The newsroom routine prescribing that public interest disagreements be covered in a balanced fashion is a cornerstone of informative journalism, particularly in the Anglo-American world. Balanced reporting has been frequently criticised by journalism and communication scholars on multiple grounds; most notoriously, for its tendency to devolve into false balance, whereby a viewpoint conflict is improperly portrayed as a dispute between epistemic equals. Moreover, a widely shared intuition is that…
Read moreThe newsroom routine prescribing that public interest disagreements be covered in a balanced fashion is a cornerstone of informative journalism, particularly in the Anglo-American world. Balanced reporting has been frequently criticised by journalism and communication scholars on multiple grounds; most notoriously, for its tendency to devolve into false balance, whereby a viewpoint conflict is improperly portrayed as a dispute between epistemic equals. Moreover, a widely shared intuition is that peddlers of false balance are deserving of blame. This seems right; if the charge is to stick, however, we need a more detailed understanding of exactly why falsely balanced journalism is so problematic. This article fills some of these gaps by drawing on discussions in argumentation theory, to reconstruct the kind of inferential pattern set off by balanced reporting; social epistemology, to examine the kind of evidence produced by tokens of this format; and theories of pragmatic enrichment, to identify the mechanisms leading recipients to unwarranted conclusions about the reported topic.
