•  664
    Naturalism and intuitions
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1): 27-49. 2007.
    This paper examines the relationship between methodological naturalism and the standard practice within philosophy of constructing theories on the basis of our intuitions about imaginary cases, especially in the work of Alvin Goldman. It is argued that current work in cognitive science presents serious problems for Goldman's approach.
  •  425
    Epistemic normativity
    Synthese 94 (3). 1993.
    This paper examines the source and content of epistemic norms. In virtue of what is it that epistemic norms have their normative force? A semantic approach to this question, due to Alvin Goldman, is examined and found unacceptable. Instead, accounts seeking to ground epistemic norms in our desires are argued to be most promising. All of these accounts make epistemic norms a variety of hypothetical imperative. It is argued that such an account may be offered, grounding our epistemic norms in desi…Read more
  •  345
    Knowledge in humans and other animals
    Philosophical Perspectives 13 327-346. 1999.
    This paper defends an approach to epistemology which treats the study of knowledge as on a par with the study of natural kinds. Knowledge is seen as a natural phenomenon subject to empirical investigation. In particular, it is argued that work in cognitive ethology is relevant to understanding the nature of knowledge, and that this approach sheds light on traditional philosophical questions about knowledge, including questions about the source of epistemic normativity.
  •  328
  •  290
    What reflective endorsement cannot do
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1): 1-19. 2010.
    We sometimes stop to reflect on our mental states, and such reflection can lead, at times, to changing our minds. It can, as well, lead us to endorse the very attitudes which we previously held. Such reflective endorsement has been called upon to play a wide range of roles in philosophical theorizing. It has been thought to ground a distinction between two fundamentally different kinds of knowledge: reflective knowledge and mere animal knowledge. It has been thought to serve as a ground for …Read more
  •  232
    Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2001.
    This anthology brings together ten papers which have defined and advanced the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology
  •  214
    Jonathan Vogel has presented a disturbing problem for reliabilism. 1 Reliabilists claim that knowledge is reliably produced true belief. Reliabilism is, of course, a version of externalism, and on such a view, a knower need have no knowledge, no justified belief, indeed, no conception that his or her belief is reliably produced. It is the fact that the knower's true belief is reliably produced which makes it a case of knowledge, not any appreciation of this fact. But Vogel now argues that reliab…Read more
  •  212
    Beyond foundationalism and the coherence theory
    Journal of Philosophy 77 (10): 597-612. 1980.
  •  210
    Knowledge and its Place in Nature
    Oxford University Press. 2002.
    Hilary Kornblith argues for a naturalistic approach to investigating knowledge. Knowledge, he explains, is a feature of the natural world, and so should be investigated using scientific methods. He offers an account of knowledge derived from the science of animal behavior, and defends this against its philosophical rivals. This controversial and refreshingly original book offers philosophers a new way to do epistemology.
  •  203
    Knowledge and Its Place in Nature
    Philosophical Review 115 (2): 246-251. 2006.
  •  198
    Timothy Williamson's the philosophy of philosophy
    Analysis 69 (1): 109-116. 2009.
    Timothy Williamson's new book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, has a number of central themes. The very idea that philosophy has a method which is different in kind from the sciences is one Williamson rejects. “… the common assumption of philosophical exceptionalism is false. Even the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori turns out to obscure underlying similarities”. Although Williamson sees the book as “a defense of armchair philosophy”, he also argues that “the differences in su…Read more
  •  196
    Testimony, memory and the limits of the a priori
    Philosophical Studies 86 (1): 1-20. 1997.
    A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle that we …Read more
  •  187
  •  179
    The metaphysical status of knowledge
    Philosophical Issues 17 (1). 2007.
  •  162
    The metaphysics of irreducibility
    Philosophical Studies 63 (August): 125-45. 1991.
