Gordon Globus

The focus here is on the neglected, simply accepted, quotidian world, rather than the much-discussed consciousness. Contra common sense and science both, any actual independent external world out there is here denied. World is conceived instead as a _continual creation_ on the part of each quantum thermofield brain in parallel, which is “triply-tuned”: by sensory input, by memory and by self-tuning. Such a brain does not primarily process information—does not compute—but through its multiple tunability achieves an internal match in which a world is disclosed, even though there is no world out there, only objects under quantum description at microscopic, mesoscopic and macroscopic scales. This unconventional formulation revives a version of monadology via quantum brain theory. ER -

The field of consciousness studies is 'deconstructed' in terms of etymology, definition, and the deep involvement of perceptual consciousness in two persistently controversial areas: the hard problem of qualia and the measurement problem in quantum physics. An alternative to perceptual consciousness is developed within the framework of dissipative quantum thermofield brain dynamics: disclosure. Like consciousness, disclosure is constrained by sensory action, 'self-action' , and memory. The problematics of consciousness/brain, qualia, and measurement in quantum physics are resolved by substituting disclosure for perceptual consciousness and distinguishing the phenomenal brainp from the macroscopic quantum object brainq. This proposal would narrow consciousness studies to the cognitive and reflexive, and opens the possibility of what might be called 'existential studies'

Heidegger has provided a profound account of human existence in terms of the to-be-da. Even though Heidegger disregarded its brain machine basis (and even though brain scientists disregard Heidegger), the issue of the Dasein's machine basis is raised by the empirically extremely well confirmed “supervenience” of the Dasein on the brain. Since the Turing machine will not do as basis for the Dasein, as Dreyfus has shown, contemporary functionalism cannot resolve the issue. Instead an “existential functionalism,” which looks to some other kind of machine than the computer, is called for. A machine that continuously tunes filters on input and that detects any match between abstract properties of the input flux and filter specifications was considered. A match points to those tuning rules whose abstract conditions have been satisfied by input, and the rules thus selected are enabled to generate their own fulfillment through mechanisms that can presently be only speculated about. Such a machine cannot sustain direct perception but is “methodologically solipsistic.” At the most general level of description, the wet machine that provides a supervenience base for the Dasein is to be considered a “windowless monad.”

The well-known symbol of the Tao is freshly interpreted in terms of dissipative quantum thermofield brain dynamics. The primary duality of the Tao is between two dynamical modes of operation. The secondary duality within each mode of the Tao symbolizes creation and annihilation operations. The relation between the dual modes is 'intrinsic' in that these modes do not exist independently of their relationship. What is ontologically primary is the dual modes belonging-together in the 'between-two'. Three sources of constraint on the between-two are considered: sensory input, intention and 're-traces' of recognitions. 'Awareness', 'subjectivity', 'intentionality' and 'world' are located in the dissipative thermofield framework. On this interpretation the Tao symbol's composure is monadological

This book results from a group meeting held at the Institute for Scientific Exchange in Torino, Italy. The central aim was for scientists to think together in new ways with those in the humanities inspired by quantum theory and especially quantum brain theory. These fields of inquiry have suffered conceptual estrangement but now are ripe for rapprochement, if academic parochialism is put aside. A prevalent theme of the book is a moving away from individual elements and individual actors acting upon each other, toward a coordinate hermeneutic dynamics that manifests as a coherent totality. Among the topics covered are image in photography and in neuroscience; language; time; brain and mathematics; quantum brain dynamics and quantum communication."

If the brain has a level of quantum functioning that permits superposition of possibilities and nonlocal control of states, then new answers to the problem of the consciousness/brain relation become available. My discussion is based on Yasue and co-workers’ account of a quantum field theory of brain functioning, called ‘quantum brain dynamics’. In the framework developed each person can properly state: ‘I am nonlocal control and my meanings are control variables.’ Cognition is identified with a conjugate reality and perception is where quantum cognition, quantum memory and the quantum re-presentation of quantum reality meet and make a conjugate match. A new problem arises with regard to the world, however, since on this interpretation the one world-in-common is relinquished in favour of multiple parallel world-thrownnesses. But since quantum physics remains to this day deeply uncommonsensical, we should not hope to provide quantum solutions in consciousness studies without overturning the deepest convictions of common sense

A possible relation between Derrida's deconstruction of metaphysics and connectionism is explored by considering diffeacuterance in neural nets terms. First diffeacuterance, as the crossing of Saussurian difference and Freudian deferral, is modeled and then the fuller 'sheaf of diffeacuterance is taken up. The metaphysically conceived brain has two versions: in the traditional computational version the brain processes information like a computer and in the connectionist version the brain computes input vector to output vector transformations non-symbolically. The 'deconstructed brain' neither processes information nor computes functions but is spontaneously economical.

