Jane Gatley

University philosophy outreach programs are proliferating. On campuses across the world, students and staff are taking philosophy out to the wider community, and especially to children and young people in schools. Their mission is to engage the public in philosophical discussion and to make a notoriously abstract and arcane subject accessible, meaningful and useful. As yet, there is little published research on these programs. They give rise to two clusters of questions deserving of scholarly attention. First, there are questions about the rationale for philosophy outreach. What is the purpose of taking philosophy into the community? What are the intended benefits of these programs, to the children and young people who participate in them, to the students and staff who lead them, to society at large, or to the discipline of philosophy itself? How do these aims inform the selection of philosophical topics, texts, tools and techniques? The second group of questions have to do with the success of philosophy outreach. What attempts have been made to evaluate these programs and their outcomes? Do they, in fact, yield the benefits intended by those who design and deliver them? Are there any drawbacks to participation, or benefits other than the intended ones? What challenges (financial, institutional, pedagogical, psychological) have been encountered by those engaged in philosophy outreach and how have they been overcome? These are the questions that animate this double special issue on university philosophy outreach programs. The tremendously positive response we received to our call for papers, from contributors in Europe, North America and Australasia, confirms our impression that these questions are ripe for scholarly attention. Here, in Issue 10(1) we present the first tranche of papers; the next tranche will follow later this year, in Issue 10(2).

This book presents a case for teaching philosophy in schools. It develops two original arguments for teaching philosophy to all students at some point over the course of their education. Gatley argues that teaching philosophy is the best way to help students to think clearly using ordinary, or non-specialist concepts such as 'good', 'truth', or 'happiness'. She goes on to argue that teaching philosophy is the best way to help students to make sense of the different conceptual schemes used by different school subjects. Combining these two arguments, Gatley suggests that these two roles for philosophy are central to the task of educating people, and so philosophy ought to be included on school curricula. Building on the work of philosophers of education including Richard Stanley Peters, Harry Brighouse, Matthew Lipman, Mary Midgley and Martha Nussbaum, the book covers a range of topics including Philosophy for Children (P4C), the aims education, religious education, curriculum design and education policy.

Latin is currently being trialled as a subject in 40 state secondary schools in England. This paper focuses on one of the justifications of this trial: that teaching Latin in state secondary schools provides students with cultural capital which in turn counters social injustice. By taking the example of Latin as a starting point, I reach two conclusions about cultural capital. The first is that providing students with cultural capital can be good for some individuals, and so justified on a case-by-case basis depending on context. However, this justification does not hold for curriculum policy making. My second conclusion is that in the long term, pursuing cultural capital as part of curriculum policy exacerbates the social injustices it purports to address. Wherever an activity is introduced for the sake of cultural capital rather than its educational value, educationally valuable activities risk being pushed off the curriculum, potentially degrading the educational value of the curriculum. In the case of teaching Latin, it may provide benefits to particular students, but as part of curriculum policy it risks exacerbating social injustices and undermining the educational value of school curricula. Going beyond the place of Latin on the curriculum, I argue that all appeals to cultural capital provide a poor basis for curriculum policy making.

R. S. Peters and a small group of contemporaries set the foundations for analytic philosophy of education in the 1960s, a field which continues to this day. This article asks about the value of analytic philosophy of education today, and proposes alterations to its initial aims and methods to make its value clearer. I outline some critiques of analytic philosophy of education, and respond by clarifying its aims. The key insight is that if analytic philosophy of education is explicitly aligned with recent trends in social philosophy to focus on ameliorative analysis, then its value and relevance as a method in educational studies becomes clearer. Ameliorative analysis starts with the social role that a concept plays, and analyses it with this purpose in mind. I illustrate how R. S. Peters analysis of education would be approached differently with ameliorative analysis in mind, and conclude by pointing to some interesting points of discussion that arise from this approach.

