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Theodore Sider: The Tools of Metaphysics and the Metaphysics of Science (review)Journal of Philosophy 118 (1): 51-55. 2021.
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Which Fitch?Analysis 81 (3): 436-439. 2021.
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A short argument for truthmaker maximalismAnalysis 80 (1): 40-44. 2020.
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The Metaphysics of Truth, by Douglas EdwardsMind 128 (511): 970-976. 2019.
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Knowing how things might have beenSynthese 198 (S8): 1981-1999. 2018.I know that I could have been where you are right now and that you could have been where I am right now, but that neither of us could have been turnips or natural numbers. This knowledge of metaphysical modality stands in need of explanation. I will offer an account based on our knowledge of the natures, or essencess, of things. I will argue that essences need not be viewed as metaphysically bizarre entities; that we can conceptualise and refer to essences; and that we can gain knowledge of them…Read more
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Material Objects and Essential Bundle TheoryPhilosophical Studies 175 (12): 2969-2986. 2018.In this paper we present a new metaphysical theory of material objects. On our theory, objects are bundles of property instances, where those properties give the nature or essence of that object. We call the theory essential bundle theory. Property possession is not analysed as bundle-membership, as in traditional bundle theories, since accidental properties are not included in the object’s bundle. We have a different story to tell about accidental property possession. This move reaps many benef…Read more
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Review of Douglas Edwards, The Metaphysics of Truth (review)Mind 128 (511). 2019.
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Forgetting memory skepticismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2): 253-263. 2020.Memory skepticism denies our memory beliefs could have any notable epistemic good. One route to memory skepticism is to challenge memory’s epistemic trustworthiness, that is, its functioning in a way necessary for it to provide epistemic justification. In this paper we develop and respond to this challenge. It could threaten memory in such a way that we altogether lack doxastic attitudes. If it threatens memory in this way, then the challenge is importantly self-defeating. If it does not threate…Read more
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Reliabilism’s Memory LossPhilosophical Quarterly 71 (3): 565-585. 2021.Generativism about memory justification is the view that memory can generate epistemic justification. Generativism is gaining popularity, but process reliabilists tend to resist it. Process reliabilism explains the justification of beliefs by way of the reliability of the processes they result from. Some advocates of reliabilism deny various forms of generativism. Other reliabilists reject or remain neutral about only the more extreme forms. I argue that an extreme form of generativism follows f…Read more
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Conceiving and ImaginingThe Harvard Review of Philosophy 22 84-99. 2015.Abstract A phenomenological distinction is drawn between what is imaginable and what is conceivable (but not imaginable). This distinction is rooted, historically, in Descartes’ famous discussion of the piece of wax, and he describes as the difference between “imagination” and “intellection.” His example is described, but then the distinction is extended to a number of unexpected other kinds of cases. One is the experience of a native speaker of her own words. She can conceive of these words mea…Read more
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On what it takes for there to be no fact of the matterNoûs 42 (4): 753-769. 2008.Philosophers are very fond of making non-factualist claims—claims to the effect that there is no fact of the matter as to whether something is the case. But can these claims be coherently stated in the context of classical logic? Some care is needed here, we argue, otherwise one ends up denying a tautology or embracing a contradiction. In the end, we think there are only two strategies available to someone who wants to be a non-factualist about something, and remain within the province of classi…Read more
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Suspending is BelievingSynthese (3): 1-26. 2019.A good account of the agnostic attitude of Suspending Judgement should explain how it can be rendered more or less rational/justified according to the state of one's evidence – and one's relation to that evidence. I argue that the attitude of suspending judgement whether p constitutively involves having a belief; roughly, a belief that one cannot yet tell whether or not p. I show that a theory of suspending that treats it as a sui generis attitude, wholly distinct from belief, struggles to accou…Read more
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Transparency is SurveillancePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2): 331-361. 2021.In her BBC Reith Lectures on Trust, Onora O’Neill offers a short, but biting, criticism of transparency. People think that trust and transparency go together but in reality, says O'Neill, they are deeply opposed. Transparency forces people to conceal their actual reasons for action and invent different ones for public consumption. Transparency forces deception. I work out the details of her argument and worsen her conclusion. I focus on public transparency – that is, transparency to the public o…Read more
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What is Justified Belief?In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology, D. Reidel. pp. 1-25. 1976.The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of justified belief. What I have in mind is an explanatory theory, one that explains in a general way why certain beliefs are counted as justified and others as unjustified. Unlike some traditional approaches, I do not try to prescribe standards for justification that differ from, or improve upon, our ordinary standards. I merely try to explicate the ordinary standards, which are, I believe, quite different from those of many classical, e. g., ‘Cartesi…Read more
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Existential inertia and the Aristotelian proofInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 89 (3): 201-220. 2020.Edward Feser defends the ‘Aristotelian proof’ for the existence of God, which reasons that the only adequate explanation of the existence of change is in terms of an unchangeable, purely actual being. His argument, however, relies on the falsity of the Existential Inertia Thesis, according to which concrete objects tend to persist in existence without requiring an existential sustaining cause. In this article, I first characterize the dialectical context of Feser’s Aristotelian proof, paying spe…Read more
