Gergely Ambrus

The general framework in which Brandom lays out his philosophical system is an inferentialist theory of content. Inferentialism holds, broadly speaking, that the meaning of a sentence is its inferential role, i.e. the sets of sentences which may be inferred from it, and from which it may be inferred. For such an approach one of the most difficult cases to handle are perceptual reports, which involve words that seem to refer to experiences and experiential qualities, the meaning of which seems not to be exhausted by their inferential role. In the following I shall analyse Brandom’s inferentialist interpretation of perceptual reports and some of its metaphysical implications

The general framework in which Brandom lays out his philosophical system is an inferentialist theory of content. Inferentialism holds, broadly speaking, that the meaning of a sentence is its inferential role, i.e. the sets of sentences that may be inferred from it, and from which it may be inferred. For such an approach one of the most difficult cases to handle is perceptual reports, which involve words that seem to refer to experiences and experiential qualities, the meaning of which seems not to be exhausted by their inferential role. In the following I shall analyse Brandom’s inferentialist interpretation of perceptual reports and some of its metaphysical implications.

This papes discusses Moritz Schlick’s “Austrian” psychophysical identity theory, formulated in the Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, and compares it to the similar views of Russell and to contemporary Russellian monism. A close similarity between Russell’s and Schlick’s views was already stated by Herbert Feigl long ago; beyond investigating this relation, my aim is also to identify features contemporary Russellian monists may have in common with their historical ancestors. I argue that they share some fundamental assumptions: linguistic physicalism, an ontology that may be characterized as physicalist dualist property pluralism, and a dual-language account of the psychophysical identity thesis which is an alternative to reductionist materialism. Further, Schlick, Russell and Chalmers ground these tenets on a structuralist account of the meaning of physical terms which, however, they lay out in importantly different ways.

The paper investigates Marya Schechtman’s narrativist account of self and personal identity, which she dubbed the “Narrative Self-Constitution View”. I lay out the main features of this conception by contrasting it with the views of Derek Parfit, a major contemporary representative of the psychological relationalist tradition originating from Locke and Hume, to which Schechtman’s theory, and narrativism in general, may be seen as a major alternative. After presenting the main features of these two accounts, I set out to defend Parfit against an important criticism of Schechtman which seeks to discredit Parfit’s notion of quasi-memory (and quasi-belief, quasi-desire etc. as well). Parfit’s psychological continuity view essentially depends on these notions, hence undermining them provides a ground for accepting narrativism. However, I also argue that the psychological continuity view fails seriously as well, as it does not account for identification I take to be a necessary condition of being the same person. Lastly, I discuss certain possible explanations of identification, and address the question whether these support the narrativist or the psychological continuity view.

The question of how physicalism originated is a complex one, to which we cannot expect an unambiguous answer. The major reason for this is that there were different formulations of the doctrine, which makes it near impossible to identify the inventor of physicalism. Nonetheless, the received view is that the main actors were Neurath and Carnap: Neurath proposed his versions of physicalism earlier, but it was Carnap who first published an elaborated formulation of the metalinguistic doctrine according to which the universal language of science ought to be physical language. However, in 1932 Wittgenstein accused Carnap of plagiarism concerning physicalism (ignoring Neurath's contributions completely). There is considerable literature on the origins of physicalism as well as on the priority-dispute between Wittgenstein and Carnap. The aim of my paper is to contribute to these investigations. However, I look at the topic from a somewhat different angle, in the following regard. Examinations of the diverse early physicalist doctrines as well as of the priority claims concerning physicalism tended to focus on the accounts of “primary language” or “protocol language”; on whether observation sentences ought to be formulated in phenomenalistic or physicalistic language, referring to experiences or to physical objects and their properties. In contrast, I concentrate on Carnap's and Wittgenstein's views on the content of psychological sentences, in particular heteropsychological sentences, which report the psychological states of other persons. Carnap and Wittgenstein both proposed physicalistic-behaviouristic accounts starting in the late 1920s. I examine in detail Carnap’s and Wittgenstein’s accounts between 1929 and 1932, their connections, and the arguments put forward in favour of them. Presenting their rather similar views as well as their rather different motivations and background assumptions casts further light on the emergence of physicalism in the early thirties, and possibly also on Wittgenstein's troubled relationship with Carnap.

In this essay I discuss the evolution of A. J. Ayer’s account of the mind-body relation through his career, with an emphasis on his early ideas. The reconstruction of Ayer’s ideas on this particular topic, beyond being interesting in itself, may also be illuminating inasmuch as it provides further details on the path Ayer carved out for himself within the large-scale development of analytic philosophy, progressing from the radical anti-metaphysicalism of the logical positivists in the 1930s towards the (re)birth of analytic metaphysics in the 1960s. Ayer’s philosophical development may be divided into two major periods characterized by a comprehensive phenomenalist and a “sophisticated realist” approach. In the phenomenalist period, Ayer regarded the question of whether sense-data are mental or physical nonsensical, and he did not address the nature of the psychophysical relation either. After the realist turn, however, he did find these questions meaningful, and discussed them in detail. In LTL and other prominent works from the phenomenalist period, issues concerning the nature of mind, body and their relation were expounded primarily through linguistic analysis, i.e. by investigating the meaning of sentences reporting mental states of one’s own and of others as well as of perceptual reports. These investigations were framed by Ayer’s views on the privacy or publicity of sense-data and phenomenalistic language, which changed significantly several times. In laying out Ayer’s phenomenalism I also discuss his views on privacy in some detail. Furthermore, I briefly touch upon Ayer’s account of the psychophysical relation in the late realist period, which may be characterized by his trenchant “anti-physicalism”, and his wavering between a mere correlation view and a version of Russellian monism. These later views were laid out in the “sophisticated realist” framework and may be considered metaphysical, in contrast with Ayer’s earlier purely linguistic approach.

The paper discusses Schlick's Fragen der Ethik. It comprises of two parts. The first part analyses Schlick's metaethical views, his arguments against objective values and absolute norms, and his analysis of the meaning of "good" in general and "morally good" in particular. Further, it also tests these views against some plausible objections. The second part addresses an apparent tension in Schlick's conception. The underlying general thesis of the Fragen der Ethik is that philosophical ethics is an exclusively descriptive, non-normative endeavor: philosophy ought not to aim at proving what the good is, and which norms are objectively valid. Justification of values or norms may only consist in determining whether they are endorsed, judged as values or norms by a particular society. This is, however, the task of scientific ethics, i.e. empirical scientific research. In contrast with this proclaimed view, Schlick in the last chapter of the book also puts forth his own normative ethical views, i.e. his Principle of Happiness-apparently leaving the role of the moral philosopher and moral scientist behind and acting as a moralist. Moreover, it seems, that he relies on this normative principle to ground his analysis of the meaning of "morally good".