Gordon Pettit

The conditions of moral responsibility include having the right kind and amount of control over actions, events or states of affairs that are morally significant. Both metaphysical issues and normative concerns are relevant, and these are extensively intertwined. This dissertation proposes a framework for an original theory of moral responsibility. The idea that rational autonomy is required for moral responsibility is developed and defended. I clarify various aspects of rationality and the nature of autonomy in the context of my topic. I also address the important but infrequently discussed relation between views about the nature of morality and one's claims about the conditions for moral responsibility. I describe a form of moral objectivism assumed in my arguments, and argue that this assumption is not a disadvantage. ;Considerations about moral responsibility are often overly influenced by Frankfurt-style examples , and I provide an analysis of FSEs. I defend the position that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition for moral responsibility, despite a pervasive denial of this claim. I argue that if we carefully specify the events for which agents are morally responsible, we find that FSE-based arguments fail to show that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility. I contrast my theory with two recent theories of moral responsibility that I believe are the most successful: the Guidance Control Theory of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza and the Reason View of Susan Wolf. ;Finally, I evaluate restrictivism, the position that something required for moral responsibility---the ability to do otherwise---is very rare. I argue that the best restrictivist argument is unsound and the most plausible revisions of the argument also fail. I conclude that people often have the ability to do otherwise if they have it at all, and there are no good reasons to adhere to restrictivism

Arguments for Restrictivism – the position that we are rarely free– have been proposed by incompatibilists Peter van Inwagen and David Vander Laan among others. This article is concerned much more with these arguments than with quantifying the frequency of free actions. There are two general ways to argue for restrictivism. First, one may take a Negative Strategy, arguing that the situations in which one is not free are common and predominant. Second, one may focus on situations in which one is apparently free, and argue directly that these situations are rare – the Inventory Strategy. I conclude that both types of arguments for restrictivism are unconvincing.

The problem of evil has been raised as a problem for any monotheist who has traditional beliefs about God. The belief that God exists and is omniscient) omnipotent, and omnibenevolent has been claimed to be inconsistent with the existence of evil. Though philosophical theists have provided successful defenses against the problem of evil, few if any, have given an adequate explanation of the existence of evil that is considered plausible on a specific belief system. In this thesis I explore the contributions that Christian theism makes toward resolving the problem of evil. I divide the problem into four areas and argue that the origin of evil must be addressed if an adequate response to the problem of evil is to be identified. I also argue that since the existence of evil is to be expected on a traditional Christian belief system, inductive arguments that claim the existence of evil makes it improbable that the Christian God exists fail

On February 28, 2002, John Dominic Crossan gave a very well-organized and entertaining presentation for the Annual Mary Olive Woods Lecture and was well received by the large audience. His talk should spark continued interest in who is likely the most influential person ever to walk the earth. He condensed three lectures into one as he spoke of the materials, methods, and results of his historical research into the life of Jesus. The materials mentioned were the canonical Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. (Although throughout his research, Crossan relies very heavily on other texts such as the Gospel of Peter and the Gospel of Thomas, he did not mention these as material resources; see related comments below.) The bulk of his talk focused on the methods, in which he described an idealized version of what an anthropologist, an historian, and an archeologist would have to say about the early First Century Palestine, especially Galilee, if they knew nothing of the four gospels. The results are the ideas that Jesus taught primarily about the kingdom of God and used that as a basis for nonviolent resistance to the Roman Empire. The primary ministry of the historical Jesus is that of a social reformer, with political overtones. Pilate saw the threat that Jesus posed to the authority of the Romans, and had him executed because of that threat. Jesus brought “sociosomatic” healing to individuals, and encouraged his companions (not disciples) to do likewise. For an idea of what Crossan has in mind when he speaks of sociosomatic healing, think of the maturation of the main character in Good Will Hunting. With humor and a lively presentation, Crossan provided much useful and interesting information in his lecture and the discussion that followed.

The article explores the difference between something being merely extremely improbable but believable and something being literally incredible–unbelievably improbable without intervention of some sort. In the former case, a rational person would not expect a special explanation for the occurrence, but in the latter, she does. John Leslie and Peter van Inwagen have proposed principles that can be used to distinguish the two types of cases. The weaknesses of their principles are shown and a revised principle is proposed that is more suited for the task.

In contrast to the most common view, I argue that one can consistently affirm that fundamental moral principles are objective and invariable, and yet are dependent on God. I explore and reject appealing to divine simplicity as a basis for affirming this conjunction. Rather, I develop the thesis that God is identical to the Good (the Identity View or IV) and argue that the IV does not fall to the criticisms of simplicity. I then consider a divine will theory (DWT) that claims moral principles are grounded in God’s will. When the IV is conjoined with a DWT, there is reason to affirm an objective, theistically based ethics. The IV and DWT proposed here are models and while I attempt to increase their plausibility, I do not argue for their truth. The IV conjoined with a moral theory such as DWT explains the dependence of moral principles on God, while allowing for objectivity since morality is rooted in the eternal unchanging standard of the Good.

Frankfurt-style examples (FSEs) cast doubt on the initially plausible claim that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility. Following the lead of Peter van Inwagen and others, I argue that if we are careful in distinguishing events by causal origins, then we see that FSEs fail to show that one may be morally responsible for x, yet have no alternatives to x. I provide reasons for a fine-grained causal origins approach to events apart from the context of moral responsibility, and respond to the objection that moral responsibility depends on abstract entities other than events. In response to John Martin Fischer and others, I argue that the alternatives available in recent FSEs are robust enough for moral responsibility. If one thinks that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition for moral responsibility, the FSEs give no reason to relinquish this belief