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Value perception, properties, and the primary bearers of valueIn Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception, Oxford University Press. 2018.
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26Propositional and credal accuracy in an indeterministic worldSynthese 199 (3-4): 9391-9410. 2021.It is truism that accuracy is valued. Some deem accuracy to be among the most fundamental values, perhaps the preeminent value, of inquiry. Because of this, accuracy has been the focus of two different, important programs in epistemology. The truthlikeness program pursued the notion of propositional accuracy—an ordering of propositions by closeness to the objective truth of some matter. The epistemic utility program pursued the notion of credal state accuracy—an ordering of credal states by clos…Read more
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16Fitting Attitudes, Finkish Goods, and Value AppearancesOxford Studies in Metaethics 11. 2016.According to Fitting Attitude theorists, for something to possess a certain value it is necessary and sufficient that it be fitting to take a certain attitude to the bearer of that value. This seems obvious for thick evaluative attributes, but less obvious for thin evaluative attributes. This chapter argues that the fitting response to the thin evaluative attributes of states is desire. The good is what it is fitting to desire, the bad what it is fitting to be averse to, and the better what it i…Read more
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552What Accuracy Could Not BeBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2): 551-580. 2019.Two different programmes are in the business of explicating accuracy—the truthlikeness programme and the epistemic utility programme. Both assume that truth is the goal of inquiry, and that among inquiries that fall short of realizing the goal some get closer to it than others. Truthlikeness theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of propositions. Epistemic utility theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of credal states. Both assume we can make cognitiv…Read more
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44Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking, by Cuneo, Terence: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. xiv + 259, £35 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3): 602-605. 2016.
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TruthlikenessIn Martin P. Curd (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, . pp. 478--488. 2008.
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674The Fictionalist’s Attitude ProblemEthical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5): 485-498. 2007.According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational but its metaphysical presuppositions are wildly implausible. This is the basis of Mackie's now famous error theory: that moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that Mackie's approach can be vindicated by a fictionalist account of moral…Read more
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218Act and value: Expectation and the representability of moral theoriesTheoria 57 (1-2): 42-76. 1991.According to the axiologist the value concepts are basic and the deontic concepts are derivative. This paper addresses two fundamental problems that arise for the axiologist. Firstly, what ought the axiologist o understand by the value of an act? Second, what are the prospects in principle for an axiological representation of moral theories. Can the deontic concepts of any coherent moral theory be represented by an agent-netural axiology: (1) whatever structure those concepts have and (2) whatev…Read more
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69The logic of freedom and responsibilityStudia Logica 41 (n/a): 227. 1982.The aim of this paper is to offer a rigorous explication of statements ascribing ability to agents and to develop the logic of such statements. A world is said to be feasible iff it is compatible with the actual past-and-present. W is a P-world iff W is feasible and P is true in W (where P is a proposition). P is a sufficient condition for Q iff every P world is a Q world. P is a necessary condition for Q iff Q is a sufficient condition forP. Each individual property S is shown to generate a rul…Read more
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13Alan Goldman. Reasons from Within: Desires and Values (review)Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (3): 473-476. 2012.
