Janar Mihkelsaar

The present article examines the breakdown of the metaphysical tradition that makes visible a gap between the impossibility of an ultimate foundation and the necessity of foundation. This gap, particularly noticeable in the impossibility and necessity of a social totality, is resolved in political acts of grounding that generate contingent foundations. Political grounding is a never-ending task without any final fulfilment, insofar as it cannot render the differential field of the social fully transparent. In Laclau’s post-foundational idea of politics, the metaphysical concept of foundation is nullified but kept operative. Giorgio Agamben proposes an approach that extinguishes the nullified foundationalism. In doing so, however, he does not fall prey to anti-foundationalism because the concept of foundation is not simply negated but fulfilled messianically. For Agamben, this ”messianic fulfilment’, concomitant with every post-foundational act of grounding, involves ”retrieval’ and ”revocation’. A grounding act is ”retrieved’ when it gives itself back to itself through the complete actualization of its impotentiality; this realized impotentiality, which is indistinguishable from actuality, ”revokes’ grounding. Finally, I argue that politics, insofar as it is the sphere of gesturality, is a proper locus of messianic fulfilment.

The aim of this article is to read Rogues, in order to show that Derrida is neither a philosopher of democracy nor a critic of sovereignty, but rather a thinker of democratic sovereignty. Taking my cue from his Aporias, I argue that democratic sovereignty is aporetically in excess over itself, for it is based on articulating the path through the im-possible passage from the unconditional injunction of the ‘promise’ to the exigency of sovereignty. That is why it can neither be absorbed into the conditions of any existing democracy nor abstracted into any pure identity of sovereignty. Political trends today fail in enduring the aprioricity of aporia, as neoliberals valorize the posited conditions of existing democracy and populists the objective pregivenness of the ‘people’.

This article explores how the later Heidegger and the early Derrida experience and say the “being” of language. Both stumble upon the impossibility of bringing language into language—either because, for Derrida, all terms are implicated in the differential process of semiosis; or because, for Heidegger, articulations are responses called forth from the being of language. This is how we experience the finitude of language. Instead of being plainly nameless, the word comes into presence in its being-absent, but does so in conflicting ways. Derrida’s différance brings into language the infinite self-signification of language, while Heidegger’s Ereignis brings into it the self-concealment of language in propositional statements. Cet article examine comment Heidegger, vers la fin de sa vie, et Derrida, à ses débuts, éprouvent et disent « l’être » du langage. Tous deux découvrent l’impossibilité de faire entrer le langage dans le langage – soit, dans le cas de Derrida, car tous les termes sont impliqués dans le processus différentiel de la semiosis; soit, dans le cas de Heidegger, car les articulations sont les réponses appelées par l’être du langage. C’est ainsi que nous faisons l’expérience de la finitude du langage. Au lieu d’être tout simplement sans nom, le mot trouve présence dans son être-absent, de manières néanmoins conflictuelles. La différance de Derrida fait entrer dans le langage l’auto-signification infinie du langage, alors que l’Ereignis de Heidegger y introduit l’auto-dissimulation du langage dans des formulations propositionnelles.

The urgent task of political ontology is, I believe, neither to investigate the nature of the political nor to define politics; instead, the pressing task is to put into question the political difference itself between the political and politics. The subject of my inquiry is, in other words, the political difference as political difference. To demonstrate this thesis, I examine Oliver Marchart’s and Giorgio Agamben’s positions. The political difference takes in Marchart the form of the never-ending play between the political and politics and in Agamben the constantly renewed sovereign decision between life and law. Besides reformulating Marchart’s and Agamben’s positions, I want to show that the never-ending play and the sovereign decision fail to capture the political difference, because it is approached through the differentiated—whether between the political and politics or between life and law. Drawing on the diverse works of Agamben, I argue that the political difference becomes intelligible as the political differentiability that points to the power of differentiation, to the ability of the political differencing to differentiate. And the task of thinking and of political practice is neither the thinking itself nor the political practice itself, but rather to experience political differentiability as the shared field of thinking and practice, as the common dimension of philosophy and politics. I argue that experiencing political differentiability, ontology and politics can avoid falling prey, respectively, to intellectualism and to wild practicism.

What is at stake in the antagonistic limits of society is the limit form of relation between dichotomous concepts. By determining this relation, Laclau and Mouffe’s “political articulation” and Agamben’s sovereign decision institute a particular type of order. In contrast to Laclau and Mouffe, however, Agamben aims to render the subversive interplay of binary concepts “inoperative.” What, I contend, is at issue in this disagreement is neither pessimism nor optimism, neither totalitarianism nor democracy, but rather the question of how to conceive social antagonisms. When, namely, the limit type of relation between negativity and positivity, life and law, shows itself as such, then the antagonistic relation reveals itself as “pure antagonism.” This is why Agamben deems it necessary to deactivate the empty form of relation which political articulation and sovereign decision express. Agamben’s inoperativity, however, does not found an undivided society, but rather proposes to rethink antagonisms as “the form-of-life.”