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Parity and ParetoPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research. forthcoming.Pareto principles are at the core of ethics and decision theory. The Strong Pareto principle says that if one thing is better than another for someone and at least as good for everyone else, then the one is overall better than the other. But a host of famous figures express it differently, with ‘not worse’ in place of ‘at least as good.’ In the presence of parity (or incommensurability), this results in a strictly stronger Pareto principle, which I call Super‐Strong Pareto. Super‐Strong Pareto, …Read more
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Decision Theory UnboundNoûs. forthcoming.
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Superiority Discounting Implies the Preposterous ConclusionUtilitas 34 (4): 493-501. 2022.Many population axiologies avoid the Repugnant Conclusion by endorsing Superiority: some number of great lives is better than any number of mediocre lives. But as Nebel shows, RC follows from the Intrapersonal Repugnant Conclusion: a guaranteed mediocre life is better than a sufficiently small probability of a great life. This result is concerning because IRC is plausible. Recently, Kosonen has argued that IRC can be true while RC is false if small probabilities are discounted to zero. This arti…Read more
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Knowledge by constraintPhilosophical Perspectives 35 (1): 1-28. 2021.
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Thinking, Guessing, and BelievingPhilosophers' Imprint 22 (1): 1-34. 2022.This paper defends the view, put roughly, that to think that p is to guess that p is the answer to the question at hand, and that to think that p rationally is for one’s guess to that question to be in a certain sense non-arbitrary. Some theses that will be argued for along the way include: that thinking is question-sensitive and, correspondingly, that ‘thinks’ is context-sensitive; that it can be rational to think that p while having arbitrarily low credence that p; that, nonetheless, rational …Read more
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Discounting Small Probabilities Solves the Intrapersonal Addition ParadoxEthics 132 (1): 204-217. 2021.Nebel argues for the Repugnant Conclusion via the “Intrapersonal Repugnant Conclusion,” on which certainty of a mediocre life is better for individuals than a sufficiently small chance of an excellent life. In this article, I deny that acceptance of the Intrapersonal Repugnant Conclusion leads us to the Repugnant Conclusion. I point out that on many views which avoid the Repugnant Conclusion we should discount very small probabilities down to zero. If we do, then Nebel’s crucial premise of Ex An…Read more
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What is "real" in Probabilism?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3): 573-587. 2017.
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A dilemma for lexical and Archimedean views in population axiologyEconomics and Philosophy 38 (3): 395-415. 2022.Lexical views in population axiology can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion without violating Transitivity or Separability. However, they imply a dilemma: either some good life is better than any number of slightly worse lives, or else the ‘at least as good as’ relation on populations is radically incomplete. In this paper, I argue that Archimedean views face an analogous dilemma. I thus conclude that the lexical dilemma gives us little reason to prefer Archimedean views. Even if we give up on lexic…Read more
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A St Petersburg Paradox for risky welfare aggregationAnalysis 81 (3): 420-426. 2021.
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What Theoretical Equivalence Could Not BePhilosophical Studies 178 (12): 4119-4149. 2021.Formal criteria of theoretical equivalence are mathematical mappings between specific sorts of mathematical objects, notably including those objects used in mathematical physics. Proponents of formal criteria claim that results involving these criteria have implications that extend beyond pure mathematics. For instance, they claim that formal criteria bear on the project of using our best mathematical physics as a guide to what the world is like, and also have deflationary implications for vario…Read more
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What calibrating variable-value population ethics suggestsEconomics and Philosophy 1-12. forthcoming.Variable-Value axiologies avoid Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion while satisfying some weak instances of the Mere Addition principle. We apply calibration methods to two leading members of the family of Variable-Value views conditional upon: first, a very weak instance of Mere Addition and, second, some plausible empirical assumptions about the size and welfare of the intertemporal world population. We find that such facts calibrate these two Variable-Value views to be nearly totalist, and therefor…Read more
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The impossibility of a satisfactory population prospect axiology (independently of Finite Fine-Grainedness)Philosophical Studies 178 (11): 3671-3695. 2021.Arrhenius’s impossibility theorems purport to demonstrate that no population axiology can satisfy each of a small number of intuitively compelling adequacy conditions. However, it has recently been pointed out that each theorem depends on a dubious assumption: Finite Fine-Grainedness. This assumption states that there exists a finite sequence of slight welfare differences between any two welfare levels. Denying Finite Fine-Grainedness makes room for a lexical population axiology which satisfies …Read more
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Transfinitely Transitive ValuePhilosophical Quarterly 72 (1): 108-134. 2021.This paper develops transfinite extensions of transitivity and acyclicity in the context of population ethics. They are used to argue that it is better to add good lives, worse to add bad lives, and equally good to add neutral lives, where a life's value is understood as personal value. These conclusions rule out a number of theories of population ethics, feed into an argument for the repugnant conclusion, and allow us to reduce different-number comparisons to same-number ones. Challenges to the…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |