•  101
    The Qualitative Thesis
    Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    The Qualitative Thesis says that if you are not sure that ¬φ, then you are sure of the indicative conditional φ > ψ just in case you are sure of the material conditional φ ⊃ ψ. We argue that The Qualitative Thesis provides compelling reasons to accept a thesis that we call Conditional Locality, which says, roughly, that the interpretation of an indicative conditional depends, in part, on the conditional’s local embedding environment. In the first part of the paper, we present an argument—due to …Read more
  •  540
    Counterfactual Probability
    Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    Stalnaker's Thesis about indicative conditionals is, roughly, that the probability one ought to assign to an indicative conditional equals the probability that one ought to assign to its consequent conditional on its antecedent. The thesis seems right. If you draw a card from a standard 52-card deck, how confident are you that the card is a diamond if it's a red card? To answer this, you calculate the proportion of red cards that are diamonds -- that is, you calculate the probability of drawing…Read more
  •  220
    How Strong Is a Counterfactual?
    Journal of Philosophy 118 (7): 373-404. 2021.
    The literature on counterfactuals is dominated by strict accounts and variably strict accounts. Counterexamples to the principle of Antecedent Strengthening were thought to be fatal to SA; but it has been shown that by adding dynamic resources to the view, such examples can be accounted for. We broaden the debate between VSA and SA by focusing on a new strengthening principle, Strengthening with a Possibility. We show dynamic SA classically validates this principle. We give a counterexample to i…Read more
  •  223
    I Believe I Can φ
    In Thomas Brochhagen, Floris Roelofsen & Nadine Theiler (eds.), Proceedings of the 20th Amsterdam Colloquium, . pp. 256-265. 2015.
    We propose a new analysis of ability modals. After briefly criticizing extant approaches, we turn our attention to the venerable but vexed conditional analysis of ability ascriptions. We give an account that builds on the conditional analysis, but avoids its weaknesses by incorporating a layer of quantification over a contextually supplied set of actions.
  •  623
    Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism
    Mind 127 (507): 863-879. 2018.
    Epistemic Permissivists face a special problem about the relationship between our first- and higher-order attitudes. They claim that rationality often permits a range of doxastic responses to the evidence. Given plausible assumptions about the relationship between your first- and higher-order attitudes, it can't be rational to adopt a credence on the edge of that range. But Permissivism says that, for some such range, any credence in that range is rational. Permissivism, in its traditional f…Read more
  •  395
    Agentive Modals
    Philosophical Review 126 (3): 301-343. 2017.
    This essay proposes a new theory of agentive modals: ability modals and their duals, compulsion modals. After criticizing existing approaches—the existential quantificational analysis, the universal quantificational analysis, and the conditional analysis—it presents a new account that builds on both the existential and conditional analyses. On this account, the act conditional analysis, a sentence like ‘John can swim across the river’ says that there is some practically available action that is …Read more