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25An Unjustly Neglected Theory of Semantic ReferencePhilosophical Studies (5): 1297-1316. 2024.There is a simple, intuitive theory of the semantic reference of proper names that has been unjustly neglected. This is the view that semantic reference is conventionalized speakers reference, i.e. the view that a name semantically refers to an object if, and only if, there exists a convention to use the name to speaker-refer to that object. The theory can be found in works dealing primarily with other issues (e.g. Stine in Philos Stud 33:319–337, 1977; Schiffer in Erkenntnis 13:171–206, 1978; S…Read more
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7Two Social Dimensions of ExpertiseIn Christopher Winch & Mark Addis (eds.), Education and Expertise, Wiley. 2018.In the study of expertise, few debates come as big as that between constructivists and realists. This chapter discusses the signal debate between realists and constructivists about expertise. It sets out a view that includes aspects of both the constructivist and realist position to show that insights from what is often considered to be rival camps can be incorporated in a position that does justice to both. The chapter argues that, while expertise is real, there are two distinct social dimensio…Read more
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17Anaphora and semantic innocenceJournal of Semantics 27 (1): 119-124. 2010.Semantic theories that violate semantic innocence, that is require reference shifts when terms are embedded in ‘that’ clauses and the like, are often challenged by producing sentences where an anaphoric expression, while not itself embedded in a context in which reference shifts, is anaphoric on an antecedent expression that is embedded in such a context. This, in conjunction with a widely accepted principle concerning unproblematic anaphora (the ‘Principle of Anaphoric Reference’), is used to s…Read more
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33Game Theory and DemonstrativesErkenntnis. forthcoming.This paper argues, based on Lewis’ claim that communication is a coordination game (Lewis in Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 3–35, 1975), that we can account for the communicative function of demonstratives without assuming that they semantically refer. The appeal of such a game theoretical version of the case for non-referentialism is that the communicative role of demonstratives can be accounted for without entering the cul de sac …Read more
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54Almog was Right, Kripke’s Causal Theory is TrivialPhilosophia 51 (3): 1627-1641. 2023.Joseph Almog pointed out that Kripkean causal chains not only exist for names, but for all linguistic items (Almog 1984: 482). Based on this, he argues that the role of such chains is the presemantic one of assigning a linguistic meaning to the use of a name (1984: 484). This view is consistent with any number of theories about what such a linguistic meaning could be, and hence with very different views about the semantic reference of names. He concludes that the causal theory is ‘rather trivial…Read more
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56The Supposed “Inseparability” of Fact and ValueSouth African Journal of Philosophy 22 (1): 51-62. 2003.A wide variety of philosophers seem to agree that there is something dubious about the distinction between fact and value. This paper evaluates some of the arguments made for such a contention. It is argued that only the crudest form of pragmatism leads to a conflation of fact and value. Other arguments against the fact/value distinction, mostly drawn from Putnam's Reason, Truth and History, are examined in order to show that they are either false or trivial. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.22(1) 2003: 5…Read more
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77Why hobbits cannot existThink 8 (21): 29-36. 2009.Kotzee and Smit explain why, if unicorns don't exist, then they could not possibly have existed. In fact, even if horned horses were discovered somewhere, they would not necessarily be unicorns. The key to understanding why this is so lies in understanding how so-called natural kind terms function
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47Speaker's reference, semantic reference and public referenceStellenbosch Papers in Linguistics PLUS 55 133-143. 2018.Kripke (1977) views Donnellan's (1966) misdescription cases as cases where semantic reference and speaker's reference come apart. Such cases, however, are also cases where semantic reference conflicts with a distinct species of reference I call "public reference", i.e. the object that the cues publicly available at the time of utterance indicate is the speaker's referent of the utterance. This raises the question: do the misdescription cases trade on the distinction between semantic reference an…Read more
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68Russell’s EccentricityErkenntnis 86 (2): 275-293. 2019.Russell claims that ordinary proper names are eccentric, i.e. that the semantic referent of a name is determined by the descriptive condition that the individual utterer of the name associates with the name. This is deeply puzzling, for the evidence that names are subject to interpersonal coordination seems irrefutable. One way of making sense of Russell’s view would be to claim that he has been systematically misinterpreted and did not, in fact, offer a semantic theory at all. Such a view is pu…Read more
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66Institutions and the Artworld – A Critical NoteJournal of Social Ontology 4 (1): 53-66. 2018.Contemporary theories of institutions as clusters of stable solutions to recurrent coordination problems can illuminate and explain some unresolved difficulties and problems adhering to institutional definitions of art initiated by George Dickie and Arthur Danto. Their account of what confers upon objects their institutional character does not fit well with current work on institutions and social ontology. The claim that “the artworld” confers the status of “art” onto objects remains utterly mys…Read more
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1CITATION: Smit, J. P. 2013. A note on mental content in the Causal Theory. Stellenbosch Papers in Linguistics, 42:77-80, doi:10.5774/42-0-138.