    During the 'sixties and 'seventies, Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, and Richard Boyd, among others, developed a type of materialism that eschews reductionist claims.1 In this view, explana- tions, natural kinds, and properties in psychology do not reduce to counterparts in more basic sciences, such as neurophysiology or physics. Nevertheless, all token psychological entities-- states, processes, and faculties--are wholly constituted of physical entities, ultimately out of entities over which microph…Read more
  •  144
    Sosa in perspective
    Philosophical Studies 144 (1): 127--136. 2009.
    Ernest Sosa draws a distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, and this distinction forms the centerpiece of his new book, A Virtue Epistemology . This paper argues that the distinction cannot do the work which Sosa assigns to it.
  •  143
    The role of reasons in epistemology
    Episteme 12 (2): 225-239. 2015.
    The notion of a reason often plays a central role in epistemological theories. Justification is often explained in terms of the having of appropriate reasons, and a variety of epistemological distinctions are most naturally explained, it seems, by adverting to reasons. This paper examines the extent to which we may, instead, make do without appeal to such a notion. It is argued that the extent to which the notion of a reason should play an important role in epistemological theorizing will depend…Read more
  •  140
    Introspection and misdirection
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (4). 1989.
    Internalist theories of justification put introspection to work in service of the task of error detection. Introspecting to determine whether our beliefs are well-supported by reasons is supposed to reveal where it is that our beliefs fail to measure up to appropriate standards. Internalists do not, however, offer any empirical evidence that introspection can constructively play this role. This chapter examines relevant evidence from social psychology about the way in which introspection actu…Read more
  •  139
    Distrusting reason
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1). 1999.
    The activity of reason-giving plays an important role in our intellectual lives. Some philosophers, however, have expressed a deep distrust of this activity. This chapter examines the grounds for such distrust and argues that it deserves a far more serious hearing than it is typically given. There are important cases in which the very activity of reason giving should be called into question, but the kinds of challenges to reason giving which are most concerning are, it is argued, ones which d…Read more
  •  133
    What is it like to be me?
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1): 48-60. 1998.
    Introspection plays an ineliminable role in affording us with self-knowledge, or so it is widely believed. It is argued here that introspective evidence, by itself, is often insufficient to ground reasonable belief about many of our mental states, and the knowledge we do have of much of our mental life is crucially dependent on other sources.
  •  132
    Naturalizing Epistemology (edited book)
    Mass.: Mit Press. 1985.
    explores the interaction between psychology and epistemology and addresses empirical questions about how we should arrive at our beliefs, and whether the processes by which we arrive at our beliefs are the ones by which we ought to arrive at our beliefs
  •  130
    Naturalistic Epistemology and Its Critics
    Philosophical Topics 23 (1): 237-255. 1995.
  •  116
    Can Internalism Be Saved?
    Metaphilosophy 34 (5): 621-629. 2003.
  •  102
    Why Should We Care About the Concept of Knowledge?
    Episteme 8 (1): 38-52. 2011.
    Can we learn something interesting about knowledge by examining our concept of knowledge? Quite a bit, many argue. My own view, however, is that the concept of knowledge is of little epistemological interest. In this paper, I critically examine one particularly interesting defense of the view that the concept of knowledge is of great epistemological interest: Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. A minimalist view about the value of examining our concept of knowledge is defended
  •  99
    Referring to artifacts
    Philosophical Review 89 (1): 109-114. 1980.
  •  92
    How internal can you get?
    Synthese 74 (3). 1988.
    This paper examines Laurence BonJour''s defense of internalism inThe Structure of Empirical Knowledge with an eye toward better understanding the issues which separate internalists from externalists. It is argued that BonJour''s Doxastic Presumption cannot play the role which is required of it to make his internalism work. It is further argued that BonJour''s internalism, and, indeed, all other internalisms, are motivated by a Cartesian view of an agent''s access to her own mental states. This C…Read more
  •  91
    Linda Zagzebski’s Virtues of the Mind
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 197-201. 2000.