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Sterol, fatty acid, and pigment characteristics of UTEX 2341, a marine eustigmatophyte identified previously as Chlorella minutissimaJournal of Phycology 31 (5): 774--777. 1995.
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39Can a single account of supererogation handle both finite and infinite cases?Philosophical Studies 180 (8): 2399-2413. 2023.Discussions of supererogation usually focus on cases in which the agent can choose among a finite number of options. However, Daniel Muñoz has recently shown that cases in which the agent faces an infinite chain of increasingly less good options make trouble for existing definitions of supererogation. Muñoz proposes a promising new definition as a solution to the problem of infinite cases. I argue that any acceptable account of supererogation must (1) enable us to accurately identify supererogat…Read more
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87Even More SupererogatoryAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1): 1-20. 2024.Losing an arm to rescue a child from a burning building is supererogatory. But is losing an arm to save two children more supererogatory than losing two arms to save a single child? What factors make one act more supererogatory than another? I provide an innovative account of how to compare which of two acts is more supererogatory, and show the superiority of this account to its chief rival.
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35Moral Decision Guides: Counsels of Morality or Counsels of Rationality?Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22 (1). 2022.In a two-tiered, or Dual Oughts, moral theory, the objective account of right and wrong is supplemented by decision guides designed to enable an agent, uncertain about the circumstances or consequences of her possible actions, to indirectly apply the objective theory by using an appropriate decision guide. But are the decision guides counsels of morality or counsels of rationality? Peter Graham argues they are counsels of pragmatic rationality. This paper shows Graham’s view is unsuccessful, and…Read more
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247Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable IgnoranceCriminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2): 115-146. 2011.Recent writers on negligence and culpable ignorance have argued that there are two kinds of culpable ignorance: tracing cases, in which the agent’s ignorance traces back to some culpable act or omission of hers in the past that led to the current act, which therefore arguably inherits the culpability of that earlier failure; and non-tracing cases, in which there is no such earlier failure, so the agent’s current state of ignorance must be culpable in its own right. An unusual but intriguing just…Read more
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Mind, Vol. LXXXVI (April, 1977) pp. 242-248.
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6in Ethics, Humanism, and Medicine, ed. Marc Basson (New York: Alan R. Liss, 1980), pp. 81-94.
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104The morality of creating and eliminating dutiesPhilosophical Studies 176 (12): 3211-3240. 2019.We often act in ways that create duties for ourselves: we adopt a child and become obligated to raise and educate her. We also sometimes act in ways that eliminate duties: we get divorced, and no longer have a duty to support our now ex-spouse. When is it morally permissible to create or to eliminate a duty? These questions have almost wholly evaded philosophical attention. In this paper we develop answers to these questions by arguing in favor of the asymmetric approach to deontic value. This a…Read more
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90The Zimmerman-Graham Debate on Objectivism versus ProspectivismJournal of Moral Philosophy 15 (4): 401-414. 2018.In Living with Uncertainty Michael Zimmerman argues against the Objective view and for the Prospective view of morality. He claims that the conscientious agent would always choose the act that maximizes projected value, and that this is incompatible with Objectivism. Peter Graham defends Objectivism against Zimmerman’s attack. He argues that a conscientious agent must balance fulfilling obligations against avoiding the worst wrong-doings, and that this stance is consistent with Objectivism and w…Read more
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54Making Morality WorkOxford University Press. 2018.What should we do if we cannot figure what morality requires of us? Holly M. Smith argues that the best moral codes solve this problem by offering two tiers, one of which tells us what makes acts right and wrong, and the other of which provides user-friendly decision guides. She opens a path towards resolving a deep problem of moral life.
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359Fetal-Maternal ConflictsIn Jules L. Coleman & Allen Buchanan (eds.), In Harm's Way: Essays in Honor of Joel Feinberg, Cambridge University Press. 1994.in In Harm’s Way: Essays in Honor of Joel Feinberg, edited by Allen Buchanan and Jules Coleman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 324-343.
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96Subjective rightness: Holly M. SmithSocial Philosophy and Policy 27 (2): 64-110. 2010.Twentieth century philosophers introduced the distinction between “objective rightness” and “subjective rightness” to achieve two primary goals. The first goal is to reduce the paradoxical tension between our judgments of what is best for an agent to do in light of the actual circumstances in which she acts and what is wisest for her to do in light of her mistaken or uncertain beliefs about her circumstances. The second goal is to provide moral guidance to an agent who may be uncertain about the…Read more
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Doing the best one canIn Alvin I. Goldman & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt, Springer. pp. 186-214. 1978.in Values and Morals, eds. Alvin Goldman and Jaegwon Kim (Reidel, 1978), pp. 186-214.
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21The 'collective' interpretation of utilitarian generalizationPhilosophical Studies 34 (2). 1978.Peer Reviewed.
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166The Subjective Moral Duty to Inform Oneself before ActingEthics 125 (1): 11-38. 2014.The requirement that moral theories be usable for making decisions runs afoul of the fact that decision makers often lack sufficient information about their options to derive any accurate prescriptions from the standard theories. Many theorists attempt to solve this problem by adopting subjective moral theories—ones that ground obligations on the agent’s beliefs about the features of her options, rather than on the options’ actual features. I argue that subjective deontological theories suffer a…Read more
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70Moral realism, moral conflict, and compound actsJournal of Philosophy 83 (6): 341-345. 1986.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
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664Doing the Best One CanIn A. I. Goldman & I. Kim (eds.), Values and Morals, D. Reidel. pp. 185--214. 1978.
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432Two Concepts of DemocracyIn Norman Bowie (ed.), Ethical Issues in Government, Temple University Press. 1981.