-
102Desire-as-belief implies opinionation or indifferenceAnalysis 55 (1): 2-5. 1995.The anti- Humean proposal of constructing desire as belief about what would be good must be abandoned on pain of triviality. Our central result shows that if an agent's belief- desire state is represented by Jeffrey's expected value theory enriched with the Desire as Belief Thesis (DAB), then, provided that three pairwise inconsistent propositions receive non- zero probability, the agent must view with indifference any proposition whose probability is greater than zero. Unlike previous results a…Read more
-
81Fast and frugal heuristics: rationality and the limits of naturalismSynthese 190 (5): 831-850. 2013.Gerd Gigerenzer and Thomas Sturm have recently proposed a modest form of what they describe as a normative, ecological and limited naturalism. The basic move in their argument is to infer that certain heuristics we tend to use should be used in the right ecological setting. To address this argument, we first consider the case of a concrete heuristic called Take the Best (TTB). There are at least two variants of the heuristic which we study by making explicit the choice functions they induce, ext…Read more
-
106Belief and Probability: A General Theory of Probability CoresInternational Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53 (3). 2012.
-
25First-Order Classical Modal LogicStudia Logica 84 (2): 171-210. 2006.The paper focuses on extending to the first order case the semantical program for modalities first introduced by Dana Scott and Richard Montague. We focus on the study of neighborhood frames with constant domains and we offer in the first part of the paper a series of new completeness results for salient classical systems of first order modal logic. Among other results we show that it is possible to prove strong completeness results for normal systems without the Barcan Formula (like FOL + K)in …Read more
-
126Knowing and supposing in games of perfect informationStudia Logica 86 (3). 2007.The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain …Read more
-
73First order classical modal logicStudia Logica 84 (2): 171-210. 2006.The paper focuses on extending to the first order case the semantical program for modalities first introduced by Dana Scott and Richard Montague. We focus on the study of neighborhood frames with constant domains and we offer in the first part of the paper a series of new completeness results for salient classical systems of first order modal logic. Among other results we show that it is possible to prove strong completeness results for normal systems without the Barcan Formula (like FOL + K)in …Read more
-
224First-order classical modal logicStudia Logica 84 (2). 2006.The paper focuses on extending to the first order case the semantical program for modalities first introduced by Dana Scott and Richard Montague. We focus on the study of neighborhood frames with constant domains and we offer in the first part of the paper a series of new completeness results for salient classical systems of first order modal logic. Among other results we show that it is possible to prove strong completeness results for normal systems without the Barcan Formula (like FOL + K)in …Read more
-
8Formal epistemology and logicIn Susana Nuccetelli, Ofelia Schutte & Otávio Bueno (eds.), A Companion to Latin American Philosophy, Wiley-blackwell. 2009.This chapter contains sections titled: Belief Revision in Latin America: The Legacy of Carlos Alchourrón The AGM Approach The Logic of Theory Change and Epistemology What Is an Epistemic State? Departures from AGM References.
-
9Readings in Formal Epistemology: Sourcebook (edited book)Imprint: Springer. 2016.This volume presents 38 classic texts in formal epistemology, and strengthens the ties between research into this area of philosophy and its neighbouring intellectual disciplines. The editors provide introductions to five subsections: Bayesian Epistemology, Belief Change, Decision Theory, Interactive Epistemology and Epistemic Logic. 'Formal epistemology' is a term coined in the late 1990s for a new constellation of interests in philosophy, the origins of which are found in earlier works of epis…Read more
-
156Formal epistemology, context and content: Introduction to special issue on recent developments in formal epistemology: Formal epistemology, context and contentReview of Symbolic Logic 1 (4): 395-401. 2008.This special issue presents a series of articles focusing on recent work in formal epistemology and formal philosophy. The articles in the latter category elaborate on the notion of context and content and their relationships. This work is not unrelated to recent developments in formal epistemology. Logical models of context, when connected with the representation of epistemic context, are clearly relevant for many issues considered by formal epistemologists. For example, the semantic framework …Read more
-
Quantified Modal LogicJournal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 27 (2). 2010.The chapter is divided in two parts. The first part gives an introduction to issues in quantified modal logic. We provide an overview of recent work in QML and we presuppose the use of a relational semantics. We discuss models for constant domains, increasing domains and varying domains and present axiomatizations for the corresponding logics. We also discuss philosophical issues related to the interpretation of the quantifiers, terms and identity and we present a first-order quantified intensio…Read more
-
47Consider a rational agent X at certain point of time t. X's epistemic state can be represented in different ways
-
139Journal of Philosophical Logic 34, 97-119, 2005.
-
59Review of Franz Huber, Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (1). 2010.
-
66IntroductionSynthese 172 (1): 1-6. 2010.Daniel Ellsberg presented in Ellsberg various examples questioning the thesis that decision making under uncertainty can be reduced to decision making under risk. These examples constitute one of the main challenges to the received view on the foundations of decision theory offered by Leonard Savage in Savage. Craig Fox and Amos Tversky have, nevertheless, offered an indirect defense of Savage. They provided in Fox and Tversky an explanation of Ellsberg’s two-color problem in terms of a psycholo…Read more
-
41The "Ellsberg phenomenon" has played a significant role in research on imprecise probabilities. Fox and Tversky [5] have attempted to explain this phenomenon in terms of their "comparative ignorance" hypothesis. We challenge that explanation and present empirical work suggesting an explanation that is much closer to Ellsberg's own diagnosis
-
132The logic of conditionalsStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2007.entry for the Entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007.
-
45Let L be a language containing the modal operator B - for full belief. An information model is a set E of stable L-theories. A sentence is valid if it is accepted in all theories of every model
-
88forthcoming in Studies on Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford.
-
102Belief revision conditionals: basic iterated systemsAnnals of Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1-3): 3-28. 1999.It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [25]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gärdenfors showed in [13] that believing ‘If A then B’ cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A — as long as supposing obeys minimal Bayesian constraints. Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the questio…Read more
-
65Review of Sherrilyn Roush, Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence and Science (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (7). 2006.
-
137Iterative probability kinematicsJournal of Philosophical Logic 30 (5): 479-524. 2001.Following the pioneer work of Bruno De Finetti [12], conditional probability spaces (allowing for conditioning with events of measure zero) have been studied since (at least) the 1950's. Perhaps the most salient axiomatizations are Karl Popper's in [31], and Alfred Renyi's in [33]. Nonstandard probability spaces [34] are a well know alternative to this approach. Vann McGee proposed in [30] a result relating both approaches by showing that the standard values of infinitesimal probability function…Read more
-
28In a series of recent articles Angelika Kratzer has argued that the standard account of modality along Kripkean lines is inadequate in order to represent context-dependent modals. In particular she argues that the standard account is unable to deliver a non-trivial account of modality capable of overcoming inconsistencies of the underlying conversational background
-
170Ambiguity aversion: the explanatory power of indeterminate probabilitiesSynthese 172 (1): 37-55. 2010.Daniel Ellsberg presented in Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75:643–669, 1961) various examples questioning the thesis that decision making under uncertainty can be reduced to decision making under risk. These examples constitute one of the main challenges to the received view on the foundations of decision theory offered by Leonard Savage in Savage (1972). Craig Fox and Amos Tversky have, nevertheless, offered an indirect defense of Savage. They provided in Fox and Tversky (1995) a…Read more
-
The Description–Experience Gap in Risky and Ambiguous GamblesJournal of Behavioral Decision Making 27 (4): 316-327. 2014.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Probability |