James Sares

This article develops an interpretation and defense of Husserl’s account of the omnitemporality of idealities. I first examine why Husserl rejects the atemporality and temporal individuation of idealities on phenomenological grounds, specifically that these attributions prove countersensical in how they relate idealities to consciousness. As an alternative to these conceptions, I develop a two-sided interpretation of omnitemporality expressed in modal terms of actuality and possibility, the actual referring to appearances in time and the possible, to reactivation at any time. In defense of this interpretation of omnitemporality, I consider influential criticisms against Husserl’s account of idealities as they concern time, particularly whether the historical genesis of idealities compromises their omnitemporality by binding them to time. Ultimately, I argue that the transcendental historicity of idealities, despite being relevant to the question of validity and access, proves indifferent to their omnitemporality.

This chapter provides an account of sexual ontology, grounded in and responsive to Irigaray’s philosophy, that focuses on the question of possibility. I first consider possibility in terms of the ontological negativity of sexuate beings, whereby one sex or sexuate morphology does not exhaust all that that kind of being is or can be. Second, I consider how sexual difference, as a relational structure of being, engenders possibilities for sexuate beings to develop as irreducible individuals. With particular focus on the human being and the looming question of transhumanist technologies, I argue that these principles develop a sexual ontology that recognizes determinate limits between sexes while allowing for varied and creative expressions of sexuate life.

This essay evaluates Hegel's claim that the phenomenon of time exhibits a quantitative logic in the context of a paradox concerning temporal presence. On the one hand, in time, the present always is. It seems that the very nature of time, assuming that it is really passing, requires us to assent to the continuous being of the present. If time is always passing, there must always be a present when the passing actually occurs and thus when beings actually exist. On the other hand, any particular moment of presence, as a point or an interval, immediately ceases to be or has not yet come to be. And, because of this, no delineated moment can be purely self-present. Conceived as an unextended point, presence would be nothing enduring of its own against time's passing, while, conceived as an interval, presence contains before and after within itself, meaning as an interval that is not actually present at once. The paradox is therefore that time's passing demands we think being present and presence as being, while being present, strictly speaking, seems impossible due precisely to that passing. Hegel claims to reconcile the self-same form of presence, a presence that always is, with continuous change under the category of quantity. However, I argue that the non-identity between the logical category and the phenomenon of time renders this reconciliation ineffective against the paradox, breaking down, more specifically, as it concerns the formation of a temporal magnitude. I evaluate alternative Hegelian interpretations for determining whether the irresolvability of the paradox proves problematic after all, arguing that the paradox in fact presents a significant problem for the conceivability of temporal existence.

This chapter develops an argument for the ontological significance of sexual difference through Irigaray’s account of “the negative.” Reading Irigaray with Hegel’s logical analysis of finitude as a negative self-reference, or in terms of the dependence of identity on difference, I consider how this ontological negativity functions in two senses: first, in terms of a generational negativity, whereby sexuate beings rely on this difference as their own copulative condition of possibility; and second, in terms of a more general negative self-relation to sexuate others as incarnated in the determinate limits of one’s own sexuate body. Against skeptical challenges to the reality of these two senses of ontological negativity, this chapter thus develops an account of sexual difference in terms of the irreducible reference to otherness in oneself, subverting the idea that there could be sexuate identity without difference.

In this introduction, we consider how this volume demonstrates not only that the question of sexual difference can be asked with Irigaray but that her project necessitates engaging the question if we are to take seriously her diagnosis of sexual difference as “one of the major philosophical issues, if not the issue, of our age.” We consider how Irigaray's questioning of sexual difference implicates a dialectic of natural and cultural determinations, challenging reductive and essentialist readings of her project. In the process, we trace how the contributors of this volume think sexual difference with Irigaray, revealing the value of her thought for addressing contemporary debates about sex, gender, and race.

Luce Irigaray has written that “sexual difference is one of the major philosophical issues, if not the issue, of our age.” Spanning metaphysics, phenomenology, and psychoanalysis, her work examines how sexual difference structures being and subjectivity, organizes our experience of the world, and affects the images and discourses involved in knowledge production and practical action. No other philosopher has paid such careful attention to the consequences of the elision of sexual difference in philosophical thought. However, at a time when notions of sexual and gender difference are hotly contested, Irigaray’s thought has often been dismissed as essentialist or reductively binary. This book brings together leading scholars to consider the philosophical implications of Irigaray’s writing on sexual difference, particularly for issues of gender and race. Their essays directly confront the charge of essentialism, exploring how Irigaray’s thought opens new possibilities for understanding the complexity of gender identities, including nonbinary and trans experiences as well as alternative configurations of masculinity and femininity. Though Irigaray is sometimes accused of a failure to appreciate racial difference, contributors show the productive role of her work in thinking race. This book also illuminates how Irigaray’s work provides creative practices that help realign human experience and our relations with nature and each other.

Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalytic project has been understood to be antithetical, or at best indifferent, to any project of sexual ontology. Against these dominant views, I argue for an interpretation of the schizoanalytic project that does justice to the differentiation of beings—particularly the human being—according to distinct forms of sexuate morphology. I claim that, although it is largely absent in Deleuze and Guattari’s writings, we can read this kind of determinate sexual difference into their project at both the organic stratum of the organism and the alloplastic stratum of human signification and meaning. Given its importance in structuring bodies and organizing generational reproduction, I consider how sexual difference is the historical condition of possibility for alloplastic subjectivity. Nevertheless, I argue that the innovative features of Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalytic project emerge from their recognition that neither the organismic structure of sexual difference nor its social and personal representation is static. As such, reading sexual difference into the schizoanalytic project not only supplements Deleuze and Guattari’s work but also opens possibilities for developing a sexual ontology that recognizes the dynamic embodiment of individuals without denying the structural reality of sexual difference.