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363Population and Having Children NowJournal of Practical Ethics 5 (2): 49-61. 2017.This paper aims to state the obvious – the commonsense, rational approach to child-producing. We have no general obligation to promote either the “general happiness” or the equalization of this and that. We have children if we want them, if their life prospects are decent – and if we can afford them, which is a considerable part of their life prospects being OK – and provided that in doing so we do not inflict injury on others. It’s extremely difficult to do this latter, but affording them, in r…Read more
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842Resolving the Debate on Libertarianism and AbortionLibertarian Papers 8 267-272. 2016.I take issue with the view that libertarian theory does not imply any particular stand on abortion. Liberty is the absence of interference with people’s wills—interests, wishes, and desires. Only entities that have such are eligible for the direct rights of libertarian theory. Foetuses do not; and if aborted, there is then no future person whose rights are violated. Hence the “liberal” view of abortion: women (especially) may decide whether to bear the children they have conceived. Birth is a go…Read more
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2Have We A Right to Non-discrimination?In D. Poff & W. Waluchow (eds.), Business Ethics in Canada, Prentice Hall. pp. 183-199. 1987.
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Maxificing: life on a budget; or, if you would maximize, then satisfice!In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason, Cambridge University Press. pp. 59--70. 2004.
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166Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Today’s WorldThe Journal of Ethics 8 (4): 305-348. 2004.This article argues that there is no sound basis for thinking that we have a general and strong duty to rectify disparities of wealth around the world, apart from the special case where some become wealthy by theft or fraud. The nearest thing we have to a rational morality for all has to be built on the interests of all, and they include substantial freedoms, but not substantial entitlements to others' assistance. It is also pointed out that the situation of the world's poor is not that of victi…Read more
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5Rights and UtilitarianismCanadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 5 (n/a): 137-160. 1979.Few questions about utilitarianism have been more vexed than that of its relation to rights. It is commonplace to hold that there are nonutilitarian rights, rights not founded on considerations of utility. And it is even thought that the very notion of rights is inherently incapable of being significantly employed within the utilitarian framework. In the present paper, I wish to consider both of these matters. I propose to give reasons—mostly not really new—for rejecting the stronger, conceptual…Read more
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10Future people and usIn Richard I. Sikora & Brian M. Barry (eds.), Obligations to Future Generations, White Horse Press. pp. 38--60. 1978.
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46The "Invisible Hand"Journal of Business Ethics 46 (3). 2003.The argument of the "Invisible Hand" is that the system of free enterprise benefits society in general even though it is not the aim of any particular economic agent to do that. This article proposes an analysis of why this is so. The key is that the morality of the market forbids only force and fraud; it does not require people to do good to others. Nevertheless, when all transactions are voluntary to both parties, that is exactly what we can expect to happen. This is both because the sum of th…Read more
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29MinarchismEtica E Politica 5 (2): 1-14. 2003.This essay addresses the on-going controversy between supporters of minimal government, or minarchists, and supporters of no government, or anarchists. Both lay claim to the Libertarian principle, which holds that the only justification for the use of force is to deal with aggressive force initiated by someone else. Both agree that force is justified in dealing with aggressors. The only question is, who wields it, and how? The essay explains, briefly, the role of private property in all this. Pr…Read more
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63Property rights: Original acquisition and Lockean provisosPublic Affairs Quarterly 13 (3): 205-227. 1999.
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Timo Airaksinen and Martin A. Bertman, eds., Hobbes: War among Nations Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 11 (1): 3-5. 1991.
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1Jerry Z. Muller, ed., Conservatism—An Anthology of Social and Political Thought from David Hume to the Present Reviewed by (review)Philosophy in Review 17 (6): 432-433. 1997.
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53Aesthetics, Charity, Utility, and Distributive JusticeThe Monist 56 (4): 527-551. 1972.As I sit down to begin this essay, the strains of “Tristan und Isolde” are still ringing in my ears; meanwhile, another dozen or so Pakistanian refugees have died for lack of sufficient food, shelter, or medical attention, probably, during the time it will have taken to compose this paragraph. The Isolde in that performance commanded, probably, a fee of four or five thousand dollars; each member of the audience paid, on the average, perhaps ten dollars to see the performance. This works out, pro…Read more
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17Professor Filice’s Defense of Pacifism: A CommentJournal of Philosophical Research 17 483-491. 1992.
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D. Weinstein, Equal Freedom and Utility-Herbert Spencer's Liberal Utilitarianism Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 19 (4): 295-297. 1999.
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1John Christman, The Myth of Property , pp. ix + 184, + Notes, Bibliography, Index (review)Reason Papers 21 77-81. 1996.
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17Liberal-Conservative: The Real Controversy (review)Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (2/3): 167-188. 2000.
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1O obronie poprzez odstraszanie jądroweEtyka 25 271-285. 1990.At the present time and for the foreseeable future, likely, there is no defence, strictly speaking, against nuclear weapons. Nations facing a threat of attack involving nuclear weapons, therefore, have only three alternatives: resort to deterrence, try to get by with conventional defences, or surrender. It is discussable which of these is the most prudent option for any given nation, but I argue that we cannot accept any view entailing that the first is not a right. What we can do, however, is t…Read more
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1Drugs and ResponsibilityIn S. Luper-Foy C. Brown (ed.), Drugs, Morality, and the Law, Garland. pp. 3--24. 1994.
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44Reiman on Labor, Value, and the Difference PrincipleThe Journal of Ethics 18 (1): 47-74. 2014.In As Free and as Just as Possible: The Theory of Marxian Liberalism, Jeffrey Reiman proposes to develop a theory of “Marxian Liberalism.” ‘Liberalism’ here is defined by the principle that “sane adult human beings should be free in the sense of free from coercion that would block their ability to act on the choices they make.” While the idea of coercion could use some glossing, it is not obvious that poverty, unemployment, racism, and sexism are as such coercive. In this book, it is, very broad…Read more
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24Comment on Levy's ‘Forced to be free? Increasing patient autonomy by constraining it’Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (5): 302-303. 2014.The general thrust of Neil Levy's paper is that a certain amount of paternalism should be viewed as compatible with liberalism.1 I am not quite convinced that what he is defending is properly paternalism. In addition, I am not entirely sure what his proposal is. Here are a few comments about several points in the paper.1. A possibly small question is worth raising when Levy says, ‘That is, the state may not interfere with individuals’ actions, even to promote their own conception of the good. Th…Read more
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59When, If Ever, Do We Aggregate? And Why?Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1): 48-75. 2009.Aggregation in moral philosophy calls for the summing or averaging of values or utilities as a guide to individual behavior. But morality, it is argued, needs to be individualistic, in view of the evident separateness of persons, especially given the great disparities among individuals who nevertheless interact with each other in social life. The most plausible general moral program is the classical liberal (or “libertarian”) one calling for mutual noninterference rather than treating others as …Read more
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32God by design?In Neil A. Manson (ed.), God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science, Routledge. pp. 80--88. 2003.
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University of WaterlooDepartment of Philosophy
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |