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Ontological NihilismIn Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 6, Oxford University Press Uk. 2011.
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106Why Special Relativity is a Problem for the A-TheoryPhilosophical Quarterly 70 (279): 385-406. 2019.Neither special nor general relativity make any use of a notion of absolute simultaneity. Since A-Theories about time do make use of such a notion, it is natural to suspect that relativity and A-Theory are inconsistent. Many authors have argued that they are in fact not inconsistent, and I agree with that diagnosis here. But that doesn’t mean, as these authors seem to think, that A-Theory and relativity are happy bedfellows. I argue that relativity gives us good reason to reject the A-Theory, ev…Read more
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223Ontological NihilismOxford Studies in Metaphysics 6 3-54. 2011.Ontological nihilism is the radical-sounding thesis that there is nothing at all. This chapter first discusses how the most plausible forms of this thesis aim to be slightly less radical than they sound and what they will have to do in order to succeed in their less radical ambitions. In particular, they will have to paraphrase sentences of best science into ontologically innocent counterparts. The chapter then points out the defects in two less plausible strategies, before going on to argue tha…Read more
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2This report provides practical recommendations for the design and execution of multicenter functional MRI studies based on the collective experience of the Function Biomedical Informatics Research Network. The study was inspired by many requests from the fMRI community to FBIRN group members for advice on how to conduct MC-fMRI studies. The introduction briefly discusses the advantages and complexities of MC-fMRI studies. Prerequisites for MC-fMRI studies are addressed before delving into the pr…Read more
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17Existence and Many‐One IdentityPhilosophical Quarterly 63 (251): 313-329. 2013.C endorses the doctrine of Composition as Identity, which holds that a composite object is identical to its many parts, and entails that one object can be identical to several others. In this dialogue, N argues that many‐one identity, and thus composition as identity, is conceptually confused. In particular, N claims it violates two conceptual truths: that existence facts fix identity facts, and that identity is no addition to being. In response to pressure from C, N considers several candidate …Read more
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11Philosophical Perspectives, Philosophy of Language (edited book)Wiley. 2014.Philosophical Perspectives: Philosophy of Language brings together state of the art essays to address the key issues at the heart of the philosophy of language, written by some of the top minds in the field
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115Strong And Weak PossibilityPhilosophical Studies 125 (2): 191-217. 2005.The thesis of existentialism holds that if a proposition p exists and predicates something of an object a, then in any world where a does not exist, p does not exist either. If “possibly, p” entails “in some possible world, the proposition that p exists and is true,” then existentialism is prima facie incompatible with the truth of claims like “possibly, the Eiffel Tower does not exist.” In order to avoid this claim, a distinction between two kinds of world-indexed truth –and two associated kind…Read more
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Quantifier Pluralism is:the view that there are different ‘kinds of existence’, which are best cashed out as different fundamental quantifiers. Timothy Williamson and Vann McGee have an argument (the ‘There Can Be Only One’ argument) that seems to refute this view. I try to defend quantifier pluralism against it, for reasons I haven’t quite fathomed yet
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92The construction of logical space and the structure of factsPhilosophical Studies 172 (10): 2609-2616. 2015.In The Construction of Logical Space, Agustín Rayo defends trivialism, according to which number-involving truths are trivially equivalent to other, non-number-involving truths; picturesquely, ‘I have five fingers on my hand’ and ‘the number of fingers on my hand is five’ express the same fact, but carved up in different ways. A single fact thus has multiple structures. I distinguish two ways this might go: on the deflationary picture, facts get their structures from our linguistic practices, wh…Read more
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3Compatibilism is the view that free will can exist even if determinism — the thesis that there is only one physically possible future at any given time — is true. In this thesis, I defend compatibilism by arguing against two of its main rivals. I first argue against necessary eliminativism — the view that free will is impossible — by deploying an attractive view of language (Lewis, 1983, 1984; Sider, 2001) to show that, so long as ordinary folk are liable to experience conflicting intuitions abo…Read more
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100Possibility, by MIchael Jubien (review)Analysis 70 (1): 184-186. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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44The Facts in Logical Space: A Tractarian OntologyOxford University Press UK. 2016.Philosophers have long been tempted by the idea that objects and properties are abstractions from the facts. But how is this abstraction supposed to go? If the objects and properties aren't 'already' there, how do the facts give rise to them? Jason Turner develops and defends a novel answer to this question: The facts are arranged in a quasi-geometric 'logical space', and objects and properties arise from different quasi-geometric structures in this space.
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39The structuralist conception of metaphysics holds that it aims to uncover the ultimate structure of reality and explain how the world's richness and variety are accounted for by that ultimate structure. On this conception, metaphysicians produce fundamental theories, the primitive, undefined expressions of which are supposed to 'carve reality at its joints', as it were. On this conception, ontological questions are understood as questions about what there is, where the existential quantifier 'th…Read more
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1381Donald Baxter's Composition as IdentityIn Donald Baxter & Aaron Cotnoir (eds.), Composition as Identity, Oxford University Press. 2014.
