Ivory Day

This paper discusses the problems of an ontological value of the variable in Russell’s philosophy. The variable is essential in Russell’s theory of denotation, which among other things, purports to prove Meinongian being outside of subsistence and existence to be logically unnecessary. I argue that neither Russell’s epistemology nor his ontology can account for the ontological value of the variable without running into qualities of Meinongian being that Russell disputed. The problem is that the variable cannot be logically grounded by Russell’s theory of denotation. As such, in so far as being is concerned, Meinong and Russell’s theories are much closer than is typically thought. The arguments are supported with concerns raised by Russell, Frege, and Moore regarding the ontological value of the variable. The problem can be summarised as follows: the variable is the fundamental denoting-position of a formal theory that is meant to explain the structure of the ontological. If such a formal theory is meant to ground the ontological, then the formal must also represent the actual structure of the ontological. Yet the variable, the fundamental symbol of denotation in a theory that defines objects, is ontologically indefinable.

The purpose of this chapter is to argue that the work of Susan Stebbing, an analytic philosopher and proponent of both common sense philosophy and logicism at the time of their emergence in English scholarship, provides a better model for an analysis of continental thought than the work of her contemporary, Bertrand Russell. The comparison is important as it shows why Stebbing’s work should be chosen over Russell’s if the goal is to find a quintessential analytic approach to continental thought from an influential and early figure of analytic philosophy whose approach also engages and does justice to the continental thought it addresses. To do so the article demonstrates why the methods Stebbing utilised when analysing philosophy from traditions different from her own were superior to Russell’s tactics for the same purposes. Their respective interpretations of the philosophy of Henri Bergson are compared to give a concrete example of the results of their respective methods of understanding. The article begins with a general account of what makes Stebbing’s approach particularly effective. This includes the premises she adopts and her tactics of analysis. It then gives a more elaborate account of these vis-à-vis her study of Bergson’s philosophy. Following is an explanation of Russell’s tendencies when analysing philosophical frameworks different to his own, including Bergson’s. Finally, Stebbing and Russell’s respective understanding of Bergson’s philosophy is compared on four general pillars: classification of Bergson’s work (with focus on its purported rapport with pragmatism); Bergson’s stance on intellectualism; the philosophical pertinence of his style; and the place of argumentation in his philosophy. These comparisons demonstrate the superiority of Stebbing’s approach.