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45Two New Successive Addition ArgumentsHeythrop Journal 65 (2): 152-160. 2024.One of William Lane Craig's key arguments for the finitude of the past is the Successive Addition Argument (SAA). Malpass (2021) has recently developed a novel challenge to the SAA, utilising a thought experiment from the work of Fred Dretske, which is meant to show that it is possible to count to infinity, to argue that there is a counterexample to the SAA's second premise. In this paper, I contend that the Malpass‐Dretske counterexample should not worry advocates of the SAA. First, I argue tha…Read more
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611An inexplicably good argument for causal finitismInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 94 (2): 199-211. 2023.Causal finitism, the view that the causal history of any event must be finite, has garnered much philosophical interest recently—especially because of its applicability to the Kalām cosmological argument. The most prominent argument for causal finitism is the Grim Reaper argument, which attempts to show that, if infinite causal histories are possible, then other paradoxical states of affairs must also be possible. However, this style of argument has been criticized on the grounds of (i) relying …Read more
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703Properties, Collections, and the Successive Addition Argument: A Reply to MalpassPhilosophia 51 (3): 1-7. 2023.The Successive Addition Argument (SAA) is one of the key arguments espoused by William Lane Craig for the thesis that the universe began to exist. Recently, Malpass, Mind, 131(523), 786–804 (2021) has developed a challenge to the SAA by way of constructing a counterexample that originates in the work of Fred Dretske. In this paper, I show that the Malpass-Dretske counterexample is in fact no counterexample to the argument. Utilizing a distinction between properties of members and properties of c…Read more
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638A Phenomenological Approach to the Bayesian Grue ProblemAporia 22 (1): 1-12. 2022.It is a common intuition in scientific practice that positive instances confirm. This confirmation, at least based purely on syntactic considerations, is what Nelson Goodman’s ‘Grue Problem’, and more generally the ‘New Riddle’ of Induction, attempt to defeat. One treatment of the Grue Problem has been made along Bayesian lines, wherein the riddle reduces to a question of probability assignments. In this paper, I consider this so-called Bayesian Grue Problem and evaluate how one might proffer a …Read more
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1Absolutist-Dispositional Meta-Ethics and Genuine Moral DisagreementDialogue 64 (3): 138-42. 2022.Often, semantic accounts of ethical statements wherein those statements have their truth-conditions linked in some capacity to the mental state of an agent face the difficulty of explaining how it is that moral agents and communities genuinely disagree. However, there are––I shall argue––such semantic theories of ethical statements we can construct that avoid this explanatory deficit, insofar as they are both absolute and dispositional theories. In this paper, I will (i) explore and analyze one …Read more
Ibrahim Dagher
Yale University
Yale Law School
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Yale Law SchoolDoctoral student
New Haven, CT, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Religion |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Law |
Normative Ethics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Modality |
PhilPapers Editorships
Kalam Cosmological Argument |