In this article, I outline three critiques of analytic philosophy; that it is irrelevant to individuals and society; unconstructive; and excessively technical. These critiques are linked to skepticism about the educational value of analytic philosophy. In response, I suggest that if analytic philosophy provides constructive guidance about prominent and pressing questions, then it holds potential educational value. I identify a body of prominent and pressing questions that are addressed by analytic philosophy as a discipline. Because analytic philosophy is often concerned with the analysis of ordinary concepts, there is at least some potential educational value to analytic philosophy insofar as it provides guidance about the meaning of ordinary concepts that ground ordinary questions. Taking P. F. Strawson's paradigmatically analytic account of philosophy, I show that analytic philosophy can directly address ordinary questions in a constructive manner. Analytic philosophy is neither irrelevant, unconstructive, nor excessively technical.

Western schooling has been dominated by some form of broad theoretical education since classical times; this sort of education has traditionally been termed a “liberal education.”1 Providing a coherent account of why a broad theoretical education is worthwhile is an important project given the pervasiveness of this model of education. One common account of the value of liberal education links a broad theoretical education with the intrinsic value of the knowledge transmitted. In this paper, I offer a different, utility-based account of the value of liberal education.

External pressure on Higher Education Institutes in the United Kingdom has brought the question of the extrinsic value of academic philosophy into focus. One line of research into questions about the extrinsic value of philosophy comes from the Philosophy for Children (P4C) movement. There is a large body of literature about the benefits of P4C. This paper argues that the distinctive nature of the P4C pedagogy limits the claims made by the P4C literature about the extrinsic value of philosophy to claims about the value of P4C. While this is not a problem within the P4C literature that recognises these limitations, the paper makes three claims about why it is sometimes inappropriate to extend claims from research into the value of P4C to claims about the value of non‐P4C philosophy. It argues that more research is needed to investigate the value of non‐P4C philosophy.

In this paper we present an empirical case study into the effects of attending a philosophy conference on social skill development in 15- to 18-year-old students. We focus on the impact that the conference had on their communication skills, sociability, cooperation and teamwork skills, self-confidence, determination, social responsibility, and empathy. These are social skills previously studied in 2017 by Siddiqui et al. who found student development in these areas as a result of Philosophy for Children (P4C) sessions in primary schools. In this paper, we ask whether our conference—Pursuit of Knowledge—brought about comparable results. Overall, attendees reported that they felt that the conference had improved their communication skills, sociability, cooperation and teamwork, self-confidence, determination, social responsibility and empathy. We conclude that further research into the potential of models of philosophy akin to the model employed by the conference should be conducted. We discuss the potential of this model as a means of educating for social skills.

The New Welsh Curriculum sets itself apart from its predecessors through the use of explicit aims; these are the Four Purposes of the New Welsh Curriculum. At the same time, it sets out six Areas of Learning and Experience which incorporate traditional school subjects and emphasise the importance of providing a broad and balanced education. In this paper, I ask whether these two strands, the Four Purposes and the six Areas of Learning and Experience, can be united into a single coherent curriculum. I argue that if the curriculum is entirely driven by the Four Purposes, then much of the content associated with traditional school subjects in the Areas of Learning and Experience is redundant. On the contrary, if the Areas of Learning and Experience are prioritised, then the Four Purposes are unlikely to be met. In response, I propose that the content associated with Areas of Learning and Experience can be understood a prerequisite for meeting the Four Purposes, but the content is not sufficient on its own. This reconciles some of the tension between the two curriculum strands, but means that the Areas of Learning and Experience will need to be supplemented by additional activities in order for the New Welsh Curriculum to achieve its purposes.

The Routledge international handbook of philosophy for children offers ‘a wide variety of critical perspectives on this diverse and controversial field, in order to generate new discussions and to identify emerging questions and themes’. As a collection of scholarly papers on Philosophy for Children, the volume is a thorough and detailed handbook which highlights the distance P4C has travelled since its inception 50 years ago. Several uses of this volume spring to mind. Somebody new to P4C would do well to read the concise introduction which covers the history and thematic strands which shape P4C. Experienced practitioners or researchers could use the handbook to explore new directions and ideas in the field. School leaders and policy makers could refer to the section headings to identify uses of P4C that would pertain to their particular situations. The editors have identified a fairly definitive list of key questions for P4C; while the papers do not form a cohesive whole, they do function as a useful handbook to give readers a taste of some of the answers currently available to these questions.