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794Inductive risk and values in sciencePhilosophy of Science 67 (4): 559-579. 2000.Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the "external" parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how …Read more
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662From Tapestry to Loom: Broadening the Perspective on Values in SciencePhilosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (8). 2018.After raising some minor philosophical points about Kevin Elliott’s A Tapestry of Values (2017), I argue that we should expand on the themes raised in the book and that philosophers of science need to pay as much attention to the loom of science (i.e., the institutional structures which guide the pursuit of science) as the tapestry of science. The loom of science includes such institutional aspects as patents, funding sources, and evaluation regimes that shape how science gets pursued, and that …Read more
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452State of the Field: Why novel prediction mattersStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4): 580-589. 2013.There is considerable disagreement about the epistemic value of novel predictive success, i.e. when a scientist predicts an unexpected phenomenon, experiments are conducted, and the prediction proves to be accurate. We survey the field on this question, noting both fully articulated views such as weak and strong predictivism, and more nascent views, such as pluralist reasons for the instrumental value of prediction. By examining the various reasons offered for the value of prediction across a ra…Read more
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428Resisting the Great Endarkenment: On the Future of PhilosophyPhilosophical Inquiries 2 (6): 93-106. 2018.Elijah Millgram’s book The Great Endarkenment takes philosophy to task for failing to note the kinds of creatures we are (serial hyperspecializers) and what that means for philosophy. In this commentary, I will complicate the picture he draws, while suggesting a more hopeful path forward. First, I argue that we are not actually serial hyperspecializers. Nevertheless, we are hyperspecializers, and this is the main source of the looming endarkenment. I will suggest that a proper understanding of e…Read more
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414The Irreducible Complexity of ObjectivitySynthese 138 (3). 2004.The terms ``objectivity'''' and ``objective'''' are among the mostused yet ill-defined terms in the philosophy of science and epistemology. Common to all thevarious usages is the rhetorical force of ``I endorse this and you should too'''', orto put it more mildly, that one should trust the outcome of the objectivity-producing process.The persuasive endorsement and call to trust provide some conceptual coherenceto objectivity, but the reference to objectivity is hopefully not merely an attemptat …Read more
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289The Value of Cognitive ValuesPhilosophy of Science 80 (5): 796-806. 2013.Traditionally, cognitive values have been thought of as a collective pool of considerations in science that frequently trade against each other. I argue here that a finer-grained account of the value of cognitive values can help reduce such tensions. I separate the values into groups, minimal epistemic criteria, pragmatic considerations, and genuine epistemic assurance, based in part on the distinction between values that describe theories per se and values that describe theory-evidence relation…Read more
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268Science, Policy, and the Value-Free IdealUniversity of Pittsburgh Press. 2009.Douglas proposes a new ideal in which values serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but where the role values play is constrained at key points, protecting the integrity and objectivity of science.
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229Reintroducing prediction to explanationPhilosophy of Science 76 (4): 444-463. 2009.Although prediction has been largely absent from discussions of explanation for the past 40 years, theories of explanation can gain much from a reintroduction. I review the history that divorced prediction from explanation, examine the proliferation of models of explanation that followed, and argue that accounts of explanation have been impoverished by the neglect of prediction. Instead of a revival of the symmetry thesis, I suggest that explanation should be understood as a cognitive tool that …Read more
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213Although a strict dichotomy between facts and values is no longer accepted, less attention has been paid to the roles values should play in our acceptance of factual statements, or scientific descriptive claims. This paper argues that values, whether cognitive or ethical, should never preclude or direct belief on their own. Our wanting something to be true will not make it so. Instead, values should only be used to consider whether the available evidence provides sufficient warrant for a claim. …Read more
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208Rethinking the Conceptual Space for Science in Society after the VFIPhilosophy of Science. 2023.Replacing the value-free ideal (VFI) for science requires attention to the broader understanding of how science in society should function. In public spaces, science needed to project the VFI in norms for science advising, science education, and science communication. This resulted in the independent science advisor model and a focus on science literacy for science education and communication. Attending to these broader implications of the VFI which structure science and society relationships i…Read more
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207Pure science and the problem of progressStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46 55-63. 2014.How should we understand scientific progress? Kuhn famously discussed science as its own internally driven venture, structured by paradigms. He also famously had a problem describing progress in science, as problem-solving ability failed to provide a clear rubric across paradigm change—paradigm changes tossed out problems as well as solving them. I argue here that much of Kuhn’s inability to articulate a clear view of scientific progress stems from his focus on pure science and a neglect of appl…Read more
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186Weighing Complex Evidence in a Democratic SocietyKennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (2): 139-162. 2012.Weighing complex sets of evidence (i.e., from multiple disciplines and often divergent in implications) is increasingly central to properly informed decision-making. Determining “where the weight of evidence lies” is essential both for making maximal use of available evidence and figuring out what to make of such evidence. Weighing evidence in this sense requires an approach that can handle a wide range of evidential sources (completeness), that can combine the evidence with rigor, and that can …Read more
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177The Moral Terrain of ScienceErkenntnis 79 (S5): 1-19. 2014.The moral terrain of science, the full range of ethical considerations that are part of the scientific endeavor, has not been mapped. Without such a map, we cannot examine the responsibilities of scientists to see if the institutions of science are adequately constructed. This paper attempts such a map by describing four dimensions of the terrain: (1) the bases to which scientists are responsible (scientific reasoning, the scientific community, and the broader society); (2) the nature of the res…Read more
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156Science in a Democratic Society by Philip Kitcher (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4). 2013.