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Stage One of the Aristotelian Proof: A Critical AppraisalSophia 60 (4): 781-796. 2021.What explains change? Edward Feser argues in his ‘Aristotelian proof’ that the only adequate answer to these questions is ultimately in terms of an unchangeable, purely actual being. In this paper, I target the cogency of Feser’s reasoning to such an answer. In particular, I present novel paths of criticism—both undercutting and rebutting—against one of Feser’s central premises. I then argue that Feser’s inference that the unactualized actualizer lacks any potentialities contains a number of non…Read more
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The fruitful death of modal collapse argumentsInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 91 (1): 3-22. 2021.Modal collapse arguments are all the rage in certain philosophical circles as of late. The arguments purport to show that classical theism entails the absurdly fatalistic conclusion that everything exists necessarily. My first aim in this paper is bold: to put an end to action-based modal collapse arguments against classical theism. To accomplish this, I first articulate the ‘Simple Modal Collapse Argument’ and then characterize and defend Tomaszewski’s criticism thereof. Second, I critically ex…Read more
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Simply Unsuccessful: The Neo-Platonic Proof of God’s ExistenceEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (4): 129-156. 2022.Edward Feser defends the ‘Neo-Platonic proof ’ for the existence of the God of classical theism. After articulating the argument and a number of preliminaries, I first argue that premise three of Feser’s argument—the causal principle that every composite object requires a sustaining efficient cause to combine its parts—is both unjustified and dialectically ill-situated. I then argue that the Neo-Platonic proof fails to deliver the mindedness of the absolutely simple being and instead militates a…Read more
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From Modal Collapse to Providential CollapsePhilosophia 50 (3): 1413-1435. 2022.The modal collapse objection to classical theism has received significant attention among philosophers as of late. My aim in this paper is to advance this blossoming debate. First, I briefly survey the modal collapse literature and argue that classical theists avoid modal collapse if and only if they embrace an indeterministic link between God and his effects. Second, I argue that this indeterminism poses two challenges to classical theism. The first challenge is that it collapses God’s status a…Read more
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A Step-by-Step Argument for Causal FinitismErkenntnis 88 (5): 2097-2122. 2023.
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Classical Theism, Arbitrary Creation, and Reason-Based ActionSophia 61 (3): 565-579. 2022.Surely God, as a perfectly rational being, created the universe for some _reason_. But is God’s creating the universe for a reason compatible with divine impassibility? That is the question I investigate in this article. The _prima facie_ tension between impassibility and God’s creating for a reason arises from impassibility’s commitment to God being uninfluenced by anything _ad extra_. If God is uninfluenced in this way, asks the detractor, how could he be moved to create anything at all? This …Read more
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1 Knowledge and Conclusive EvidenceIn Joseph Campbell (ed.), Knowledge and Skepticism, Mit Press. pp. 27. 2010.
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Higher-Order EvidenceAnalysis 80 (4): 789-807. 2021.
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Higher-Order EvidenceIn Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, Routledge. pp. 176-194. 2024.
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In Squaring the Circle in Descartes’ Meditations, Stephen Wagner aims to show that Descartes’ project in the Meditations is best understood as a ‘strong validation of reason’ i.e., as proving in a non-circular way that human reason is a reliable, truth-conducive faculty. For such an enterprise to qualify as a ‘strong’ validation, Wagner contends, skeptical doubt must be given its strongest force. The most stringent doubt available in the Meditations is the deceiving God. To rule out the possibil…Read more
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The Circle of Ideas and the Circularity of the MeditationsDialogue 5 (2): 131-153. 1966.
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Descartes on the Eternal Truths and Essences of Mathematics: An Alternative ReadingVivarium 54 (2-3): 204-249. 2016.René Descartes is neither a Conceptualist nor a Platonist when it comes to the ontological status of the eternal truths and essences of mathematics but articulates a view derived from Proclus. There are several advantages to interpreting Descartes’ texts in light of Proclus’ view of universals and philosophy of mathematics. Key passages that, on standard readings, are in conflict are reconciled if we read Descartes as appropriating Proclus’ threefold distinction among universals. Specifically, p…Read more
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Descartes on Forms and MechanismsCambridge University Press. 2009.The modern view of causation can be traced back to the mechanistic science of Descartes, whose rejection of Aristotelian physics, with its concept of substantial forms, in favor of mechanical explanations was a turning-point in the history of philosophy. However the reasoning which led Descartes and other early moderns in this direction is not well understood. This book traces Descartes' groundbreaking theory of scientific explanation back to the mathematical demonstrations of Aristotelian mecha…Read more
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Descartes on the Eternal Truths and Essences of Mathematics: An Alternative ReadingNew Content is Available for Vivarium. forthcoming._ Source: _Page Count 46 René Descartes is neither a Conceptualist nor a Platonist when it comes to the ontological status of the eternal truths and essences of mathematics but articulates a view derived from Proclus. There are several advantages to interpreting Descartes’ texts in light of Proclus’ view of universals and philosophy of mathematics. Key passages that, on standard readings, are in conflict are reconciled if we read Descartes as appropriating Proclus’ threefold distinction among un…Read more
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