•  3
    Mereological Nominalism, as traditionally understood, states (1) that properties are mereological wholes and (2) that instantiation is mereological. Thus defined, this view faces a number of well-known issues, which make it virtually untenable. Recently, Effingham (Philos Phenom Res 100(1):160–185, 2020) has offered an alternative account of Mereological Nominalism, which intends to avoid these problems by accepting (1) while rejecting (2). In this paper, we argue that this theory is not viable …Read more
  •  54
    Resisting easy inferences
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3): 729-735. 2021.
    Amie Thomasson has articulated a novel conception of ontological debates, defending an easy approach to ontological questions as part of the articulation of a deflationary metaphysical view (Thomasson, 2015). After raising some concerns to the approach, we sketch a neutralist alternative to her ontological framework, offering an even easier way of conducting ontological debates.
  •  1
    Categorial Ontologies: From Realism to Eliminativism (edited book)
    Routledge. forthcoming.
  •  9
    Editor’s introduction
    Synthese 198 (Suppl 3): 759-761. 2020.
  •  39
    Philosophy Compass 15 (1). 2020.
    Philosophy Compass, EarlyView.
  •  10
    The Neutralist Analysis of Similarity
    Philosophia 49 (1): 37-47. 2019.
    Consider two similarity facts: a is similar to b with respect to G, and c is similar to d with respect to G. According to the Platonist approach to similarity, the analysis of such facts forces us to admit that similarity facts are to be analyzed into facts about universal similarities of the form: a is similar to b with respect to G, and c is similar to d with respect to G, where similarity is a universal. In this paper, I defend Neutralism, a view according to which there are properties and si…Read more
  •  46
    The essays collected in this volume explore the fundamental issues of philosophical realism, including metaphysical realism. Do things exist and have properties independently of being objects of thought or perception? epistemological realism: Is it possible to know any part of reality in and of itself? and ontological realism: Are there universals?
  •  18
    The regress argument against realism about structure
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1-12. forthcoming.
    ABSTRACTIs structure a fundamental and indispensable part of the world? Is the question of ontology a question about structure? Structure is a central notion in contemporary metaphysics [Sider 2011...
  • The Question of Ontology: The Contemporary Debate (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  24
    Factualism and the Scientific Image
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (5): 669-678. 2018.
    ABSTRACTThe Sellarsian task of ontology is to reconcile two seemingly divergent images of ordinary objects such as persons, tomatoes and tables, namely, the manifest image of common sense and the scientific image provided by fundamental physics. Can the genuine categories of the ontologies of Substantialism, Structural Realism, and Factualism, such as ‘substance’, ‘structure’, and ‘fact’, help us to solve the problem of the reconciliation of the two images of ordinary objects? In this paper I de…Read more
  •  4
    The Nature of Ordinary Objects (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2019.
    The metaphysics of ordinary objects is an increasingly vibrant field of study for philosophers. This volume gathers insights from a number of leading authors, who together tackle the central issues in contemporary debates about the subject. Their essays engage with topics including composition, persistence, perception, categories, images, artifacts, truthmakers, metaontology, and the relationship between the manifest and scientific images. Exploring the nature of everyday things, the contributor…Read more
  •  58
    Are Properties Particular, Universal, or Neither?
    American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2): 165-174. 2018.
    Are properties universal or particular? According to Universalism, properties are universals because there is a certain fundamental tie that makes properties capable of being shareable by more than one thing. On the opposing side, Particularism is the view that properties are particulars due to the existence of a fundamental tie that makes properties incapable of being shared. My aim in this paper is to critically examine the connections between the notions of the fundamental tie and universalit…Read more
  •  27
    A Materialist Criterion of Fundamentality
    American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (4): 319-324. 2014.
    1. Categories and the Scientific Turn of Metaphysics: The Notion of World-Fundamentality What are the fundamental inhabitants of the world? This question, as old as it is new, is about the fundamental structure of our world. Is our world a world of Aristotle's ordinary substances, Locke's physical substances, Husserl's wholes, Wittgenstein's facts, Sellars's processes, or Quine's sets? In order to distinguish the sort of metaphysical fundamentality at stake in this discussion from other possible…Read more
  •  35
    A Naturalist Ontology of Instantiation
    Ratio 31 (2): 155-164. 2018.
    The aim of this paper is to defend a naturalistic approach to instantiation and the Principle of Instantiation. I argue that the instantiation of an ordinary property F consists of two coordinated relationships at the levels of the manifest and scientific images, namely, constituency and entailment. Also, I offer an account of the Principle of Instantiation related to this conception of instantiation based on the notion of scientific prediction.
  •  95
    Observation and Interpretation: the Problem of the Problem of Universals (review)
    Metaphysica 13 (2): 131-143. 2012.
    It is argued that a number of related influential contemporary solutions to certain problems of the “realism–nominalism issue” seem to depend on an interpretation of those problems rather than upon observations of things. The problem of universals is a case in point. Therefore, there is a problem of the problem of universals and it has to be clarified what the problem of universals is. A primitive or uninterpreted raising of the problem is the main pupose of this paper. In order to accomplish su…Read more
  •  33
    “In One”: The Bearer Issue and the Principles of Exemplification (review)
    Axiomathes 23 (2): 201-211. 2013.
    Traditionally, the so-called exemplification or the relation between the particular and the universal has been one of the three central problems making up the classical problem of universals: (1) What is a particular? (2) What is a universal? (3) What is the relation between the particular and the universal? I used the expression “classical problem of universals” instead of “the problem of universals” since the classical formulation of the problem could be said to contain a questionable assumpti…Read more
  •  34
    Exemplification as molecular function
    Philosophical Studies 170 (2): 335-342. 2014.
    Since the publication of Universals and Scientific Realism (Armstrong 1978a, b) until Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (Armstrong 2010), via Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Armstrong 1989), a World of States of Affairs (Armstrong 1997), and Truth and Truthmakers (Armstrong 2004), David Armstrong has developed one of the most influential theories of instantiation in contemporary analytic metaphysics (see, for example, Lewis, in Aust J Phil 61(4), 343–377, 1983; Baxter in Aust J Phil, …Read more