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154The Moral Responsibilities of Scientists (Tensions between Autonomy and Responsibility)American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1). 2003.
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144Boundaries between Science and PolicyEnvironmental Philosophy 2 (1): 14-29. 2005.In the debate over the role of science in environmental policy, it is often assumed that science can and should be clearly demarcated from policy. In this paper, I will argue that neither is the case. The difficulty of actually differentiating the scientific arena from the policy arena becomes apparent the moment one attempts to actually locate the boundary. For example, it is unclear whether scientific summaries to be used by regulatory agencies are in the realm of science or policy. If science…Read more
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108Prediction, explanation, and dioxin biochemistry: Science in public policy (review)Foundations of Chemistry 6 (1): 49-63. 2004.
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106Engagement for progress: applied philosophy of science in contextSynthese 177 (3): 317-335. 2010.Philosophy of science was once a much more socially engaged endeavor, and can be so again. After a look back at philosophy of science in the 1930s-1950s, I turn to discuss the current potential for returning to a more engaged philosophy of science. Although philosophers of science have much to offer scientists and the public, I am skeptical that much can be gained by philosophers importing off-the-shelf discussions from philosophy of science to science and society. Such efforts will likely look …Read more
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98Robert Crease and Evan Selinger: The Philosophy of Expertise (review)Philosophy of Science 74 (4): 552-555. 2007.
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93Science, Policy, Values: Exploring the NexusPerspectives on Science 24 (5): 475-480. 2016.The importance of science for guiding policy decisions has been an increasingly central feature of policy-making for much of the past century. But which science we have available to us and what counts as adequate science for policy-making shapes substantially the specific impact science has on policy decisions. Policy influences which science we pursue and how we pursue it in practice, as well as how science ultimately informs policy. Values inform our choices in these areas, as values shape the…Read more
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76Book symposium on expertise: Philosophical reflections by Evan Selinger automatic press/vip, vince inc. Press 2011Philosophy and Technology 26 (1): 93-109. 2013.
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75Fraud from the frontlines: the importance of being nice Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9492-2 Authors Heather Douglas, Department of Philosophy, University of Tennessee at Knoxville, 815 McClung Tower, Knoxville, TN 37996-0480, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796
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49Hugh Lacey, _Is Science Value Free?: Values & Scientific Understanding_ . Routledge (1999), xiv + 285 pp., $90.00 (cloth) (review)Philosophy of Science 69 (2): 379-406. 2002.
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41Addressing the Reproducibility Crisis: A Response to HudsonJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (2): 201-209. 2022.In this response to Robert Hudson’s article, “Should We Strive to Make Science Bias-Free? A Philosophical Assessment of the Reproducibility Crisis,” we identify three ways in which he misrepresents our work: he conflates value-ladenness with bias; he describes our view as one in which values are the same as evidential factors; and he creates a false dichotomy between two ways that values could be considered in science for policy. We share Hudson’s concerns about promoting scientific reproducibil…Read more
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38‘She Knew What was Expected of Her’: The White Legal System’s Encounter with Traditional MarriageFeminist Legal Studies 13 (2): 181-203. 2005.A recent case in the Northern Territory of Australia has raised the issues of intra-racial rape and the legal recognition of traditional marriages between Indigenous people. The defendant in the Jamilmira case was charged with statutory rape of a 15-year-old girl. He argued that the girl’s status as his promised wife should lead to mitigation of his sentence. Members of the Northern Territory judiciary and others in the community were divided in their response to his claim. Ultimately the case l…Read more
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34Book Review Kevin Elliott , Is a Little Pollution Good for You? Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011), 264 pp., $65.00 (review)Philosophy of Science 79 (3): 425-428. 2012.
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31Science, Values, and CitizensIn Marcus P. Adams, Zvi Biener, Uljana Feest & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (eds.), Eppur Si Muove: Doing History and Philosophy of Science with Peter Machamer: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Peter Machamer, Springer. 2017.Science is one of the most important forces in contemporary society. The most reliable source of knowledge about the world, science shapes the technological possibilities before us, informs public policy, and is crucial to measuring the efficacy of public policy. Yet it is not a simple repository of facts on which we can draw. It is an ongoing process of evidence gathering, discovery, contestation, and criticism. I will argue that an understanding of the nature of science and the scientific proc…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
General Philosophy of Science |
Areas of Interest
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
General Philosophy of Science |