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37Scrumptious FunctionsGrazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1): 137-156. 2001.The taste of this particular chunk of fresh pineapple, the one which I am just now eating, is scrumptious. That taste is something the chunk has in common with other such chunks, like the one I had a few seconds ago and the one I will have in a few seconds time. The taste of this pineapple chunk is thus a feature, a property, which this and various other chunks of pineapple share. Now, intuitively at least, no purely mathematical entity, like a function, is scrumptious. Hence a property, like th…Read more
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66Recombinant valuesPhilosophical Studies 106 (3). 2001.An attractive admirer of George Bernard Shaw once wrote to him with a not-so modest proposal: ``You have the greatest brain in the world, and I have the most beautiful body; so we ought to produce the most perfect child.'' Shaw replied: ``What if the child inherits my body and your brains?''What if, indeed? Shaw's retort is interesting not because it revealsa grasp of elementary genetics, but rather because it suggests his grasp of an interesting and important principle of axiology. Since the br…Read more
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47Justice, Ethics, and New Zealand Society (edited book)Oxford University Press. 1992.What is sovereignty? Was it ceded to the Crown in the Treaty of Waitangi? If land was unjustly confiscated over a century ago, should it be returned? Is an ecosystem valuable in itself, or only because of its value to people? Does a property right entail a right to destroy? Can collectives (such as tribes) bear moral responsibility? Do they have moral rights? If so, what are the implications for the justice system? These questions are essentially philosophical, yet all thoughtful New Zealanders …Read more
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79Desire and the Good: in search of the right fitIn Deonna J. & Lauria F. (eds.), The Nature of Desire, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.I argue for an evaluative theory of desire—specifically, that to desire something is for it to appear, in some way or other, good. If a desire is a non-doxastic appearance of value then it is no mystery how it can rationalize as well as cause action. The theory is metaphysically neutral—it is compatible with value idealism (that value reduces to desire), with value realism (that it is not so reducible), and with value nihilism (all appearances of value are illusory). Despite this metaphysical ne…Read more
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39Value RealismIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
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67Act and MaximPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1): 71-92. 1993.Suppose that the value of each act of compliance with some maxim is lower than the value of each act of non-compliance, even though maxim-compliance overall would be best for the agent. In such a case we have what I will call value-discrepancy between act and maxim. While the value of overall maxim-compliance is high, no particular act of compliance with the maxim seems to be worth it. Consequentialism is the thesis that the rightness of an option is determined by the comparative value of that o…Read more
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158The content, consequence and likeness approaches to verisimilitude: compatibility, trivialization, and underdeterminationSynthese 190 (9): 1647-1687. 2013.Theories of verisimilitude have routinely been classified into two rival camps—the content approach and the likeness approach—and these appear to be motivated by very different sets of data and principles. The question thus naturally arises as to whether these approaches can be fruitfully combined. Recently Zwart and Franssen (Synthese 158(1):75–92, 2007) have offered precise analyses of the content and likeness approaches, and shown that given these analyses any attempt to meld content and like…Read more
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51Value and DesiresIn Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory, Oxford University Press Usa. 2015.Are things good because we desire them or do we desire them because they are good? Theories that countenance only desire-dependent values are idealist, those that countenance desire-independent values are realist. A value can be either subject-relative or subject-neutral. Subjectivism countenances only subject-relative and desire-dependent values. Subject-neutral idealism countenances at least some subject-neutral values. Realism repudiates the dependence of value on actual desires, but endorses…Read more
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The consequences of actionsIn J. Copeland (ed.), Logic and Reality, Oxford University Press. pp. 273-99. 1996.
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1On a dogma concerning realism and incommensurabilityIn R. Nola (ed.), Relativism and Realism in Science, Reidel. pp. 169-293. 1988.
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91Hume, the BAD Paradox, and Value RealismPhilo 4 (2): 109-122. 2001.A recent slew of arguments, if sound, would demonstrate that realism about value involves a kind of paradox-I call it the BAD paradox.More precisely, they show that if there are genuine propositions about the good, then one could maintain harmony between one’s desires and one’s beliefs about the good only on pain of violating fundamental principles of decision theory. I show. however, the BAD paradox turns out to be a version of Newcomb’s problem, and that the cognitivist about value can avoid t…Read more
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396A refutation of Peircean idealismIn Cheyne C. (ed.), Rationality and Reality, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 155-66. 2006.
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157Verisimilitude by power relationsBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1): 129-135. 1990.A number of different theories of truthlikeness have been proposed, but most can be classified into one of two different main programmes: the probability-content programme and the likeness programme.1 In Brink and Heidema [1987] we are offered a further proposal, with the attraction of some novelty. I argue that while the heuristic path taken by the authors is rather remote from what they call ‘the well-worn paths’,2 in fact their point of arrival is rather closer to existing proposals within th…Read more
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68Miller's so-called paradox of informationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (3): 253-261. 1979.
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69Supervenience, goodness, and higher-order universalsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (1). 1991.Supervenience theses promise ontological economy without reducibility. The problem is that they face a dilemma: either the relation of supervenience entails reducibility or it is mysterious. Recently higher-order universals have been invoked to avoid the dilemma. This article develops a higher-order framework in which this claim can be assessed. It is shown that reducibility can be avoided, but only at the cost of a rather radical metaphysical proposal.
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