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601Bayesian realism and structural representationBehavioral and Brain Sciences 45. 2022.We challenge Bruineberg et al's view that Markov blankets are illicitly reified when used to describe organismic boundaries. We do this both on general methodological grounds, where we appeal to a form of structural realism derived from Bayesian cognitive science to dissolve the problem, and by rebutting specific arguments in the target article.
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464Predictive Processing and Body RepresentationIn Colin Chamberlain (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Bodily Awareness, Routledge. 2022.We introduce the predictive processing account of body representation, according to which body representation emerges via a domain-general scheme of (long-term) prediction error minimisation. We contrast this account against one where body representation is underpinned by domain-specific systems, whose exclusive function is to track the body. We illustrate how the predictive processing account offers considerable advantages in explaining various empirical findings, and we draw out some implicati…Read more
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1508Conscious Self-EvidencingReview of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (4): 809-828. 2022.Self-evidencing describes the purported predictive processing of all self-organising systems, whether conscious or not. Self-evidencing in itself is therefore not sufficient for consciousness. Different systems may however be capable of self-evidencing in different, specific and distinct ways. Some of these ways of self-evidencing can be matched up with, and explain, several properties of consciousness. This carves out a distinction in nature between those systems that are conscious, as describe…Read more
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36The effect of uncertainty on prediction error in the action perception loopCognition 210 (C): 104598. 2021.Among all their sensations, agents need to distinguish between those caused by themselves and those caused by external causes. The ability to infer agency is particularly challenging under conditions of uncertainty. Within the predictive processing framework, this should happen through active control of prediction error that closes the action-perception loop. Here we use a novel, temporally-sensitive, behavioural proxy for prediction error to show that it is minimised most quickly when volatilit…Read more
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106Predictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousnessPhilosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (II). 2020.The search for the neural correlates of consciousness is in need of a systematic, principled foundation that can endow putative neural correlates with greater predictive and explanatory value. Here, we propose the predictive processing framework for brain function as a promising candidate for providing this systematic foundation. The proposal is motivated by that framework’s ability to address three general challenges to identifying the neural correlates of consciousness, and to satisfy two cons…Read more
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70Explanation in the science of consciousness: From the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) to the difference makers of consciousnessPhilosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (II). 2020.At present, the science of consciousness is structured around the search for the neural correlates of consciousness. One of the alleged advantages of the NCCs framework is its metaphysical neutrality—the fact that it begs no contested questions with respect to debates about the fundamental nature of consciousness. Here, we argue that even if the NCC framework is metaphysically neutral, it is structurally committed, for it presupposes a certain model—what we call the Lite-Brite model—of conscious…Read more
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42Events and Machine LearningTopics in Cognitive Science 13 (1): 243-247. 2021.Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 13, Issue 1, Page 243-247, January 2021.
