Iris Spoor

In “Compliance, Complicity, and the Nature of Nonideal Conditions” (2003), Tamar Schapiro suggests a framework that deontological theories might use to mitigate the stringency of the moral law in certain cases. This framework depends on a crucial distinction between two forms of non-compliance: transgression and subversion. Schapiro considers several possibilities for cases of subversive non-compliance including an intriguing fictional example from L.A. Confidential2003, p. 347) and Kant’s infamous murder at the door scenario (2006, p. 52). For the purpose of this essay, I will focus on Schapiro’s analysis of the murderer at the door scenario. While her analysis is nuanced and insightful, I contend that Schapiro has mistaken the nature of the murderer’s non-compliance in this case. I highlight this by developing the game analogy further. I suggest that the murderer is not refusing to play, as Schapiro would have it, rather he is cleverly playing the game by exploiting its rules. Seen in this light, his wrongdoing in this scenario would not be enough to subvert, or corrupt, the entire practice. Given this, disobedience to the moral law (lying in this case) would not be justified. I go on to suggest that further development of the game analogy could provide potential new insights into the nature of non-compliance and non-ideal conditions.