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154The Incentivized Action View of Institutional Facts as an Alternative to the Searlean View: A Response to Butchard and D’AmicoPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (1): 44-55. 2016.In our earlier work, we argued, contra Searle, that institutional facts can be understood in terms of non-institutional facts about actions and incentives. Butchard and D’Amico claim that we have misinterpreted Searle, that our main argument against him has no merit and that our positive view cannot account for institutional facts created via joint action. We deny all three charges.
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8CITATION: Smit, J. P. 2011. Some lessons from Kripke’s A Puzzle About Belief. Stellenbosch Papers in Linguistics, 40:39-56, doi: 10.5774/40-0-38.
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147What is money? An alternative to Searle's institutional factsEconomics and Philosophy 27 (1): 1-22. 2011.In The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle develops a theory of institutional facts and objects, of which money, borders and property are presented as prime examples. These objects are the result of us collectively intending certain natural objects to have a certain status, i.e. to ‘count as’ being certain social objects. This view renders such objects irreducible to natural objects. In this paper we propose a radically different approach that is more compatible with standard economic th…Read more
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116Developing the incentivized action view of institutional realitySynthese 191 (8). 2014.Contemporary discussion concerning institutions focus on, and mostly accept, the Searlean view that institutional objects, i.e. money, borders and the like, exist in virtue of the fact that we collectively represent them as existing. A dissenting note has been sounded by Smit et al. (Econ Philos 27:1–22, 2011), who proposed the incentivized action view of institutional objects. On the incentivized action view, understanding a specific institution is a matter of understanding the specific actions…Read more
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136Cigarettes, dollars and bitcoins – an essay on the ontology of moneyJournal of Institutional Economics 12 (2). 2016.What does being money consist in? We argue that something is money if, and only if, it is typically acquired in order to realise the reduction in transaction costs that accrues in virtue of agents coordinating on acquiring the same thing when deciding what thing to acquire in order to exchange. What kinds of things can be money? We argue against the common view that a variety of things (notes, coins, gold, cigarettes, etc.) can be money. All monetary systems are best interpreted as implementing …Read more
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64How to Do Things Without Words - A Theory of DeclarationsPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (3): 235-254. 2017.Declarations like “this meeting is adjourned” make certain facts the case by representing them as being the case. Yet surprisingly little attention has been paid to the mechanism whereby the utterance of a declaration can bring about a new state of affairs. In this paper, we use the incentivization account of institutional facts to address this issue. We argue that declarations can serve to bring about new states of affairs as their utterance have game theoretical import, typically in virtue of …Read more
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726Traditional descriptivism and Kripkean causalism are standardly interpreted as rival theories on a single topic. I argue that there is no such shared topic, i.e. that there is no question that they can be interpreted as giving rival answers to. The only way to make sense of the commitment to epistemic transparency that characterizes traditional descriptivism is to interpret Russell and Frege as proposing rival accounts of how to characterize a subject’s beliefs about what names refer to. My argu…Read more
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113Why Bare Demonstratives Need Not Semantically ReferCanadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1): 43-66. 2012.I-theories of bare demonstratives take the semantic referent of a demonstrative to be determined by an inner state of the utterer. E-theories take the referent to be determined by factors external to the utterer. I argue that, on the Standard view of communication, neither of these theories can be right. Firstly, both are committed to the existence of conventions with superfluous content. Secondly, any claim to the effect that a speaker employs the conventions associated with these theories cann…Read more
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18CITATION: Smith, J. P. 2014. A note on name individuation and identifying descriptions. Stellenbosch Papers in Linguistics, 43:165-170, doi:10.5774/43-0-165.
Stellenbosch, Western Cape, South Africa
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Social Science |