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1205Existence and Many-One IdentityPhilosophical Quarterly 63 (250): 313-329. 2013.C endorses the doctrine of Composition as Identity, which holds that a composite object is identical to its many parts, and entails that one object can be identical to several others. In this dialogue, N argues that many‐one identity, and thus composition as identity, is conceptually confused. In particular, N claims it violates two conceptual truths: that existence facts fix identity facts, and that identity is no addition to being. In response to pressure from C, N considers several candidate …Read more
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134Compatibilism and the Free Will DefenseFaith and Philosophy 30 (2): 125-137. 2013.The free will defense is a theistic strategy for resisting the atheistic argument known as “the logical problem of evil.” It insists that God may have to allow some evil in order to get the greater good of creatures freely choosing to act rightly. Many philosophers have thought that the free will defense requires the truth of incompatibilism, according to which acts cannot be free if they are causally determined. For it seems that if compatibilism is true, God should be able to get the goods of …Read more
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3039Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1): 28-53. 2007.Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pretheoretical intuitions, we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism is in fact intuitive calls for empirical testing. W…Read more
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317Logic and Ontological PluralismJournal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2): 419-448. 2012.Ontological pluralism is the doctrine that there are different ways or modes of being. In contemporary guise, it is the doctrine that a logically perspicuous description of reality will use multiple quantifiers which cannot be thought of as ranging over a single domain. Although thought defeated for some time, recent defenses have shown a number of arguments against the view unsound. However, another worry looms: that despite looking like an attractive alternative, ontological pluralism is reall…Read more
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103(Metasemantically) Securing Free WillAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2): 295-310. 2013.Metasemantic security arguments aim to show, on metasemantic grounds, that even if we were to discover that determinism is true, that wouldn't give us reason to think that people never act freely. Flew's [1955] Paradigm Case Argument is one such argument; Heller's [1996] Putnamian argument is another. In this paper I introduce a third which uses a metasemantic picture on which meanings are settled as though by an ideal interpreter. Metasemantic security arguments are widely thought discredited b…Read more
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1200Ontological PluralismJournal of Philosophy 107 (1): 5-34. 2010.Ontological Pluralism is the view that there are different modes, ways, or kinds of being. In this paper, I characterize the view more fully (drawing on some recent work by Kris McDaniel) and then defend the view against a number of arguments. (All of the arguments I can think of against it, anyway.)
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158Fitting attitudes de dicto and de seNoûs 44 (1): 1-9. 2010.The Property Theory of attitudes holds that the contents of mental states --- especially de se states --- are properties. The "nonexistence problem" for the Property Theory holds that the theory gives the wrong consequences as to which worlds "fit" which mental states: which worlds satisfy desires, make beliefs true, and so on. If I desire to not exist, since there is no world where I have the property of not existing, my desire is satisfied in no worlds. In this paper I argue that the problem c…Read more
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140Are the folk agent-causationists?Mind and Language 21 (5): 597-609. 2006.Experimental examination of how the folk conceptualize certain philosophically loaded notions can provide information useful for philosophical theorizing. In this paper, we explore issues raised in Shaun Nichols' (2004) studies involving people's conception of free will, focusing on his claim that this conception fits best with the philosophical theory of agent-causation. We argue that his data do not support this conclusion, highlighting along the way certain considerations that ought to be tak…Read more
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5259Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibilityPhilosophical Psychology 18 (5): 561-584. 2005.Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from action theory to ethics to epistemology. In this paper we present the results of our attempts to apply this approach to the free will debate, in which philosophers on opposing sides claim that their view best accounts for and accords with folk intuitions. After discussing the motivation for such research, we…Read more
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77Folk intuitions, asymmetry, and intentional side effectsJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2): 214-219. 2004.An agent S wants to A and knows that if she A-s she will also bring about B. S does not care at all about B. S then A-s, also bringing about B. Did she intentionally bring B about? Joshua Knobe (2003b) has recently argued that, according to the folk concept of intentional action, the answer depends on B's moral significance. In particular, if B is reprehensible, people are more likely to say that S intentionally brought it about. Knobe defends this position with empirical facts about how ordinar…Read more
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1537The phenomenology of free willJournal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8): 162-179. 2004.Philosophers often suggest that their theories of free will are supported by our phenomenology. Just as their theories conflict, their descriptions of the phenomenology of free will often conflict as well. We suggest that this should motivate an effort to study the phenomenology of free will in a more systematic way that goes beyond merely the introspective reports of the philosophers themselves. After presenting three disputes about the phenomenology of free will, we survey the (limited) psycho…Read more
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129The Incompatibility of Free Will and NaturalismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4): 565-587. 2009.The Consequence Argument is a staple in the defense of libertarianism, the view that free will is incompatible with determinism and that humans have free will. It is often thought that libertarianism is consistent with a certain naturalistic view of the world — that is, that libertarian free will can be had without metaphysical commitments beyond those pro- vided by our best (indeterministic) physics. In this paper, I argue that libertarians who endorse the Consequence Argument are forced to rej…Read more
Tucson, AZ, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Probability |