Some forty years ago, Norman Malcolm and Charles Hartshorne, philosophers from two distinctive schools of thought, championed, independently of each other, a form of ontological argument based on chapter III of Anselm’s Proslogion as well as on various chapters of Reply to Gaunilo.1 While different aspects of the argument are emphasized by Malcolm and Hartshorne, this second form of the ontological argument hinges on the following two points: (1) necessary existence is constitutive of the concep…
Read moreSome forty years ago, Norman Malcolm and Charles Hartshorne, philosophers from two distinctive schools of thought, championed, independently of each other, a form of ontological argument based on chapter III of Anselm’s Proslogion as well as on various chapters of Reply to Gaunilo.1 While different aspects of the argument are emphasized by Malcolm and Hartshorne, this second form of the ontological argument hinges on the following two points: (1) necessary existence is constitutive of the concept of God,2 and (2) therefore, in understanding the concept of God, one understands that God necessarily exists in fact or in actuality. Whereas Malcolm vacillates between affirming only (1) and both (1) and (2),3 Hartshorne affirms both (1) and (2); however, he holds that Anselm’s formulation of the actual existence of God is somewhat confused. My argument here is that while (1) has some sense, (2) is a confusion arising from confounding the logical or conceptual existence of God with the actual existence of God.4