonstrably untenable as it rests on a mistaken view of the relationship between our psychological self-Knowledge and language
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40A conflation of folk psychologiesProspects for Intentionality Working Papers in Philosophy 3 42-51. 1993.Stich begins his paper "What is a Theory of Mental Representation?" by noting that while there is a dizzying range of theories of mental representation in today's philosophical market place, there is very little self-conscious reflection about what a theory of mental representation is supposed to do. This is quite remarkable, he thinks, because if we bother to engage in such reflection, some very surprising conclusions begin to emerge. The most surprising conclusion of all, according to Stich, i…Read more
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51Vehicle, process, and hybrid theories of consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2): 303-305. 2004.Martínez-Manrique contends that we overlook a possible nonconnectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. We argue that the position he develops is better understood as a hybrid vehicle/process theory. We assess this theory and in doing so clarify the commitments of both vehicle and process theories of consciousness.
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32The last rites of the dynamic unconsciousPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (2): 161-166. 2002.© 2003 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
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53Disunity defended: A reply to BayneAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2): 255-263. 2000.This Article does not have an abstract
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454Notes toward a structuralist theory of mental representationIn Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation, Elsevier. pp. 1--20. 2004.Any creature that must move around in its environment to find nutrients and mates, in order to survive and reproduce, faces the problem of sensorimotor control. A solution to this problem requires an on-board control mechanism that can shape the creature’s behaviour so as to render it “appropriate” to the conditions that obtain. There are at least three ways in which such a control mechanism can work, and Nature has exploited them all. The first and most basic way is for a creature to bump into …Read more
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38Sins of omission and commissionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5): 997-998. 2001.O'Regan & Noë (O&N) fail to address adequately the two most historically important reasons for seeking to explain visual experience in terms of internal representations. They are silent about the apparently inferential nature of perception, and mistaken about the significance of the phenomenology accompanying dreams, hallucinations, and mental imagery.
Adelaide, South Australia, Australia
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Physical Science |