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332Igal Kvart A Coding Conception in Action-Directed-Pragmatics I present formal Pragmatics for a domain in Pragmatics that I call Action-Directed Pragmatics, which focuses on the Pragmatic riddle of how implicit contents are conveyed and understood, by adopting a coding model, in which the speaker and addressee simulate each other iteratively in a deliberative context (an ‘action-pregnant’ one). The implicit content, conveyed by a speaker and decoded by her addressee, in s…Read more
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20Resolving Bank-Type Puzzles via Action-Directed PragmaticsSynthese 200 (4): 1-58. 2022.In this paper I undertake to resolve a main pragmatic puzzle triggered by Bank-type cases. After accepting ‘sanitized’ intuitions about Truth-Values, as reflected in x-phi experiments, the pragmatic puzzle about whether the husband is inconsistent remains, and if he isn’t, which intuitively is the case, how are we to explain it. The context in such cases is pragmatic, with awareness of high risks, and the treatment I propose is pragmatic as well, but not Gricean. I offer a new Pragmatics whose m…Read more
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28The epistemic significance of non-epistemic factors: an introductionSynthese 200 (3): 1-11. 2022.
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19The steering thrust phenomenon in action-directed-pragmaticsSynthese 198 (Suppl 7): 1639-1671. 2020.In this paper I explore the pragmatic phenomenon of Steering Thrust, and specifically how speakers steer others to action and the mechanism that underpins how they so steer. In addition to opening the door to a rich pragmatic domain, understanding the pragmatics of various locutions and assertions in deliberative action-oriented contexts resolves the puzzle of bank-type cases by a pragmatic treatment of the puzzle, and undermines the motivation to seek a semantic remedy, such as via Pragmatic En…Read more
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28Pragmatic Structures for Action‐Directed PragmaticsPhilosophical Perspectives 32 (1): 219-253. 2018.Philosophical Perspectives, EarlyView.
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26A High Token Indicativity Account of KnowledgeActa Analytica 33 (3): 385-393. 2018.In this paper, I provide a probabilistic account of factual knowledge, based on the notion of chance, which is a function of an event given a prior history. This account has some affinity with my chance account of token causation, but it neither relies on it nor presupposes it. Here, I concentrate on the core cases of perceptual knowledge and of knowledge by memory. The analysis of knowledge presented below is externalist. The underlying intuition guiding the treatment of knowledge in this paper…Read more
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94A probabilistic theory of knowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1). 2006.In this paper I provide a probabilistic account of factual knowledge,[1] based on the notion of chance.[2] This account has some affinity with my chance account of token causation,[3] but it neither relies on it nor presupposes it. Here I concentrate on the core cases of perceptual knowledge and of knowledge by memory (based on perception). The analysis of knowledge presented below is externalist; but pursuing such an analysis need not detract from the significance of attempts to flesh out justi…Read more
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292I argue that 'know' is only partly, though considerably, gradable. Its being only partly gradable is explained by its multi-parametrical character. That is, its truth-conditions involve different parameters, which are scalar in character, each of which is fully gradable. Robustness of knowledge may be higher or lower along different dimensions and different modes. This has little to do with whether 'know' is context-dependent, but it undermines Stanley's argument that the non-gradability of 'kno…Read more
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30Kripke’s Belief PuzzlePhilosophy Research Archives 9 369-412. 1983.This article offers a resolution of Kripke’s well-known belief puzzle.
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3Causation: Counterfactual and Probabilistic AnalysesIn John Collins, Ned Hall & Laurie Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals, Mit Press. 2004.
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34On Putnam's counterexample toa theory of counterfactualsPhilosophical Papers 16 (3): 235-239. 1987.No abstract
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229Abstract In this paper I present a short outline of an Indicativity Theory of Knowledge, for the cases of Perceptual Knowledge and Knowledge by Memory. I explain the main rationale for a token-indicativity approach, and how it is fleshed out precisely in terms of chances. I elaborate on the account of the value of knowledge it provides, and what that value is. I explain why, given the rationale of conceiving Knowledge as token indicativity, separate sub-accounts in terms of chances should be…Read more
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50The problem facing us in this paper is that of how to analyze the notion of causal relevance. This is the inverse relation of causal dependence: A is causally irrelevant to C iff C is causally independent of A. As an example of causal relevance, consider: Example 1: A - The American astronaut on Mir scratched his left ear exactly an hour ago B - I am writing this paper right now. Intuitively, A was not causally relevant to B. It is this kind of intuition that I’ll mostly be relying on when analy…Read more
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14A Probabilistic Theory of KnowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1): 1-43. 2006.Hebrew University.
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11Kripke’s Belief PuzzlePhilosophy Research Archives 9 369-412. 1983.This article offers a resolution of Kripke’s well-known belief puzzle.
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76In this paper I rely on my account of counterfactuals in order to argue that supervenience and epiphenomenalism are incompatible. This argument is strong when directed against a freestanding epiphenomenalism. Along the way I will also argue that Davidson’s argument in favor of mental causation is not valid. A crucial intermediate point in the argument is the issue of counterfactual transitivity. I argue that, even though in general counterfactual transitivity is invalid, a valid sub-inference ca…Read more
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91CounterfactualsErkenntnis 36 (2). 1992.In this article I offer an approach to counterfactuals based on a notion of objective probability. It is in the spirit of, though it does not fall squarely under, the metalinguistic model. Thus, it is not developed in terms of possible worlds, or notions parasitic on them (e.g., similarity). Its dominant features are rooted in objective probability and causal relevance (analyzed probabilistically), and thus it is not close in spirit to a maximal similarity or a minimal change approach.
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64Probabilistic cause and the thirsty travelerJournal of Philosophical Logic 31 (2): 139-179. 2002.In this paper I start by briefly presenting an analysis of token cause and of token causal relevance that I developed elsewhere, and then apply it to the famous thirsty traveler riddle. One general outcome of the analysis of causal relevance employed here is that in preemption cases (early or late) the preempted cause is not a cause since it is causally irrelevant to the effect. I consider several variations of the thirsty traveler riddle. In the first variation the first enemy emptied the cante…Read more
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465Igal Kvart RATIONAL ASSERTIBILITY, THE STEERING ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE, AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT Abstract In the past couple of decades, there were a few major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic encroachment – that there is a significant pragmatic ingredient in the truth-conditions for knowledge-ascriptions. Epistemic contextualism has flaunted the notion of a conversational standard, and Stanley's subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) promoted …Read more
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