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11Tracking the Influence of Predictive Cues on the Evaluation of Food Images: Volatility Enables NudgingFrontiers in Psychology 11. 2020.In previous research on the evaluation of food images, we found that appetitive food images were rated higher following a positive prediction than following a negative prediction, and vice versa for aversive food images. The findings suggested an active confirmation bias. Here, we examine whether this influence from prediction depends on the evaluative polarization of the food images. Specifically, we divided the set of food images into "strong" and "mild" images by how polarized (i.e., extreme)…Read more
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56From allostatic agents to counterfactual cognisers: active inference, biological regulation, and the origins of cognitionBiology and Philosophy 35 (3): 1-45. 2020.What is the function of cognition? On one influential account, cognition evolved to co-ordinate behaviour with environmental change or complexity. Liberal interpretations of this view ascribe cognition to an extraordinarily broad set of biological systems—even bacteria, which modulate their activity in response to salient external cues, would seem to qualify as cognitive agents. However, equating cognition with adaptive flexibility per se glosses over important distinctions in the way biological…Read more
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67Self-supervision, normativity and the free energy principleSynthese 199 (1-2): 29-53. 2020.The free energy principle says that any self-organising system that is at nonequilibrium steady-state with its environment must minimize its free energy. It is proposed as a grand unifying principle for cognitive science and biology. The principle can appear cryptic, esoteric, too ambitious, and unfalsifiable—suggesting it would be best to suspend any belief in the principle, and instead focus on individual, more concrete and falsifiable ‘process theories’ for particular biological processes and…Read more
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188New directions in predictive processingMind and Language 35 (2): 209-223. 2020.Predictive processing (PP) is now a prominent theoretical framework in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. This review focuses on PP research with a relatively philosophical focus, taking stock of the framework and discussing new directions. The review contains an introduction that describes the full PP toolbox; an exploration of areas where PP has advanced understanding of perceptual and cognitive phenomena; a discussion of PP's impact on foundational issues in cognitive science; and …Read more
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51Events, Event Prediction, and Predictive ProcessingTopics in Cognitive Science 13 (1): 252-255. 2021.Events and event prediction are pivotal concepts across much of cognitive science, as demonstrated by the papers in this special issue. We first discuss how the study of events and the predictive processing framework may fruitfully inform each other. We then briefly point to some links to broader philosophical questions about events.
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41The Intermediate Scope of Consciousness in the Predictive MindErkenntnis 87 (2): 891-912. 2020.There is a view on consciousness that has strong intuitive appeal and empirical support: the intermediate-level theory of consciousness, proposed mainly by Ray Jackendoff and by Jesse Prinz. This theory identifies a specific “intermediate” level of representation as the basis of human phenomenal consciousness, which sits between high-level non-perspectival thought processes and low-level disjointed feature-detection processes in the perceptual and cognitive processing hierarchy. In this article,…Read more
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1Representation in the Prediction Error Minimization FrameworkIn Sarah Robins, John Francis Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, Routledge. pp. 384-409. 2009.This chapter focuses on what’s novel in the perspective that the prediction error minimization (PEM) framework affords on the cognitive-scientific project of explaining intelligence by appeal to internal representations. It shows how truth-conditional and resemblance-based approaches to representation in generative models may be integrated. The PEM framework in cognitive science is an approach to cognition and perception centered on a simple idea: organisms represent the world by constantly pred…Read more
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29Reflections on predictive processing and the mind. Interview with Jakob HohwyAvant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 5 (3): 145-152. 2014.
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37Phenomenology and Cognitive Science: Don’t Fear the Reductionist Bogey-manAustralasian Philosophical Review 2 (2): 138-144. 2018.Shaun Gallagher calls for a radical rethinking of the concept of nature and he resists reduction of phenomenology to computational-neural science. However, classic, reductionist science, at least in contemporary computational guise, has the resources to accommodate insights from transcendental phenomenology. Reductionism should be embraced, not feared.
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59Bayes, time perception, and relativity: The central role of hopelessnessConsciousness and Cognition 69 70-80. 2019.
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46Priors in perception: Top-down modulation, Bayesian perceptual learning rate, and prediction error minimizationConsciousness and Cognition 47 75-85. 2017.
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67Can the free energy principle be used to generate a theory of consciousness?Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9. 2015.
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26Autism and the sensorimotor effects of the Rubber-Hand IllusionFrontiers in Human Neuroscience 9. 2015.
