•  690
    How Can Mathematical Objects Be Real but Mind-Dependent?
    In Jakub Mácha & Herbert Hrachovec (eds.), PLATONISM: Contributions of the 43rd International Wittgenstein Symposium., Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 159-161. 2022.
    Taking mathematics as a language based on empirical experience, I argue for an account of mathematics in which its objects are abstracta that describe and communicate the structure of reality based on some of our ancestral interactions with their environment. I argue that mathematics as a language is mostly invented. Nonetheless, in being a general description of reality it cannot be said that it is fictional; and as an intersubjective reality, mathematical objects can exist independent of any o…Read more
  •  366
    I present a general metaphysical framework for any formal system that works with truth-values. To establish such a framework, I start with the notion of absolute nothingness, from which I construct a nothingness which is akin to the notion of an empty set in mathematics. Then I provide a formal system that its ability to produce symbols is an integral property and an inseparable part of its metaphysics.