• Domination, the State and Anarchism
    In Klaus Mathis & Luca Langensand (eds.), Dignity, Diversity, Anarchy. pp. 143-168. 2021.
    Anarchists standardly critique the state for being illegitimate, and for being dominating in some sense. Often these criticisms come as a bundle: the state is illegitimate because it is dominating. But there are various stories we might tell about the connection between the two; domination makes consent impossible, domination means that the state fails to meet its own justification for existing (or for claiming authority), and so on. I suggest that we should sidestep concerns about consent: in p…Read more
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    The Social-Relational View of Recognition Respect
    Bibliotecca Della Liberta 56 (231): 5-30. 2021.
    In this paper, I focus on recognition respect as a component of Anderson’s democratic equality – specifically, how it places certain requirements on the way political institutions such as states treat both citizens and non-citizens. I argue for two claims: that recognition respect is a plausible political (as well as ethical) value, and that it should be understood in large part as a matter of an agent’s material relational standing rather than as their merely being regarded in a certain way b…Read more
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    The Habermas-Rawls Debate (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1): 249-251. 2019.
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    Autonomy, authority, and anarchy
    Dissertation, University of Glasgow. 2017.
    The problem of the ‘mountain man’, the caricature of self-sufficiency and individualism, is not a new one for autonomy theorists. It seems plausible that there is genuine value in self-direction according to one’s deeply-held principles. If autonomy involves something like this, then anyone concerned with autonomy as a social rather than individualistic phenomenon must explain what the mountain man gets wrong when he denies that his autonomy admits of being placed under obligations to others. In…Read more
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    Intimacy, Autonomy and (Non) Domination
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (2): 399-416. 2018.
    Accounts of autonomy which acknowledge the importance of non-domination – that is, of being structurally protected against arbitrary interference with one's life – face an apparent problem with regards to intimate relationships. By their very nature, such relations open us up to psychological and material suffering that would not be possible absent the particular relationship; even worse, from the non-domination point of view, is that this vulnerability seems to be structural in a way exactly an…Read more
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    Patrick R. Frierson, Kant's Questions: What is the Human Being? (review)
    Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 37 (4): 546-547. 2014.