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697Mind–brain identity and evidential insulationPhilosophical Studies 153 (3): 377-395. 2011.Is it rational to believe that the mind is identical to the brain? Identity theorists say it is (or looks like it will be, once all the neuroscientific evidence is in), and they base this claim on a general epistemic route to belief in identity. I re-develop this general route and defend it against some objections. Then I discuss how rational belief in mind–brain identity, obtained via this route, can be threatened by an appropriately adjusted version of the anti-physicalist knowledge argument. …Read more
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661How to entrain your evil demonPhilosophy and Predictive Processing. 2017.The notion that the brain is a prediction error minimizer entails, via the notion of Markov blankets and self-evidencing, a form of global scepticism — an inability to rule out evil demon scenarios. This type of scepticism is viewed by some as a sign of a fatally flawed conception of mind and cognition. Here I discuss whether this scepticism is ameliorated by acknowledging the role of action in the most ambitious approach to prediction error minimization, namely under the free energy principle. …Read more
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186Content and misrepresentation in hierarchical generative modelsSynthese 195 (6): 2387-2415. 2018.In this paper, we consider how certain longstanding philosophical questions about mental representation may be answered on the assumption that cognitive and perceptual systems implement hierarchical generative models, such as those discussed within the prediction error minimization framework. We build on existing treatments of representation via structural resemblance, such as those in Gładziejewski :559–582, 2016) and Gładziejewski and Miłkowski, to argue for a representationalist interpretatio…Read more
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913The hypothesis testing brain: Some philosophical applicationsProceedings of the Australian Society for Cognitive Science Conference. 2010.According to one theory, the brain is a sophisticated hypothesis tester: perception is Bayesian unconscious inference where the brain actively uses predictions to test, and then refine, models about what the causes of its sensory input might be. The brain’s task is simply continually to minimise prediction error. This theory, which is getting increasingly popular, holds great explanatory promise for a number of central areas of research at the intersection of philosophy and cognitive neuroscienc…Read more
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580A Case for Increased Caution in End of Life Decisions for Disorders of ConsciousnessMonash Bioethics 28 (2). 2009.Disorders of consciousness include coma, the vegetative state and the minimally conscious state. Such patients are often regarded as unconscious. This has consequences for end of life decisions for these patients: it is much easier to justify withdrawing life support for unconscious than conscious patients. Recent brain imaging research has however suggested that some patients may in fact be conscious.
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38Quietism and cognitive commandPhilosophical Quarterly 47 (189): 495-500. 1997.Crispin Wright has sought to establish the possibility of ‘significant metaphysics’ in the shape of a common metric with which to measure the realism or robustness of various discourses. One means by which to place discourses in the metric is via the ‘cognitive command constraint’. Importantly, this constraint must be a priori. Richard Rorty has argued against this, that, given content is a function of standards of representationality, the a priori requirement cannot be satisfied. I show that th…Read more
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814Social cognition as causal inference: implications for common knowledge and autismIn John Michael & Mattia Gallotti (eds.), Social Objects and Social Cognition, Springer. forthcoming.This chapter explores the idea that the need to establish common knowledge is one feature that makes social cognition stand apart in important ways from cognition in general. We develop this idea on the background of the claim that social cognition is nothing but a type of causal inference. We focus on autism as our test-case, and propose that a specific type of problem with common knowledge processing is implicated in challenges to social cognition in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). This proble…Read more
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26Neural correlates and causal mechanismsConsciousness and Cognition 21 (2): 691-692. 2012.What Joseph Neisser calls for is exactly right: more philosophy of science will help us better understand and refine the idea of neural correlates of consciousness . But the key bit of philosophy of science Neisser appeals to is itself in need of clarification; the orthodox NCC definition is more resourceful than Neisser allows, and it is possible to resist the phenomenological conception of conscious experience that fuels some of Neisser’s argument
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10Can you tickle yourself if you swap bodies with someone else?Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4): 1-11. 2013.The effect of the body transfer illusion on the perceived strength of self- and externally-generated “tickle” sensations was investigated. As expected, externally generated movement produced significantly higher ratings of tickliness than those associated with self-generated movements. Surprisingly, the body transfer illusion had no influence on the ratings of tickliness, suggesting that highly surprising, and therefore hard to predict, experiences of body image and first-person perspective do n…Read more
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Monash UniversityDepartment of Philosophy
Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative StudiesProfessor
Clayton, Victoria, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Mind |