Biological foundations of the psychoneural identity hypothesis are explicated and their implications discussed. “Consciousness per se” and phenomenal contents of consciousness per se are seen to be identical with events in the brain in accordance with Leibniz's Law, but only informationally equivalent to neural events as observed. Phenomenal content potentially is recoverable by empirical means from observed neural events, but the converse is not possible. Consciousness per se is identical with events which do not represent anything distal to sensory receptor-transducer systems. Thus, on the psychoneural identity hypothesis, consciousness per se comprises directly physical events-in-themselves rather than being a Euclidean representation of physical events as is the case for phenomenal content. After comparing consciousness per se to “onta,” a paradox is suggested: rather than being irreducible to physical reality, consciousness per se is the only experience congruent with the ultimate nature of physical reality as conceived by contemporary physics.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.3 (2005) 229-234 [Access article in PDF] Nonlinear Dynamics at the Cutting Edge of Modernity: A Postmodern View Gordon Globus Keywords nonlinear dynamics, modernity, postmodernity, quantum brain theory, free will, self-organization, autopoiesis, autorhoesis Although nonlinear dynamical conceptu-alizations have been applied to psychia-try for over 20 years,1 they have not had significant impact on the field. Unfortunately Heinrichs' very thoughtful contribution to the discussion is unlikely to move such disinterest. Pragmatically successful paradigms in the phase of Kuhnian "normal science" are highly resistant to change. There is no crisis that besets triumphalist biological psychiatry that might lead to clinical or scientific revolution. At the same time, as I suggest at the end of this commentary, the ideas of nonlinear dynamics may not be revolutionary enough, remaining staunchly within the framework of modernity.In what follows I discuss four issues related to Heinrichs' article. First, I try to enrich his presentation of nonlinear dynamics by bringing in the role of self-organization in the evolution of nonlinear dynamical brain systems and by making the nonlinear dynamics "tunable." Second, I discuss whether Heinrichs succeeds in avoiding the dualism of the biopsychosocial model that he criticizes. Third, I look at the issue of "free will," which Heinrichs would understandably like to avoid. Finally, I mention a new form of dynamics, namely thermofield dynamics, which I think is more promising than nonlinear dynamics. Self-Organizing Self-Tuning Nonlinear Dynamical Systems In the case of psychiatry, we are not considering nonlinear dynamical systems like the weather or an ecosystem, but the brain's neural networks in terms of nonlinear dynamics with all its chaos. There is a principle of such systems of neural networks that Heinrichs does not bring out, although it is extremely important for them. These systems are self-organizing under a Hamiltonian principle of "least energy." To use Hopfield and Tank's (1986) terms, nonlinear dynamical neural networks self-organize toward attractors that minimize the "computational energy" of the system, or for Smolensky (1988), self-organize toward "harmony," or for Globus (1995, 2003), in a Heideggerian vein, self-organize to maximize "belonging-together." In this elaborated framework, rational deliberation is one constraint among many on a self-organizing nonlinear dynamical process. [End Page 229]Heinrichs brings out beautifully the nonlinear dynamical way of thinking clinically. This is not the dynamics of mechanistic psychodynamics, which features psychological forces in vectorial conflict—id versus superego and their compromises—but a flowing evolution of states in which small changes in initial state may have large effects (nonlinearity) on the state trajectory. To live a life is often to feel surprise, which nonlinear dynamics with its chaotic regimes well portrays.But there is a way that classical Freud and nonlinear dynamical neural networks do come together—in the "economics," discharges and conservations of libidinal energy, expenditures and credits in Derrida's (1978) accounting. Heinrichs does not mention this similarity. The economic principles differ between Freud's late nineteenth-century thermodynamics and Heinrichs' late twentieth-century nonlinear dynamics, it is true, but it is all economics.Freud called this economic functioning the "pleasure principle" in which "libido" seeks to discharge its instinctual energy store, reducing the level of instinctual tension. This "primary process" proceeds to an attractor by the quickest, most direct way possible, whereas the "secondary process" defers reduction in instinctual tension, subjecting the primary process to thought. Self-organizing directly to the attractor is the primary process with which the secondary process interferes, introducing deferral.The economy of nonlinear dynamics pictures a "landscape," a variegated topography with peaks and valleys. Each point on the topography represents a state. Peak points are repellors—for example, states in which the phobic object is approached—and the lowest points of the valleys are attractors—for example, obsessions and compulsions. The path of occupied states self-organizes away from repellors and toward attractors. This topography is an energy landscape. Its dynamics spontaneously tends—"self-organizes"—toward least energy/high-constraint satisfaction. Freud's pleasure principle is just the Hamiltonian least energy...

Freud considered dreams to be compositions of past waking experiences but this theory is untenable: (1) the process of compositing disparate memories into the seamless dream life is miraculous, and (2) authentically novel dream worlds are experienced. Dennett makes dreams into purely cognitive affairs, a matter of scripts, denying their perceptual appearing. I suggest that dreams are de novo constructions of actual perceptual worlds, not put together from memory scraps. Implications for waking perception are considered.

Biological foundations of the psychoneural identity hypothesis are explicated and their implications discussed. "Consciousness per se" and phenomenal contents of consciousness per se are seen to be identical with events in the (unobserved) brain in accordance with Leibniz's Law, but only informationally equivalent to neural events as observed. Phenomenal content potentially is recoverable by empirical means from observed neural events, but the converse is not possible. Consciousness per se is identical with events which do not represent anything distal to sensory receptor-transducer systems. Thus, on the psychoneural identity hypothesis, consciousness per se comprises directly physical events-in-themselves rather than being a Euclidean representation of physical events as is the case for phenomenal content. After comparing consciousness per se to "onta," a paradox is suggested: rather than being irreducible to physical reality, consciousness per se is the only experience congruent with the ultimate nature of physical reality as conceived by contemporary physics