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328Igal Kvart A Coding Conception in Action-Directed-Pragmatics I present formal Pragmatics for a domain in Pragmatics that I call Action-Directed Pragmatics, which focuses on the Pragmatic riddle of how implicit contents are conveyed and understood, by adopting a coding model, in which the speaker and addressee simulate each other iteratively in a deliberative context (an ‘action-pregnant’ one). The implicit content, conveyed by a speaker and decoded by her addressee, in s…Read more
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11Resolving Bank-Type Puzzles via Action-Directed PragmaticsSynthese 200 (4): 1-58. 2022.In this paper I undertake to resolve a main pragmatic puzzle triggered by Bank-type cases. After accepting ‘sanitized’ intuitions about Truth-Values, as reflected in x-phi experiments, the pragmatic puzzle about whether the husband is inconsistent remains, and if he isn’t, which intuitively is the case, how are we to explain it. The context in such cases is pragmatic, with awareness of high risks, and the treatment I propose is pragmatic as well, but not Gricean. I offer a new Pragmatics whose m…Read more
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21The epistemic significance of non-epistemic factors: an introductionSynthese 200 (3): 1-11. 2022.
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18The steering thrust phenomenon in action-directed-pragmaticsSynthese 198 (Suppl 7): 1639-1671. 2020.In this paper I explore the pragmatic phenomenon of Steering Thrust, and specifically how speakers steer others to action and the mechanism that underpins how they so steer. In addition to opening the door to a rich pragmatic domain, understanding the pragmatics of various locutions and assertions in deliberative action-oriented contexts resolves the puzzle of bank-type cases by a pragmatic treatment of the puzzle, and undermines the motivation to seek a semantic remedy, such as via Pragmatic En…Read more
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26Pragmatic Structures for Action‐Directed PragmaticsPhilosophical Perspectives 32 (1): 219-253. 2018.Philosophical Perspectives, EarlyView.
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25A High Token Indicativity Account of KnowledgeActa Analytica 33 (3): 385-393. 2018.In this paper, I provide a probabilistic account of factual knowledge, based on the notion of chance, which is a function of an event given a prior history. This account has some affinity with my chance account of token causation, but it neither relies on it nor presupposes it. Here, I concentrate on the core cases of perceptual knowledge and of knowledge by memory. The analysis of knowledge presented below is externalist. The underlying intuition guiding the treatment of knowledge in this paper…Read more
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80Counterfactuals: Ambiguities, true premises, and knowledgeSynthese 100 (1). 1994.In this paper I explore the ambiguity that arises between two readings of the counterfactual construction, then–d and thel–p, analyzed in my bookA Theory of Counterfactuals. I then extend the analysis I offered there to counterfactuals with true antecedents, and offer a more precise formulation of the conception of temporal divergence points used in thel–p interpretation. Finally, I discuss some ramifications of these issues for counterfactual analyses of knowledge.
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99Kripke's Belief PuzzleMidwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1): 287-325. 1986.This article offers a resolution of Kripke’s well-known belief puzzle
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130The Counterfactual Analysis of CauseSynthese 127 (3): 389-427. 2001.David Lewis’s counterfactual analysis of cause consisted of the counterfactual conditional closed under transitivity.2 Namely, a sufficient condition for A’s being a cause of C is that ∼A > ∼C be true; and a necessary as well as sufficient condition is that there be a series of true counterfactuals ∼A > ∼E1, ∼E1 > ∼E2, . . . , ∼En >∼C (n > 0).
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278In the past couple of decades, there were a few major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic infringement – that a significant pragmatic ingredient figures significantly in the truth-conditions for knowledge-ascriptions. As candidates, epistemic contextualism and Relativism flaunted conversational standards, and Stanley's SSI promoted stakes. These conceptions were propelled first and foremost by obviously pragmatic examples of knowledge ascriptions that seem to require a pragmatic compon…Read more
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2Causation: Probabilistic and counterfactual analysesIn Ned Hall, L. A. Paul & John Collins (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals, Mass.: Mit Press. pp. 359--387. 2004.
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91A probabilistic theory of knowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1). 2006.In this paper I provide a probabilistic account of factual knowledge,[1] based on the notion of chance.[2] This account has some affinity with my chance account of token causation,[3] but it neither relies on it nor presupposes it. Here I concentrate on the core cases of perceptual knowledge and of knowledge by memory (based on perception). The analysis of knowledge presented below is externalist; but pursuing such an analysis need not detract from the significance of attempts to flesh out justi…Read more
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273I argue that 'know' is only partly, though considerably, gradable. Its being only partly gradable is explained by its multi-parametrical character. That is, its truth-conditions involve different parameters, which are scalar in character, each of which is fully gradable. Robustness of knowledge may be higher or lower along different dimensions and different modes. This has little to do with whether 'know' is context-dependent, but it undermines Stanley's argument that the non-gradability of 'kno…Read more
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30Kripke’s Belief PuzzlePhilosophy Research Archives 9 369-412. 1983.This article offers a resolution of Kripke’s well-known belief puzzle.
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3Causation: Counterfactual and Probabilistic AnalysesIn J. D. Collins, E. J. Hall & L. A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals, Mit Press. 2004.
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31On Putnam's counterexample toa theory of counterfactualsPhilosophical Papers 16 (3): 235-239. 1987.No abstract
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217Abstract In this paper I present a short outline of an Indicativity Theory of Knowledge, for the cases of Perceptual Knowledge and Knowledge by Memory. I explain the main rationale for a token-indicativity approach, and how it is fleshed out precisely in terms of chances. I elaborate on the account of the value of knowledge it provides, and what that value is. I explain why, given the rationale of conceiving Knowledge as token indicativity, separate sub-accounts in terms of chances should be…Read more
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50The problem facing us in this paper is that of how to analyze the notion of causal relevance. This is the inverse relation of causal dependence: A is causally irrelevant to C iff C is causally independent of A. As an example of causal relevance, consider: Example 1: A - The American astronaut on Mir scratched his left ear exactly an hour ago B - I am writing this paper right now. Intuitively, A was not causally relevant to B. It is this kind of intuition that I’ll mostly be relying on when analy…Read more
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14A Probabilistic Theory of KnowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1): 1-43. 2006.Hebrew University.
Jerusalem, Israel
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
General Philosophy of Science |