Gil Morejon

In this paper I present an interpretation of Deleuze's concept of the virtual. I argue that this concept is best understood in relation to the problematic of individuation or differentiation, which Deleuze inherits from Duns Scotus. After analysing Scotus' critique of Aristotelian or hylomorphic approaches to the problem of individuation, I turn to Deleuze's account of differentiation and his interpretation of the calculus in chapter 4 of Difference and Repetition. The paper seeks thereby to explicate Deleuze's dialectics or theory of Ideas, his approach to the principle of sufficient reason, and the concept of the virtual itself.

In this article I critically assess Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza’s metaphysics of modes. I argue that the conception of modal essence that Deleuze attributes to Spinoza is untenable in terms of Spinoza’s metaphysics. I further show that the idea that modal essences are eternally static degrees of power is incompatible with Spinoza’s ethics, wherein modes strive to increase their power by means of positive interactions with others. I suggest that Deleuze’s interpretation of this crucial aspect of Spinozism runs the risk of reinstating Platonic idealist and moralistic themes, of the kind that both Spinoza and Deleuze are committed to overcoming.

In this paper I argue that Vatter’s proposed solution to the problem of thanatopolitics in the development of a concept of eternal life is inadequate. In the first section I situate Vatter’s project, sketching out Foucault’s concept of biopolitics and marking Vatter’s specific difference from others working to articulate an affirmative biopolitics in contemporary discussions. In the second section I argue, following Foucault and Mbembe, that the possibility of a thanatopolitics or necropolitics that institutes regimes of mass death by racist fragmentations of the population is a possibility intrinsic to biopolitics as such. In the third section I reconstruct Vatter’s proposal, according to which the thanatopolitical inversion can be blocked by developing an atheistic and philosophical concept of eternal life. I argue that this is inadequate for three reasons: first, the specifically contemplative character of the life Vatter proposes as eternal seems to valorize only a particular form of life; second, the transfinite character of living as such which is valorized in this conception seems to repeat, rather than repudiate, the logic of thanatopolitics; third, this concept of life as eternal seems not to be able to account for the reality of extinction.

ABSTRACT In this article I challenge a common reading of Benedict de Spinoza’s political philosophy, which holds that since his metaphysics is entirely positive or affirmative, his politics must be affirmative as well. In the first part, I show how this interpretation is found in the works of Gilles Deleuze and Antonio Negri. In the second part, I show that the negative has no ontological reality in Spinoza’s metaphysics. In the third, building on the work of Alexandre Matheron, I show that there is nevertheless real and unavoidable negativity in Spinozist politics, and that according to Spinoza, sad passions and repression must lie at the heart of any political society.