Grant Goodrich

An adolescent’s last moment of life is an emotionally and medically complex time. Children may grapple with understanding the things happening to them and with grief of a future lost; caregivers struggle to simultaneously balance deep sorrow, hope, and love; and healthcare providers fight to maintain sound medical and ethical decision making. Increased discussion regarding adolescent end-of-life care is needed so that clinicians may better understand how to engage in ethically based medical management during these events. This holds particularly true in situations where potentially conflicting ideas exist between clinicians and family members. We describe the case of an acutely and terminally ill adolescent who remained cognitively intact but with rapidly advancing multiple organ failure and whose parents requested that he remain uninformed of his critical illness and prognosis.

Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1852–1936) is widely regarded as the father of modern comparative psychology. Yet, Morgan initially had significant doubts about whether a genuine science of comparative psychology was even possible, only later becoming more optimistic about our ability to make reliable inferences about the mental capacities of non-human animals. There has been a fair amount of disagreement amongst scholars of Morgan’s work about the nature, timing, and causes of this shift in Morgan’s thinking. We argue that Morgan underwent two quite different shifts of attitude towards the proper practice of comparative psychology. The first was a qualified acceptance of the Romanesian approach to comparative psychology that he had initially criticized. The second was a shift away from Romanes’ reliance on systematizing anecdotal evidence of animal intelligence towards an experimental approach, focused on studying the development of behaviour. We emphasize the role of Morgan’s evolving epistemological views in bringing about the first shift – in particular, his philosophy of science. We emphasize the role of an intriguing but overlooked figure in the history of comparative psychology in explaining the second shift, T. Mann Jones, whose correspondence with Morgan provided an important catalyst for Morgan’s experimental turn, particularly the special focus on development. We also shed light on the intended function of Morgan’s Canon, the methodological principle for which Morgan is now mostly known. The Canon can only be properly understood by seeing it in the context of Morgan’s own unique experimental vision for comparative psychology.