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801Ignorance of Linguistics: A Note on Michael Devitt’s Ignorance of LanguageCroatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1): 21-34. 2009.Michael Devitt has argued that Chomsky, along with many other Linguists and philosophers, is ignorant of the true nature of Generative Linguistics. In particular, Devitt argues that Chomsky and others wrongly believe the proper object of linguistic inquiry to be speakers' competences, rather than the languages that speakers are competent with. In return, some commentators on Devitt's work have returned the accusation, arguing that it is Devitt who is ignorant about Linguistics. In this note, I c…Read more
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630Surveying the factsIn John Collins & Tamara Dobler (eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception, Oup. 2018.
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611Conflicting Grammatical AppearancesCroatian Journal of Philosophy 21 (3): 403-426. 2007.I explore one apparent source of conflict between our naïve view of grammatical properties and the best available scientific view of grammatical properties. That source is the modal dependence of the range of naïve, or manifest, grammatical properties that is available to a speaker upon the configurations and operations of their internal systems—that is, upon scientific grammatical properties. Modal dependence underwrites the possibility of conflicting grammatical appearances. In response to tha…Read more
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596Prospects for a truth-conditional account of standing meaningIn Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning, Walter De Gruyter. 2012.
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558A Plea for UnderstandingIn Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in the Philosophy of Language, Palgrave. 2009.
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332Enough is Enough: Austin on KnowingIn Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays, Cambridge University Press. 2017.
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318Linguistic understanding and knowledgeNoûs 42 (1). 2008.Is linguistic understanding a form of knowledge? I clarify the question and then consider two natural forms a positive answer might take. I argue that, although some recent arguments fail to decide the issue, neither positive answer should be accepted. The aim is not yet to foreclose on the view that linguistic understanding is a form of knowledge, but to develop desiderata on a satisfactory successor to the two natural views rejected here.
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308Reading Philosophy of Language: Selected Texts with Interactive Commentary (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2005.Designed for readers new to the subject,_ Reading Philosophy of Language_ presents key texts in the philosophy of language together with helpful editorial guidance. A concise collection of key texts in the philosophy of language Ideal for readers new to the subject. Features seminal texts by leading figures in the field, such as Austin, Chomsky, Davidson, Dummett and Searle. Presents three texts on each of five key topics: speech and performance; meaning and truth; knowledge of language; meaning…Read more
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173Some Models of Linguistic UnderstandingThe Baltic International Yearbook 5 (1): 7. 2009.I discuss the conjecture that understanding what is said in an utterance is to be modelled as knowing what is said in that utterance. My main aim is to present a number of alter- native models, as a prophylactic against premature acceptance of the conjecture as the only game in town. I also offer preliminary assessments of each of the models, including the propositional knowledge model, in part by considering their respective capacities to sub-serve the transmission of knowledge through testimon…Read more
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172You and mePhilosophical Explorations 17 (3): 289-303. 2014.Are there distinctively second-personal thoughts? I clarify the question and present considerations in favour of a view on which some second-personal thoughts are distinctive. Specifically, I suggest that some second-personal thoughts are distinctive in also being first-personal thoughts. Thus, second-personal thinking provides a way of sharing another person's first-personal thoughts
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167Review: Robert J. Matthews: The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution (review)Mind 117 (466): 494-500. 2008.
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144IV—Sharing Thoughts About OneselfProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1): 57-81. 2013.This paper is about first‐person thoughts—thoughts about oneself that are expressible through uses of first‐person pronouns. It is widely held that first‐person thoughts cannot be shared. My aim is to postpone rejection of the more natural view that such thoughts about oneself can be shared. I sketch an account on which such thoughts can be shared and indicate some ways in which deciding the fate of the account will depend upon further work.
