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6O que é que se sente diante de σοφία? amor cristão, amor pagão, amores avulsosFilosofia E Educação 14 (3): 141-161. 2024.O seguinte ensaio escrito em texto corrido é uma breve apresentação da Filosofia do Amor no Cristianismo e na Antiguidade Clássica. Partimos do pressuposto que a palavra ‘filosofia’ tem uma dívida não apenas etimológica, mas conceitual com as definições de Amor, de forma que se faz pertinente uma investigação mais detida sobre o assunto. Começamos então com a interpretação cristã de C.S. Lewis sobre a Afeição, Amizade, Eros e Caridade para em seguida introduzir a visão pagã greco-romana. Concluí…Read more
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2Na abund'ncia das intuições Filosofia experimental negativa e a orientação do pensamentoAnalytica. Revista de Filosofia 20 (2): 101-115. 2017.This work explores the impact of negative X-Phi in the philosophical practice of relying on intuitions. After analyzing how intuitions work, their different types and how they orient thought, I argue that there are several interesting ways for philosophy to deal with the abundance of intuitions that sometimes are in conflict. The emerging image is one where philosophy responds directly or indirectly to truth and doesn't have in intuitions its sole evidential basis.Resumo: O texto explora o impac…Read more
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3Meus aspectos favoritos do ensino de filosofiaRevista Sul-Americana de Filosofia E Educação 1. 2011.A partir da perspectiva do entrecruzamento entre dimensões políticas, educacionais e filosóficos do ensino da filosofia, o texto discute a importância da dissolução de fronteiras entre a filosofia, a educação, a política e a ciência para a análise do ensino da filosofia.
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13Porchat, a diaphonía e o torvelinho do fenômeno no neopirronismoDiscurso 50 (2): 169-180. 2020.Neste texto examino algumas consequências da afirmação de Porchat de que o fenômeno no neopirronismo não precisa ser precisamente definido. Ao deixar o fenômeno variar ao sabor das circunstâncias, a abordagem de Porchat então parece deixar um dos elementos da dupla articulação que forma a epokhé neopirronista — a aceitação do fenômeno sem que ele comande crenças e que forma um par com a suspensão do juízo acerca do que não é fenômeno — imerso em imprecisões e, com isso, a posição neopirronista v…Read more
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28The Road from Leibniz to WhiteheadProcess Studies 49 (2): 234-253. 2020.This article is an attempt to compare the monadological multitude in Leibniz with Whitehead's view of process and the present. Some contemporary philosophers are considered in the effort to understand the monadologies of these two thinkers.
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5Horizonte e irredutibilidade: Eudoro de Sousa e o originário na ontologiaArchai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 8 109-114. 2012.
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5Horizonte e irredutibilidade: Eudoro de Sousa e o originário na ontologiaArchai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 8 109-114. 2012.
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21Horizonte e irredutibilidade: Eudoro de Sousa e o originário na ontologiaArchai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 8 109-114. 2012.
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27Towards an Indexical Paradoxico-MetaphysicsOpen Philosophy 1 (1): 155-172. 2018.This paper sketches a metaphysical view according to which the furniture of the universe is made of indexicals. The view draws from work in the philosophy of language and thought concerning demonstratives, proper names and other deictic operations. It also draws on Levinas‘ conception of the Other as beyond any substantive description. Indexicalism, as I call it, is compared with object-oriented views such as Harman‘s and Garcia‘s. Indexicalism lapses into paradox concerning totality and proves …Read more
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1498Qualia Qua Qualitons: Mental Qualities as Abstract ParticularsActa Analytica 26 (2): 155-163. 2011.In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept acquisition that takes the presen…Read more
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8Beats and beingRhuthmos. forthcoming.This presentation has been performed in the conference “Performance Philosophy,” University of Surrey, Guilford in 2013. In the original, parts that are here in bold have been struck out by the author but unfortunately this website does not support strikethrough characters. We are sorry for the inconvenience. Tic. Right now. Tac. Something irrupts. At this moment. Something takes place. Something occupies the place. Something takes over the place. The place where things happen. The land of - Phi…Read more
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313Soft facts: Thinking practices and the architecture of realityDaimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 61 7-21. 2014.It is common to criticize the idea of objectivity by claiming that we cannot make sense of any cognitive contact with the world that is not constituted by the very materials of our thinking, and to conclude that the idea must be abandoned and that the world is ‘well lost’. We resist this conclusion and argue for a notion of objectivity that places its source within the domain of thoughts by proposing a conception of facts, akin to McDowell’s, as thinkable while independent of any act of thinking…Read more
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438Sense and Sensibility Educated: A Note on Experience and (Minimal) EmpiricismInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5): 741-747. 2012.McDowell’s minimal empiricism holds that experience, understood as providing conceptually articulated contents, plays a role in the justification of our beliefs. We question this idea by contrasting the role of perceptual experience in moral and non-moral judgments and conclude that experience per se is irrelevant in the former case and should also be so in the latter one: only with the help of adequate beliefs experience can provide a connection with the world. We conclude with some remarks con…Read more
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15When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal EnoughTheoria 22 (1): 35-41. 2009.Richard Moran has defended the need for two modes of access to our mental contents, a first-personal and a third-personal one. In this paper we maintain that, in the moral case, an excess of concentration on the a third-personal perspective precludes accounting for our responsibility over our own beliefs and our capacity to normatively respond to the world.
