Iddo Landau

Feminist standpoint theory has important implications for science education. The paper focuses on difficulties in standpoint theory, mostly regarding the assumptions that different social positions produce different types of knowledge, and that epistemic advantages that women might enjoy are always effective and significant. I conclude that the difficulties in standpoint theory render it too problematic to accept. Various implications for science education are indicated: we should return to the kind of science education that instructs students to examine whether arguments, experiments, etc. are successful, rather than ask who presented them; when considering researchers and students for science education programs we should examine their scholarly achievements, rather than the group to which they belong; women should not be discouraged from engaging in “mainstream” science research and education (or other spheres of knowledge considered as “men’s topics”) and men should not be discouraged from engaging in what are considered “women’s topics” in science (or outside it); we should not assume that there are different types of science for women and for men, nor different ways for women and men to study science or conduct scientific research.

In this article I claim that distinction should be made between an "early Derrida" and a "later Derrida," similar to the one made between Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and Wittgenstein of the Investigations, or between Heidegger before the Kehre and Heidegger after it. Acceptance of such a distinction enables us to understand Derrida's teachings more clearly, to solve a disagreement in Derrida scholarship, and to understand his deconstruction as less contradictory. I shall also explain the reasons for, and causes of, the change in Derrida' teachings and distinguish between those aspects that changed and those that did not.

In his “Reply to Iddo Landau,” Edmund Wall responds to the author’s critique of some of the views expressed in his “Sexual Harassment and Wrongful Communication.” The present article concentrates on what the author takes to be the main problem in Wall’s definition: by requiring that any act, even if intentional and cruel in nature, needs to be repeated to count as sexual harassment, Wall allows too much leeway and renders permissible a wide range of intentional, mean, and harmful actions that most, including, the author believes, Wall himself, would like to outlaw. The article considers Wall’s linguistic and nonlinguistic responses to this critique and finds them problematic.

Many philosophers have suggested that lives emerge as meaningless when considered within the context of the vastness of the cosmos and of time. Landau (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89(4), 727–734, 2011, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 17(3), 457–468, 2014, 2017) has argued that considering a life within the context of the vastness of the cosmos and of time need not lead to this pessimistic conclusion. Three recent discussions, by Benatar (2017), Hanson (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23, 561–573, 2020), and Kügler (The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2021), offer criticisms of some of Landau’s arguments. The present paper continues to develop the topic by discussing these criticisms. Among other points, the paper rejects Nagel’s claim that standards are unavailable within the cosmic context. In reply to another criticism, it elaborates on reasons for preferring some standards over others. The paper also argues that Blackburn’s, Rescher’s, and Camus’s arguments differ from Nagel’s; that a disproof of the pessimistic argument does not require that we explain the argument’s popularity; and that Hanson’s account of the relation between the cosmic perspective and evaluations of meaningfulness is, at the end of the day, in fact quite similar to Landau’s, so that the difference between them is more terminological than material. Finally, the paper claims that the debate suffers from terminological untidiness and suggests the use of clearer, more precise terminology in future philosophical work on the topic.

According to Viktor Frankl, although people are not always free to choose the conditions in which they find themselves, they are always free to choose their attitude towards these conditions and, thus, are always free to find their lives meaningful. This basic tenet of Frankl’s theory is also often repeated approvingly in the secondary literature. I argue that the claim is wrong; not all people are free to find their lives meaningful. Counterexamples include people who suffer from severe depression or people who, due to lack of sufficient intelligence, ability to focus, or determination cannot profit from psychological counseling (including logotherapeutic counseling). I also criticize Frankl’s oft-repeated argument that some people’s success in finding their lives meaningful in the concentration camps shows that all people are free to find their lives meaningful. Frankl’s discussion of the noetic dimension and its relation to other dimensions of the human personality is also insufficient for defending his claim about all people’s freedom to find their lives meaningful. Frankl’s theory of the noos suggests that all people’s lives are meaningful. But since not all people’s lives are meaningful, Frankl’s claims about the noos seem incorrect: either some people do not have (or are not also) a noetic dimension or the noetic dimension does not always endow life with meaning. Further, the claim that, thanks to all people’s noetic dimension, all people’s lives are already meaningful is in tension with the claim that all people can wrest meaning from life. I suggest that understanding Frankl as only claiming that all people have a potential for meaningful lives is also unhelpful. Finally, I discuss the implications of my criticism for Frankl’s theory at large. I argue that much in this very helpful theory can be retained, but identify those aspects of the theory that need to be modified.

