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5The Social Institution of Discursive Norms (edited book)Routledge. 2021.The essays in this collection explore the idea that discursive norms-the norms governing our thought and talk-are profoundly social. Not only do these norms govern and structure our social interactions, but they are sustained by a variety of social and institutional structures. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. The first offers historical perspectives on discursive norms, including a chapter by Robert Brandom on the way Hegel transformed Kant's normativist approach to repres…Read more
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40The Social Institution of Discursive Norms: Historical, Naturalistic, and Pragmatic Perspectives (edited book)Routledge. 2021.The essays in this collection explore the idea that discursive norms--the norms governing our thought and talk--are profoundly social. Not only do these norms govern and structure of social interactions, but they are sustained by a variety of social and institutional structures. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. The first offers historical perspectives on discursive norms, including a chapter by Robert Brandom on the way Hegel transformed Kant's normativist approach to repre…Read more
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8Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents (edited book)Springer. 2013.The contributions gathered in this volume present the state of the art in key areas of current social ontology. They focus on the role of collective intentional states in creating social facts, and on the nature of intentional properties of groups that allow characterizing them as responsible agents, or perhaps even as persons. Many of the essays are inspired by contemporary action theory, emotion theory, and theories of collective intentionality. Another group of essays revisits early phenomeno…Read more
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9Self-Evaluation – Affective and Social Grounds of Intentionality (edited book)Springer. 2011.The book contains contributions by leading figures in philosophy of mind and action, emotion theory, and phenomenology. As the focus of the volume is truly innovative we expect the book to sell well to both philosophers and scholars from neighboring fields such as social and cognitive science. The predominant view in analytic philosophy is that an ability for self-evaluation is constitutive for agency and intentionality. Until now, the debate is limited in two (possibly mutually related) ways: F…Read more
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23From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity: Heidegger’s Anyone and Contemporary Social Theory (edited book)Springer Verlag. 2017.This edited volume offers a new approach to understanding social conventions by way of Martin Heidegger. It connects the philosopher's conceptions of the anyone, everydayness, and authenticity with an analysis and critique of social normativity. Heidegger’s account of the anyone is ambiguous. Some see it as a good description of human sociality, others think of it as an important critique of modern mass society. This volume seeks to understand this ambiguity as reflecting the tension between the…Read more
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Volksgeist”. Individuum und Kollektiv bei Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903)Dialektik: Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie 16 (1). 2005.
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28Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality (edited book)Springer. 2021.This edited volume examines the relationship between collective intentionality and inferential theories of meaning. The book consists of three main sections. The first part contains essays demonstrating how researchers working on inferentialism and collective intentionality can learn from one another. The essays in the second part examine the dimensions along which philosophical and empirical research on human reasoning and collective intentionality can benefit from more cross-pollination. T…Read more
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49The subject of “We intend”Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2): 231-243. 2018.This paper examines and compares the ways in which intentions of the singular kind and the plural kind are subjective. Are intentions of the plural kind ours in the same way intentions of the singular kind are mine? Starting with the singular case, it is argued that “I intend” is subjective in virtue of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is special in that it is self-identifying, self-validating, self-committing, and self-authorizing. Moving to the plural form, it is argued that in spite of apparent…Read more
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9Vom Sprechen zum Hirn und zurück: Searle im ÜberblickDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 50 (3). 2002.
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The Sense of Ability and the Phenomenology of Action.In Anita Konzelmann & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Self-Evaluation. Affective and Social Grounds of Intentionality, Springer. pp. 215-236. 2011.
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1Wir-Intentionalität – Jenseits von Individualismus und KollektivismusDialektik: Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie 12. 2001.
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14Vertrauen im GemeinschaftshandelnIn Karl Mertens & Jörn Müller (eds.), Die Dimension des Sozialen: Neue Philosophische Zugänge Zu Fühlen, Wollen Und Handeln, De Gruyter. pp. 287-312. 2014.
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1Wir-Intentionalitat. Kritik des ontologischen Individualismus und Rekonstruktion der GemeinschaftRivista di Storia Della Filosofia 63 (1): 201. 2008.