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27Você Pode Duvidar de Tudo por Algum Tempo. Você Pode Duvidar de Algumas Coisas por Todo o Tempo. Mas, Pode Você Duvidar de Tudo, Todo o Tempo?Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 6 (2). 2002.In this paper I consider two related threats to the idea that our beliefs compose a genuine worldview the global skeptic challenge to the clam that our beliefs are somehow grounded and the suspicion that our beliefs have no relation to the world whatsoever I consider these two threats from the point of view of our activity of doubting m order to establish what follows from our capacity to doubt any claim although not at once I argue that the two threats can be dispelled if we attend to a careful…Read more
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43When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal EnoughTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1): 35-41. 2007.Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal —through avowal— the other third-personal —no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions— is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own belief…Read more
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271Seeing Qualitons as Qualia: A Dialogue with Wittgenstein on Private Experience, Sense Data and the Ontology of MindPapers of the 33rd International Wittgenstein Symposium. 2013.In this paper we put forward the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. Further, we maintain that Wittgenstein hints in this direction. We also find in Wittgenstein elements of an account of language acquisition that takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition. We conclude by pointing out some difficulties of this view.
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33The registrar and the register: on Anerkennung and ÉcritureTrans/Form/Ação 35 (3): 97-112. 2012.
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727Schaffer (2010) argues that the internal relatedness of all things, no matter how it is conceived, entails priority monism. He claims that a sufficiently pervasive internal relation among objects implies the priority of the whole, understood as a concrete object. This paper shows that at least in the case of an internal relatedness of all things conceived in terms of physical intentionality - one way to understand dispositions - priority monism not only doesn't follow but also is precluded. We c…Read more
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El escéptico como despertador para sueños en tercera personaTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1): 68-74. 2009.
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43Sobre o que Não Aparece (ao Neopirrônico)Discurso 23 53-70. 1994.O artigo critica a posição filosófica neopirrônica defendida por Oswaldo Porchat Pereira (Porchat 5). Argumentamos que uma de suas noções básicas, a de fenômeno, carece de uma definição apropriada. Além disso, mostramos que o neopirronismo abre as portas para o irracionalismo e que a ciência moderna traz problemas para essa postura
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21O intellectus com os pés na res - externismo E o ponto de partida da justificaçãoPhilósophos - Revista de Filosofia 10 (2). 2005.A imagem de que restrições do mundo às nossas crenças e enunciados não são internas ao pensamento parece motivar a separação entre verdades de razão e verdades de fato. Esta separação parece ser crucial para entendermos argumentos em favor de certas versões de externismo. Neste texto, depois de considerar como pode ser feita a separação entre verdades de fato e verdades de razão, apresento uma distinção entre duas formas de externismo e defendo uma delas. Termino recomendando uma específica abor…Read more
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153When my own beliefs are not first-personal enoughTheoria 22 (1): 35-41. 2007.Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal —through avowal— the other third-personal —no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions— is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own belief…Read more
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26Pode Deus determinar o valor de pi? (Ou, pensar na objetividade depois de Hegel e Wittgenstein)Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 48 (115): 47-66. 2007.
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68Minimal empiricism without dogmasPhilosophia 35 (2): 197-206. 2007.John McDowell has defended a position called minimal empiricism, that aims to avoid the oscillation between traditional empiricism’s commitment to a set of contents working as external justifiers for our system of beliefs and a coherentist position where our thought receives no constraint from the world. We share McDowell’s dissatisfaction with both options, but find his minimal empiricism committed to the idea of a tribunal of experience where isolated contents are infused into our network of i…Read more
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16Como levar estados mentais a sério (epifenômenos e fingimentos)Manuscrito 25 (3): 79-88. 2002.Kim recomenda uma forma de fisicalismo que seria, segundo ele, a única alternativa fisicalista para evitar o epifenomenalismo. Neste trabalho, mostro que esta alternativa não é viável: o fisicalismo de Kim também não consegue lidar de maneira satisfatória com o problema da causação mental. Considerando algumas características da simulação de estados mentais e a motivação para entendermos as propriedades mentais como separáveis das físicas, esboço uma maneira de pensar nos estados mentais que evi…Read more