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166The Natural Probability Theory of StereotypesDiametros 1-27. forthcoming.A stereotype is a belief or claim that a group of people has a particular feature. Stereotypes are expressed by sentences that have the form of generic statements, like “Canadians are nice.” Recent work on generics lends new life to understanding generics as statements involving probabilities. I argue that generics (and thus sentences expressing stereotypes) can take one of several forms involving conditional probabilities, and these probabilities have what I call a naturalness requirement. This…Read more
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190Debates about the genuine disease status of controversial diseases rely on intuitions about a range of factors. Adopting tools from experimental philosophy, this paper explores some of the factors that influence judgments about whether low sexual desire should be considered a disease and whether it should be medically treated. Drawing in part on some assumptions underpinning a divide in the literature between viewing low sexual desire as a genuine disease and seeing it as improperly medicalized,…Read more
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295Fast ScienceThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. forthcoming.If scientists violate principles and practices of routine science to quickly develop interventions against catastrophic threats, they are engaged in what I call fast science. The magnitude, imminence, and plausibility of a threat justify engaging in and acting on fast science. Yet, that justification is incomplete. I defend two principles to assess fast science, which say: fast science should satisfy as much as possible the reliability-enhancing features of routine science, and the fast science …Read more
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444The Validity of the Argument from Inductive RiskCanadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2): 187-190. 2023.Havstad (2022) argues that the argument from inductive risk for the claim that non-epistemic values have a legitimate role to play in the internal stages of science is deductively valid. She also defends its premises and thus soundness. This is, as far as we are aware, the best reconstruction of the argument from inductive risk in the existing literature. However, there is a small flaw in this reconstruction of the argument from inductive risk which appears to render the argument invalid. This f…Read more
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267Simulation of Trial Data to Test Speculative Hypotheses about Research MethodsIn Kristien Hens & Andreas de Block (eds.), Advances in experimental philosophy of medicine, Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 111-128. 2023.We simulate trial data to test speculative claims about research methods, such as the impact of publication bias.
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210Drug Regulation and the Inductive Risk CalculusIn Kevin Christopher Elliott & Ted Richards (eds.), Exploring Inductive Risk: Case Studies of Values in Science, Oup Usa. pp. 17-36. 2017.Drug regulation is fraught with inductive risk. Regulators must make a prediction about whether or not an experimental pharmaceutical will be effective and relatively safe when used by typical patients, and such predictions are based on a complex, indeterminate, and incomplete evidential basis. Such inductive risk has important practical consequences. If regulators reject an experimental drug when it in fact has a favourable benefit/harm profile, then a valuable intervention is denied to the pub…Read more
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574Sisyphean Science: Why Value Freedom is Worth PursuingEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (48): 1-24. 2023.The value-free ideal in science has been criticised as both unattainable and undesirable. We argue that it can be defended as a practical principle guiding scientific research even if the unattainability and undesirability of a value-free end-state are granted. If a goal is unattainable, then one can separate the desirability of accomplishing the goal from the desirability of pursuing it. We articulate a novel value-free ideal, which holds that scientists should act as if science should be value…Read more
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323The Difference-to-Inference Model for Values in ScienceRes Philosophica 100 (4): 423-447. 2023.The value-free ideal for science holds that values should not influence the core features of scientific reasoning. We defend the difference-to-inference model of value-permeation, which holds that value-permeation in science is problematic when values make a difference to the inferences made about a hypothesis. This view of value-permeation is superior to existing views, and it suggests a corresponding maxim—namely, that scientists should strive to eliminate differences to inference. This maxim …Read more
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410Justifying Scientific ProgressPhilosophy of Science. forthcoming.I defend a novel account of scientific progress centred around justification. Science progresses, on this account, where there is a change in justification. I consider three options for explicating this notion of change in justification. This account of scientific progress dispels with a condition for scientific progress that requires accumulation of truth or truthlikeness, and it emphasises the social nature of scientific justification.
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450Marcel Weber: Philosophy of Experimental Biology: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, USD 75.00, ISBN 0521829453 (hbk), 374 pp (review)Erkenntnis 71 (3): 431-436. 2009.Philosophers have committed sins while studying science, it is said – philosophy of science focused on physics to the detriment of biology, reconstructed idealizations of scientific episodes rather than attending to historical details, and focused on theories and concepts to the detriment of experiments. Recent generations of philosophers of science have tried to atone for these sins, and by the 1980s the exculpation was in full swing. Marcel Weber’s Philosophy of Experimental Biology is a zenit…Read more
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Measuring harmsIn Miriam Solomon, Jeremy R. Simon & Harold Kincaid (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine, Routledge. 2016.
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41Care and cure: an introduction to philosophy of medicineUniversity of Chicago Press. 2018.Concepts. Health ; Disease ; Death -- Models and kinds. Causation and kinds ; Holism and reductionism ; Controversial diseases -- Evidence and inference. Evidence in medicine ; Objectivity and the social structure of science ; Inference ; Effectiveness, skepticism, and alternatives ; Diagnosis and screening -- Values and policy. Psychiatry: care or control? ; Policy ; Public health.
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865Sex Differences in Sexual DesirePhilosophy of Science 89 (5): 1094-1103. 2022.The standard view about sex differences in sexual desire is that males are lusty and loose, while females are cool and coy. This is widely believed and is a core premise of some scientific programs like evolutionary psychology. But is it true? A mountain of evidence seems to support the standard view. Yet, this evidence is shot through with methodological and philosophical problems. Developments in the study of sexual desire suggest that some of these problems can be resolved, and when they are,…Read more
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255Conventional Choices in Outcome Measures Influence Meta-Analytic ResultsPhilosophy of Science 89 (5): 949-959. 2022.It is a plausible speculation that conventional choices in outcome measures might influence the results of meta-analyses. We test that speculation by simulating data from trials on antidepressants. We vary real drug effectiveness while modulating conventional values for outcome measures. We had previously shown that one conventional choice used in meta-analyses of antidepressants falls in a narrow range of values that maximize estimates of effectiveness. Our present analysis investigates why thi…Read more
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319Red herrings about relative measures: A response to Hoefer and KraussStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 92 (C): 56-59. 2022.
