•  138
    The Dialectic of Perspectivism I
    SATS 7 (1): 5-50. 2006.
    Philosophers ... always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; they always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense.
  •  1
    The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographical Interview
    with Thomas S. Kuhn and Chicago University of
    University of Chicago Press. 2000.
    Divided into three parts, this work is a record of the direction Kuhn was taking during the last two decades of his life. It consists of essays in which he refines the basic concepts set forth in "Structure"--Paradigm shifts, incommensurability, and the nature of scientific progress.
  •  7
    Wittgensteins Kritik am additiven Verständnis des sprachlichen Zeichens
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 69 (1): 1-24. 2021.
    This paper argues that Wittgenstein, both early and late, rejects the idea that the logically simpler and more fundamental case is that of “the mere sign” and that what a meaningful symbol is can be explained through the elaboration of an appropriately supplemented conception of the sign: the sign plus something. Rather the sign, in the logically fundamental case of its mode of occurrence, is an internal aspect of the symbol. The Tractatus puts this point as follows: “The sign is that in the sym…Read more
  •  3
    The Road since Structure
    with Kuhn Thomas and John Haugeland
    In Thomas Kuhn (ed.), The Road Since Structure, University of Chicago Press. 2000.
  •  19
    On Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics
    with Hilary Putnam
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70 (1): 243-266. 1996.
  •  119
    Why worry about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus? Did not Wittgenstein himself come to think it was largely a mistaken work? Is not Wittgenstein’s important work his later work? And does not his later work consist in a rejection of his earlier views? So does not the interest of the Tractatus mostly lie in its capacity to furnish a particularly vivid exemplar of the sort of philosophy that the mature Wittgenstein was most concerned to reject? So is it not true that the only real reason to worry about the…Read more
  •  201
    Wittgenstein on meaning and use
    Philosophical Investigations 21 (3). 1998.
    Wittgenstein is usually taken to have held that the use of a term is not mentally constrained. That is utterly wrong. A use of language unconstrained by meaning is attributed by him to "meaning-blind" or "aspect-blind" creatures, not to us. We observe meaning when an aspect dawns on us; meaning is the impression (Eindruck) of a term as fitting something; hence, unlike pain, it cannot stand alone. That is a mentalistic theory of meaning: use is determined by images (Vorstellungen) that play seman…Read more
  •  171
    If someone believes himself to have discovered the solution to the problem of life … then in order to refute himself he need only reflect that there was a time when this ‘solution’ had not been discovered; but it must have been possible to live then too…. And that is the position in which we find ourselves in logic. If there comes to seem to be a ‘solution’ to logical (philosophical) problems, we should need only to caution ourselves that there was a time when they had not been solved (and even …Read more
  •  4
    Stanley Cavells Wittgenstein
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 46 (2). 1998.
  •  157
    The document before you is by a member of a fanatical sect of heretical Ludwig scholars. Through a twist of fate it has fallen into my hands. I hesitate to make it public, since its circulation may do more harm than good. What speaks against publication is that it has the power to corrupt young minds. I do not take a light view of the dangers it poses in this regard. What speaks in favor of publication is the fact that these people must be stopped. Through their pamphlets and brochures they cont…Read more
  • Realism with a Human Face (edited book)
    Harvard University Press. 1984.
  •  22
    On Wittgenstein
    with Wolfgang Kienzler, Stefan Majetschak, Volker Munz, Josef G. F. Rothhaupt, David Stern, and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl
    In Sascha Bru, Wolfgang Huemer & Daniel Steuer (eds.), wittgenstein Reading, De Gruyter. pp. 96-107. 2001.
  •  2
    An Interview with Stanley Cavell
    In R. Fleming & M. Payne (eds.), The Senses of Stanley Cavell, Bucknell. pp. 59. 1989.
  •  3
    Rethinking Epistemology (edited book)
    with Günter Abel
    De Gruyter. 2011.
    This volume contains contributions to the systematic study of knowledge. They suggest both an extension and a new path for classical epistemology. The topics in the second volume are the following: variants of skepticism; knowledge of the first, second, and third person; practical knowledge and the structure of action; knowledge and the problem of dualism; and disjunctivism concerning experience and perception."
  •  97
    Elucidation and nonsense in Frege and early Wittgenstein
    In Alice Crary & Rupert J. Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein, Routledge. pp. 174--217. 2000.
  •  1
    Rethinking Epistemology Volume 2 (edited book)
    with Günter Abel
    De Gruyter. 2012.
  •  1
    Freedom, cruelty, and truth: Rorty versus Orwell
    In Robert Brandom (ed.), Rorty and His Critics, Blackwell. pp. 268--342. 2000.
  •  47
    This paper argues that Wittgenstein, both early and late, rejects the idea that the logically simpler and more fundamental case is that of "the mere sign" and that what a meaningful symbol is can be explained through the elaboration of an appropriately supplemented conception of the sign: the sign plus something. Rather the sign, in the logically fundamental case of its mode of occurrence, is an internal aspect of the symbol. The Tractatus puts this point as follows: “The sign is that in the sym…Read more
  •  19
    Some Socratic Aspects of Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy
    In James Conant & Sebastian Sunday Grève (eds.), Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning, Cambridge University Press. pp. 231-264. 2019.
    This chapter begins with an examination, testing the reader’s knowledge of Socrates and Wittgenstein. It goes on to consider the question of why the exam might be a difficult one, and the question of what this difficulty shows about Wittgenstein. The chapter further discusses, on a more general level, the questions of why the claim that a philosopher’s conception of philosophy bears a Socratic aspect was once a tautology and why the claim that Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy bears a Socr…Read more
  •  42
    Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2019.
    This volume of new essays presents groundbreaking interpretations of some of the most central themes of Wittgenstein's philosophy. A distinguished group of contributors demonstrates how Wittgenstein's thought can fruitfully be applied to contemporary debates in epistemology, metaphilosophy and philosophy of language. The volume combines historical and systematic approaches to Wittgensteinian methods and perspectives, with essays providing detailed analysis that will be accessible to students as …Read more
  •  27
    Inheriting Wittgenstein: James Conant in Conversation with Niklas Forsberg, Part 2
    with Niklas Forsberg
    Nordic Wittgenstein Review 7 (2): 111-193. 2018.
    This is part 2 of an interview with Prof. J. Conant, conducted by Niklas Forsberg.
  • The Road Since Structure (edited book)
    with J. Haugeland
    University of Chicago Press. 1995.
  •  69
    Why Kant Is Not a Kantian
    Philosophical Topics 44 (1): 75-125. 2016.
    A central debate in early modern philosophy, between empiricism and rationalism, turned on the question which of two cognitive faculties—sensibility or understanding—should be accorded logical priority in an account of the epistemic credentials of knowledge. As against both the empiricist and the rationalist, Kant wants to argue that the terms of their debate rest on a shared common assumption: namely that the capacities here in question—qua cognitive capacities—are self-standingly intelligible.…Read more
  •  1
    The Road since Structure
    with Thomas S. Kuhn and J. Haugeland
    Philosophy of Science 68 (4): 573-575. 2001.
  •  1
    Contributors
    with Andrea Kern
    In Andrea Kern & James Conant (eds.), Varieties of Skepticism: Essays After Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell, De Gruyter. pp. 451-454. 2014.
  •  41
    Introduction
    with Sebastian Rödl
    Philosophical Topics 42 (1): 1-12. 2014.