Several philosophers have argued that if we examine our lives in context of the cosmos at large, sub specie aeternitatis, we cannot escape life's meaninglessness. To see our lives as meaningful, we have to shun the point of view of the cosmos and consider our lives only in the narrower context of the here and now. I argue that this view is incorrect: life can be seen as meaningful also sub specie aeternitatis. While criticizing arguments by, among others, Simon Blackburn, Nicholas Rescher, and Thomas Nagel, I show that what determines assessments of the meaning of a life are the standards of meaningfulness one endorses rather than the size of the context in which that life is assessed. Employing non-demanding standards of meaningfulness to assess a life is compatible with examining it in the context of the cosmos at large. That is also the case if we accept Nagel's claim that to examine a life sub specie aeternitatis is to examine it externally, impersonally and objectively: life can be evaluated as meaningful also when under these perspectives if the standards of meaningfulness we adopt are not overly challenging. Nor does the contingency of our existence, realized sub specie aeternitatis, render our life meaningless. Contrary to a commonly accepted view, then, examining our lives sub specie aeternitatis does not necessitate that we see them as meaningless

An analysis of the nature of reflexivity--a relation which relates a thing to itself although it is regularly used to relate two different things--is followed by specific discussions of its place and functions in the writings of various philosophers. These discussions substantiate the following theses: reflexivity is a basic structure common to different phenomena; although traditionally unacknowledged, it is a useful and important concept in philosophy as well as in other disciplines; acknowledging its existence and understanding its structure deepens our understanding of philosophical systems; since, like any other philosophical tool, reflexivity can be used either legitimately or illegitimately, nothing in it is inherently flawed; a structural analysis of different types of reflexivity and the relations between them can be presented; the history of its use is marked by a tendency towards its "normalization". These discussions are intended to raise awareness and generate future studies of this important but neglected philosophical structure.

IN LE P È R E GO R I O T, Balzac has the main character, Rastignac, ask his friend Bianchon whether he would agree to the killing of a Chinese Mandarin in far-away China if this would yield Bianchon a great fortune. After some joking, Bianchon answers negatively.1 For Rastignac, this thought experiment is connected to a practical dilemma: he is deliberating whether to agree that a man he has never seen, and who has done Rastignac no harm, should be killed so that he, Rastignac, may enjoy the wealth that the man’s sister, who loves Rastignac, will inherit

Many questions may be asked about the efforts to construct feminist epistemologies. One such question is whether epistemologies really imply values and practices in any significant way. Another is whether the values and practices most epistemologies are taken to be immersed in are indeed masculine. Yet another is what precisely are the feminist values and practices that feminist epistemologies should involve. A fourth is whether women and men really do think so differently from each other. And a fifth possible question is whether feminist epistemologies should be separatist, i.e., such that only women can use and construct them, or whether they should be universal human epistemologies. Although all these questions merit serious discussion, I shall here deal only with the last, assuming, at least for the sake of argument, that the first, second and fourth questions receive positive answers, and that there is a satisfying answer for the third.

In his "Reply to Iddo Landau," Edmund Wall responds to the author’s critique of some of the views expressed in his "Sexual Harassment and Wrongful Communication." The present article concentrates on what the author takes to be the main problem in Wall’s definition: by requiring that any act, even if intentional and cruel in nature, needs to be repeated to count as sexual harassment, Wall allows too much leeway and renders permissible a wide range of intentional, mean, and harmful actions that most, including, the author believes, Wall himself, would like to outlaw. The article considers Wall’s linguistic and nonlinguistic responses to this critique and finds them problematic. Key Words: sexual harassment • discrimination • law • ethics • feminism.