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271Evidence of effectivenessStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 91 (C): 288-295. 2022.There are two competing views regarding the role of mechanistic knowledge in inferences about the effectiveness of interventions. One view holds that inferences about the effectiveness of interventions should be based only on data from population-level studies (often statistical evidence from randomised trials). The other view holds that such inferences must be based in part on mechanistic evidence. The competing views are local principles of inference, the plausibility of which can be assessed …Read more
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797Medicalization of Sexual DesireEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (2). 2021.Medicalisation is a social phenomenon in which conditions that were once under legal, religious, personal or other jurisdictions are brought into the domain of medical authority. Low sexual desire in females has been medicalised, pathologised as a disease, and intervened upon with a range of pharmaceuticals. There are two polarised positions on the medicalisation of low female sexual desire: I call these the mainstream view and the critical view. I assess the central arguments for both positions…Read more
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256The Problem of New Evidence: P-Hacking and Pre-Analysis PlansDiametros 17 (66): 10-33. 2020.We provide a novel articulation of the epistemic peril of p-hacking using three resources from philosophy: predictivism, Bayesian confirmation theory, and model selection theory. We defend a nuanced position on p-hacking: p-hacking is sometimes, but not always, epistemically pernicious. Our argument requires a novel understanding of Bayesianism, since a standard criticism of Bayesian confirmation theory is that it cannot represent the influence of biased methods. We then turn to pre-analysis pla…Read more
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28Book ForumStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 81 101274. 2020.
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26A theory of evidence for evidence-based policyIn Philip Dawid, William Twining & Mimi Vasilaki (eds.), Evidence, Inference and Enquiry, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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56Medical NihilismOxford University Press. 2018.Medical nihilism is the view that we should have little confidence in the effectiveness of medical interventions. Jacob Stegenga argues persuasively that this is how we should see modern medicine, and suggests that medical research must be modified, clinical practice should be less aggressive, and regulatory standards should be enhanced.
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597Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome MeasuresPhilosophy of Science 84 (5): 840-852. 2017.Data from medical research are typically summarized with various types of outcome measures. We present three arguments in favor of absolute over relative outcome measures. The first argument is from cognitive bias: relative measures promote the reference class fallacy and the overestimation of treatment effectiveness. The second argument is decision-theoretic: absolute measures are superior to relative measures for making a decision between interventions. The third argument is causal: interprete…Read more
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922Robustness and Independent EvidencePhilosophy of Science 84 (3): 414-435. 2017.Robustness arguments hold that hypotheses are more likely to be true when they are confirmed by diverse kinds of evidence. Robustness arguments require the confirming evidence to be independent. We identify two kinds of independence appealed to in robustness arguments: ontic independence —when the multiple lines of evidence depend on different materials, assumptions, or theories—and probabilistic independence. Many assume that OI is sufficient for a robustness argument to be warranted. However, …Read more
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363Angela N. H. Creager, Elizabeth Lunbeck and M. Norton Wise , Science without Laws: Model Systems, Cases, Exemplary Narratives. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8223-4068-3. £12.99 (review)British Journal for the History of Science 42 (4): 626. 2009.
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248Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Nosology, Kendler and Parnas, eds. (review)Metapsychology Online Reviews 15 (15). 2012.
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384Probabilizing the endPhilosophical Studies 165 (1): 95-112. 2013.Reasons transmit. If one has a reason to attain an end, then one has a reason to effect means for that end: reasons are transmitted from end to means. I argue that the likelihood ratio (LR) is a compelling measure of reason transmission from ends to means. The LR measure is superior to other measures, can be used to construct a condition specifying precisely when reasons transmit, and satisfies intuitions regarding end-means reason transmission in a broad array of cases
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290Francesca Bordogna, William James at the Boundaries: Philosophy, Science, and the Geography of Knowledge. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 2008. Pp. x+382. ISBN 978-0-226-06652-3. £23.00 (review)British Journal for the History of Science 43 (1): 130-131. 2010.
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1846A theory of evidence for evidence-based policyIn Philip Dawid, William Twining & Mimi Vasilaki (eds.), Evidence, Inference and Enquiry, Oup/british Academy. pp. 291. 2011.WE AIM HERE to outline a theory of evidence for use. More specifically we lay foundations for a guide for the use of evidence in predicting policy effectiveness in situ, a more comprehensive guide than current standard offerings, such as the Maryland rules in criminology, the weight of evidence scheme of the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), or the US ‘What Works Clearinghouse’. The guide itself is meant to be well-grounded but at the same time to give practicable advice, that …Read more
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469Jessica Riskin , Genesis Redux: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Artificial Life. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007. Pp. xvii+389. ISBN 978-0-226-72081-4. £16.00, $25.00 (review)British Journal for the History of Science 42 (3): 437. 2009.
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971Down with the HierarchiesTopoi 33 (2): 313-322. 2014.Evidence hierarchies are widely used to assess evidence in systematic reviews of medical studies. I give several arguments against the use of evidence hierarchies. The problems with evidence hierarchies are numerous, and include methodological shortcomings, philosophical problems, and formal constraints. I argue that medical science should not employ evidence hierarchies, including even the latest and most-sophisticated of such hierarchies