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132Comprehending speechPhilosophical Perspectives 22 (1): 339-373. 2008.What is the epistemological role of speech perception in comprehension? More precisely, what is its role in episodes or states of comprehension able to mediate the communication of knowledge? One answer, developed in recent work by Tyler Burge, has it that its role may be limited to triggering mobilizations of the understanding. I argue that, while there is much to be said for such a view, it should not be accepted. I present an alternative account, on which episodes of comprehension are better …Read more
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106The ordinary and the experimental: Cook Wilson and Austin on method in philosophyBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5): 939-960. 2018.To what extent was ordinary language philosophy a precursor to experimental philosophy? Since the conditions on pursuit of either project are at best unclear, and at worst protean, the general question is hard to address. I focus instead on particular cases, seeking to uncover some central aspects of J. L. Austin’s and John Cook Wilson’s ordinary language based approach to philosophical method. I make a start at addressing three questions. First, what distinguishes their approach from other more…Read more
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104John Cook Wilson on the indefinability of knowledgeEuropean Journal of Philosophy 30 (4): 1547-1564. 2022.Can knowledge be defined? We expound an argument of John Cook Wilson's that it cannot. Cook Wilson's argument connects knowing with having the power to inquire. We suggest that if he is right about that connection, then knowledge is, indeed, indefinable.
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94Understanding what was saidSynthese 195 (2): 815-834. 2018.On the most prominent account, understanding what was said is always propositional knowledge of what was said. I develop a more minimal alternative, according to which understanding is sometimes a distinctive attitude towards what was said—to a first approximation, entertaining what was said. The propositional knowledge account has been supported on the basis of its capacity to explain testimonial knowledge transmission. I argue that it is not so supported.
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87Austin’s Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method, by Mark KaplanMind 129 (513): 323-331. 2020._ Austin’s Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method _, by KaplanMark. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 192.
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81Where should we look for the mind?Think 2 (5): 45-50. 2003.Is your mind in your head? The answer, surprisingly, may be . Guy Longworth sets out the philosophical case for accepting that our minds extend much further into the world than that
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77Demystifying MeaningPhilosophical Papers 30 (2): 145-167. 2001.Abstract Some philosophers find linguistic meaning mysterious. Two approaches suggest themselves for removing the felt mystery, or demystifying meaning. One involves providing a substantive account of meaning in meaning-free terms. Although this approach has come under serious attack in recent years, Paul Horwich has recently presented a version of the approach that might be thought impervious. A preliminary attempt is made to argue that Horwich's version is vulnerable to the considerations felt…Read more
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76Faith in KantIn Paul Faulkner & Thomas W. Simpson (eds.), The Philosophy of Trust, Oup. 2017.Cooperation threatens to become rationally problematic insofar as the following conditions hold: reliance has a worst outcome—we rely and the other proves unreliable; the interaction is one-off; and we are ignorant of the other’s particular motivations but recognize a general motivation to be unreliable. The problem is that the satisfaction of these conditions is commonplace. Thus cooperation should be much less common than it in fact is. So what explains it? This chapter considers and rejects v…Read more
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75Illocution and understandingInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.What are the connections between the successful performance of illocutionary acts and audience understanding or uptake of their performance? According to one class of proposals, audience understanding suffices for successful performance. I explain how those proposals emerge from earlier work and seek to clarify some of their interrelations.
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67The Philosophy of J. L. Austin, edited by Martin Gustafsson and Richard Sørli (review)Mind 123 (491): 917-920. 2014.
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57Timothy Williamson. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xi + 340 (review)SATS 3 (1): 135-139. 2002.
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49Moore on the sceptical philosopherThink 20 (57): 69-87. 2021.1. Since I don't know who you are, dear reader, and since I know that some people don't have hands, I don't know whether you have hands. Probably you do, but knowing that something is probable is rarely, if ever, a way of knowing that thing. By contrast, I know that I have hands. Let me check. Yes, here is one of my hands; and here is another. Since I know that here is one of my hands and that here is another, and since I know that it follows from those two claims that I have hands, I can deduce…Read more
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