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142Methodological solipsism reconsidered as a research strategy in cognitive psychologyPhilosophy of Science 52 (September): 451-69. 1985.Current computational psychology, especially as described by Fodor (1975, 1980, 1981), Pylyshyn (1980), and Stich (1983), is both a bold, promising program for cognitive science and an alternative to naturalistic psychology (Putnam 1975). Whereas naturalistic psychology depends on the general scientific framework to fix the meanings of general terms and, hence, the content of thoughts utilizing or expressed in those terms, computational cognitive theory banishes semantical considerations in psyc…Read more
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106Mental misrepresentationPhilosophy of Science 57 (September): 445-58. 1990.An account of the contents of the propositional attitudes is fundamental to the success of the cognitive sciences if, as seems correct, the cognitive sciences do presuppose propositional attitudes. Fodor has recently pointed the way towards a naturalistic explication of mental content in his Psychosemantics (1987). Fodor's theory is a version of the causal theory of meaning and thus inherits many of its virtues, including its intrinsic plausibility. Nevertheless, the proposal may suffer from two…Read more
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100Sensation and scientific realismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (3): 471-482. 1986.
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99Content: Covariation, control, and contingencySynthese 100 (2): 241-90. 1994.The Representational Theory of the Mind allows for psychological explanations couched in terms of the contents of propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes themselves are taken to be relations to mental representations. These representations (partially) determine the contents of the attitudes in which they figure. Thus, Representationalism owes an explanation of the contents of mental representations. This essay constitutes an atomistic theory of the content of formally or syntactically s…Read more
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61About being a batAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (1): 26-49. 1985.This Article does not have an abstract
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60Information, Semantics & Epistemology (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3): 721-726. 1993.
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57“God” is a term than which none greater can be usedInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (1). 1981.
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36The Mundane Matter of the Mental LanguageCambridge University Press. 1989.Christopher Maloney offers an explanation of the fundamental nature of thought. He posits the idea that thinking involves the processing of mental representations that take the form of sentences in a covert language encoded in the mind. The theory relies upon traditional categories of psychology, including such notions as belief and desire. It also draws upon and thus inherits some of the problems of artificial intelligence which it attempts to answer, including what bestows meaning or content u…Read more
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33A New Model for MetaphorDialectica 37 (4): 285-301. 1983.Metaphors are expressions in artificial, contrived, alien languages, and we understand metaphors by constructing translation schemes linking our natural, literal languages to these theoretically contrived metaphorical languages. The relation between a literal natural language and a metaphorical contrived language is like the relationship between a natively known language and a system of subsequently acquired languages etymologically emerging from that basic natural language. This model for under…Read more
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15Akratic Compatibilism and All Too Human Psychology: Almost Enough Is Free Will EnoughLexington Books. 2023.J. Christopher Maloney argues that free will is compatible with necessary laws of science and immutable history. For free will emerges from an akratic will that asymptotically approaches the ability to choose to act otherwise than it willfully does.
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13Thought, including conscious perception, is representation. But perceptual representation is uniquely direct, permitting immediate acquaintance with the world and ensuring perception's distinctive phenomenal character. The perceptive mind is extended. It recruits the very objects perceived to constitute self-referential representations determinative of what it is like to perceive.
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11Connectionism and conditioningIn Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 167--197. 1991.
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University of ArizonaProfessor
Polo Village, Arizona, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics of Mind |
Philosophy of Consciousness |
Intentionality |
Perception |
Mental States and Processes |