Jake Zuehl

In The Pecking Order, Niko Kolodny argues (1) that social hierarchy consists in asymmetries or disparities of power, authority, or regard, and (2) that such asymmetries and disparities are intrinsically objectionable unless sufficiently "tempered." In this paper, I critically examine his arguments and conclude that (1) all hierarchy consists in disparities of regard (or, as I prefer to say, respect), and that (2) only hierarchies of one particular kind of respect ("consideration") are so much as presumptively objectionable. I conclude that the morality of social hierarchy may provide more limited normative resources than Kolodny and other social egalitarians have thought.

In "The Case for Comparability," we argue that every comparative expression "F" obeys Comparability: if two things are at least as F as themselves, then one of them must be at least as F as the other. One of our arguments appeals to the apparent validity of the Strong Monotonicity schema: x is F; y is not F; so, x is more F than y. Erik Carlson and Olle Risberg claim that this argument is not valid, that it begs the question, and that the appearances favoring Strong Monotonicity—at least, for the adjective "good"—can be explained away. This paper defends our argument against these objections.

We argue that all comparative expressions in natural language obey a principle that we call Comparability: if x and y are at least as F as themselves, then either x is at least as F as y or y is at least as F as x. This principle has been widely rejected among philosophers, especially by ethicists, and its falsity has been claimed to have important normative implications. We argue that Comparability is needed to explain the goodness of several patterns of inference that seem manifestly valid, that the purported failures of Comparability would have absurd consequences, and that the influential arguments against Comparability are less compelling than they may have initially seemed.