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8LIn Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2017.The Representational Theory of the Mind arises with the recognition that thoughts have contents carried by mental representations. For Abelard to think, for example, that Pegasus is winged is for Abelard to be related to a MENTAL REPRESENTATION whose content is that Pegasus is winged. Now, there are different kinds of representations: pictures, maps, models, and words ‐ to name only some. Exactly what sort of REPRESENTATION is mental representation? (see imagery; connectionism.) Sententialism di…Read more
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19Akratic Compatibilism and All Too Human Psychology: Almost Enough Is Free Will EnoughLexington Books. 2023.J. Christopher Maloney argues that free will is compatible with necessary laws of science and immutable history. For free will emerges from an akratic will that asymptotically approaches the ability to choose to act otherwise than it willfully does.
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65Information, Semantics & Epistemology (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3): 721-726. 1993.
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13Thought, including conscious perception, is representation. But perceptual representation is uniquely direct, permitting immediate acquaintance with the world and ensuring perception's distinctive phenomenal character. The perceptive mind is extended. It recruits the very objects perceived to constitute self-referential representations determinative of what it is like to perceive.
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36The Mundane Matter of the Mental LanguageCambridge University Press. 1989.Christopher Maloney offers an explanation of the fundamental nature of thought. He posits the idea that thinking involves the processing of mental representations that take the form of sentences in a covert language encoded in the mind. The theory relies upon traditional categories of psychology, including such notions as belief and desire. It also draws upon and thus inherits some of the problems of artificial intelligence which it attempts to answer, including what bestows meaning or content u…Read more
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108Mental misrepresentationPhilosophy of Science 57 (September): 445-58. 1990.An account of the contents of the propositional attitudes is fundamental to the success of the cognitive sciences if, as seems correct, the cognitive sciences do presuppose propositional attitudes. Fodor has recently pointed the way towards a naturalistic explication of mental content in his Psychosemantics (1987). Fodor's theory is a version of the causal theory of meaning and thus inherits many of its virtues, including its intrinsic plausibility. Nevertheless, the proposal may suffer from two…Read more
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100Sensation and scientific realismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (3): 471-482. 1986.
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143Methodological solipsism reconsidered as a research strategy in cognitive psychologyPhilosophy of Science 52 (September): 451-69. 1985.Current computational psychology, especially as described by Fodor (1975, 1980, 1981), Pylyshyn (1980), and Stich (1983), is both a bold, promising program for cognitive science and an alternative to naturalistic psychology (Putnam 1975). Whereas naturalistic psychology depends on the general scientific framework to fix the meanings of general terms and, hence, the content of thoughts utilizing or expressed in those terms, computational cognitive theory banishes semantical considerations in psyc…Read more
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64About being a batAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (1): 26-49. 1985.This Article does not have an abstract
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58“God” is a term than which none greater can be usedInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (1). 1981.
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11Connectionism and conditioningIn Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 167--197. 1991.
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University of ArizonaProfessor
Polo Village, Arizona, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics of Mind |
Philosophy of Consciousness |
Intentionality |
Perception |
Mental States and Processes |