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Fairness and risk attitudesPhilosophical Studies 180 (10-11): 3179-3204. 2023.According to a common judgement, a social planner should often use a lottery to decide which of two people should receive a good. This judgement undermines one of the best-known arguments for utilitarianism, due to John C. Harsanyi, and more generally undermines axiomatic arguments for utilitarianism and similar views. In this paper we ask which combinations of views about (a) the social planner’s attitude to risk and inequality, and (b) the subjects’ attitudes to risk are consistent with the af…Read more
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Beyond Uncertainty: Reasoning with Unknown PossibilitiesCambridge University Press. 2021.
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What is "real" in Probabilism?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3): 573-587. 2017.
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What calibrating variable-value population ethics suggestsEconomics and Philosophy 1-12. forthcoming.Variable-Value axiologies avoid Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion while satisfying some weak instances of the Mere Addition principle. We apply calibration methods to two leading members of the family of Variable-Value views conditional upon: first, a very weak instance of Mere Addition and, second, some plausible empirical assumptions about the size and welfare of the intertemporal world population. We find that such facts calibrate these two Variable-Value views to be nearly totalist, and therefor…Read more
H. Orri Stefansson
Stockholm University
Institute for Futures Studies
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Swedish Collegium for Advanced StudyPro Futura Scientia Fellow
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Institute for Futures StudiesAdvisor (Part-time)
Stockholm, Sweden
Areas of Specialization
2 more
Decision Theory |
Population Ethics |
Philosophy of Economics |
Normative Ethics |
Decision Theory and Ethics |
Formal Epistemology |
Climate Change |