•  1405
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a…Read more
  •  637
    Consciousness, intentionality, and intelligence: Some foundational issues for artificial intelligence
    Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12 (3): 263-277. 2000.
  •  465
    " -- "New Scientist" Intended for anyone attempting to find their way through the large and confusingly interwoven philosophical literature on consciousness, ..
  •  448
    Some foundational problems in the scientific study of pain
    Philosophy of Science Supplement 69 (3): 265-83. 2002.
    This paper is an attempt to spell out what makes the scientific study of pain so distinctive from a philosophical perspective. Using the IASP definition of ‘pain’ as our guide, we raise a number of questions about the philosophical assumptions underlying the scientific study of pain. We argue that unlike the study of ordinary perception, the study of pain focuses from the very start on the experience itself and its qualities, without making deep assumptions about whether pain experiences are per…Read more
  •  250
    Consciousness, conceivability arguments, and perspectivalism: The dialectics of the debate
    Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1-2): 99-122. 2001.
  •  102
    Consciousness: What it is, how to study it, what to learn from its history
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1): 30-51. 1995.
    This article is a version of the first half of an introduction to an anthology on consciousness. It is aimed at tracing the study of consciousness in psychology roughly since psychology pulled itself apart from philosophy as an independent discipline in the late nineteenth century. The second half, which will appear as a sequel to the present article, will cover the various philosophical problems involving consciousness, and trace the consciousness debate to date. The two articles are intended a…Read more
  •  101
    On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1): 151-153. 1997.
    We argue that Block's charge of fallacy remains ungrounded so long as the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. This, in turn, depends on establishing the existence of “phenomenal properties” that are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block leaves this fundamental thesis unsubstantiated. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and …Read more
  •  70
    Problems of consciousness: A perspective on contemporary issues, current debates
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (2): 112-43. 1995.
    This article is the second and final part of a general introduction to the concept, history, and problems of consciousness. The first was an overview of the study of consciousness in the history of psychology; this essay attempts to lay out the contemporary problems of consciousness and uncover their philosophical foundations. Together they serve as a prelude to the forthcoming special issue `Explaining Consciousness -- The Hard Problem'
  •  58
    Varieties of zombiehood
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4): 326-33. 1995.
    On the basis of distinguishing three different kinds of zombies , I argue that Moody's argument against the conscious inessentialism thesis and physicalism is invalid, and comparatively analyse similarities as well as differences between two responses to Moody: Flanagan & Polger and Dennett
  •  51
    Believing that the enterprise of constructing "artificial intelligence" transcends the bounds of any one discipline, the editors of Mechanical Bodies, Computational Minds have brought together researchers in AI and scholars in the humanities to reexamine the fundamental assumptions of both areas. The AI community, for example, could benefit from explorations of human intelligence and creativity by philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, literary critics, and others, while analysis of AI's …Read more
  •  32
    Consciousness Resurrected
    Philosophy Now 36 14-16. 2002.
  •  3
    The many faces of consciousness: A field guide
    In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Mit Press. pp. 1-345. 1997.
    This dissertation argues for a "bundle thesis" of phenomenal consciousness: that the ways things seem to subjects are constituted by bundles of representational and functional properties. I argue that qualia are determined not only by intrinsic properties, but also by relational properties to other bodily and mental states . The view developed on the basis of this claim is called "phenomenal holism." ;Part I examines the current literature on phenomenal consciousness, sorting out various concept…Read more
  • Consciousness: A philosophical tour
    with Owen J. Flanagan
    In M. Ito, Y. Miyashita & Edmund T. Rolls (eds.), Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness, Oxford University Press. 1997.