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49Schwerpunkt: Kollektive Intentionalität und gemeinsames HandelnDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 55 (3): 404-408. 2007.
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45The Guise of the Bad in Augustine’s Pear TheftEthical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1): 71-89. 2018.In the second book of his Confessions, Augustine of Hippo presents his famous juvenile Pear Theft as an apparent case of acting under the guise of the bad. At least since Thomas Aquinas’ influential interpretation, scholars have usually taken Augustine’s detailed discussion of the case to be dispelling this “guise of the guise of the bad”, and to offer a solid “guise of the good”-explanation. This paper addresses an important challenge to this view: Augustine offers two different “guise of the g…Read more
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Schwierigkeiten mit dem Wir-Sagen. Überlegungen gegen und mit Heidegger.Berliner Debatte Initial 13 (1). 2002.
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1Trust Beyond BeliefIn Beatrice Kobow, Hans Bernhard Schmid & Michael Schmitz (eds.), The Background of Institutional Reality, Springer. 2013.
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21The Idiocy of Strategic Reasoning. Towards an Account of Consensual ActionAnalyse & Kritik 33 (1): 35-56. 2011.Practical reasoning is an agent's capacity to determine her course of behavior on the base of some evaluation of available alternatives. Reasoning is instrumental insofar as an agent decides over available alternatives by aiming to choose the best means to realize her own goals. Reasoning is strategic if the agent assumes that what the best means to realize her own goals is depends on what other agents will do. Strategic reasoning still plays a central role in influential accounts of social acti…Read more
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6Dass Edmund Husserl am Problem der Intersubjektivität gescheitert ist, gilt als ausgemacht - und ebenso, welche Konsequenzen daraus zu ziehen sind. Entgegen dem allenthalben pauschal erklärten `Abschied vom Subjekt' spricht aber vieles dafür, dass es in der gegenwärtigen Sozialtheorie eher um eine Reformulierung transzendentaler Subjektivität geht. Diese Interpretationsthese wirft ein neues Licht auf den sozialtheoretischen Diskurs, der im deutschen Sprachraum in den vergangenen dreissig Jahren …Read more
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2The Feeling of Being a Group. Towards a Phenomenology of Corporate EmotionsIn Mikko Salmela (ed.), Shared Emotions., Oxford University Press. 2013.
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4Table of ContentsIn Hans Bernhard Schmid, Christoph Henning & Dieter Thomä (eds.), Social Capital, Social Identities: From Ownership to Belonging, De Gruyter. 2014.
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Social Reality – The Phenomenological ApproachIn Alessandro Salice & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality, Springer Verlag. 2016.
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246Plural self-awarenessPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1): 7-24. 2014.It has been claimed in the literature that collective intentionality and group attitudes presuppose some “sense of ‘us’” among the participants (other labels sometimes used are “sense of community,” “communal awareness,” “shared point of view,” or “we-perspective”). While this seems plausible enough on an intuitive level, little attention has been paid so far to the question of what the nature and role of this mysterious “sense of ‘us’” might be. This paper states (and argues for) the following …Read more
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36‘Nostrism’: Social Identities in Experimental GamesAnalyse & Kritik 27 (1): 172-187. 2005.In this paper it is argued that a) altruism is an inadequate label for human cooperative behavior, and b) an adequate account of cooperation has to depart from the standard economic model of human behavior by taking note of the agents' capacity to see themselves and act as team-members. Contrary to what Fehr et al. seem to think, the main problem of the conceptual limitations of the standard model is not so much the assumption of sel shness but rather the atomistic conception of the individual. …Read more
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38Plural ActionPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (1): 25-54. 2008.In this paper, I distinguish three claims, which I label individual intentional autonomy, individual intentional autarky, and intentional individualism. The autonomy claim is that under normal circumstances, each individual's behavior has to be interpreted as his or her own action. The autarky claim is that the intentional interpretation of an individual's behavior has to bottom out in that individual's own volitions, or pro-attitudes. The individualism claim is weaker, arguing that any interpre…Read more
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University of ViennaRegular Faculty