•  48
    (How) Should We Tell Implicit Bias Stories?
    Disputatio 10 (50): 217-244. 2018.
    As the phenomenon of implicit bias has become increasingly widely known and accepted, a variety of criticisms have similarly gained in prominence. This paper focuses on one particular set of criticisms, generally made from the political left, of what Sally Haslanger calls “implicit bias stories”—a broad term encompassing a wide range of discourses from media discussions to academic papers to implicit bias training. According to this line of thought, implicit bias stories are counterproductive be…Read more
  •  8
    Most people show unconscious bias in their evaluations of social groups, in ways that may run counter to their conscious beliefs. This volume addresses key metaphysical and epistemological questions about implicit bias, including its effect on scientific research, gender stereotypes in philosophy, and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning.
  •  20
    Intensionality
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 76 75-119. 2002.
    [Graeme Forbes] In I, I summarize the semantics for the relational/notional distinction for intensional transitives developed in Forbes. In II-V I pursue issues about logical consequence which were either unsatisfactorily dealt with in that paper or, more often, not raised at all. I argue that weakening inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a gorgon', are valid, but that disjunction inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks …Read more
  •  237
    Subordination, Silencing, and Two Ideas of Illocution
    with Jennifer Hornsby, Louise Antony, Natalie Stoljar, Nellie Wieland, and Rae Langton
    Jurisprudence 2 (2): 379-440. 2011.
    This section gathers together five reviews of Rae Langton?s book Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification followed by a response from the author.
  •  7
    There is abundant evidence that most people, often in spite of their conscious beliefs, values and attitudes, have implicit biases. 'Implicit bias' is a term of art referring to evaluations of social groups that are largely outside conscious awareness or control. These evaluations are typically thought to involve associations between social groups and concepts or roles like 'violent,' 'lazy,' 'nurturing,' 'assertive,' 'scientist,' and so on. Such associations result at least in part from common …Read more
  •  6
    Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volumes 1 and 2: Metaphysics and Epistemology (edited book)
    with Michael S. Brownstein
    Oxford University Press UK. 2016.
    Implicit Bias and Philosophy brings the work of leading philosophers and psychologists together to explore core areas of psychological research on implicit bias, as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology addresses key metaphysical and epistemological questions on implicit bias, including the effect of implicit bias on scientific research, gender stereotypes in philosophy, and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning. Volu…Read more
  •  1
    Implicit Bias and Philosophy (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  6
    Most people show unconscious bias in their evaluations of social groups, in ways that may run counter to their conscious beliefs. Volume 1 addresses key metaphysical and epistemological questions on this kind of implicit bias, while Volume 2 turns to the themes of moral responsibility and injustice.
  •  94
    Implicit Bias and Reform Efforts in Philosophy
    with Jules Holroyd
    Philosophical Topics 46 (2): 71-102. 2018.
    This paper takes as its focus efforts to address particular aspects of sexist oppression and its intersections, in a particular field: it discusses reform efforts in philosophy. In recent years, there has been a growing international movement to change the way that our profession functions and is structured, in order to make it more welcoming for members of marginalized groups. One especially prominent and successful form of justification for these reform efforts has drawn on empirical data rega…Read more
  •  51
    Intensionality: What are Intensional Transitives?: Jennifer Saul
    Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1): 101-119. 2002.
  •  62
    Philosophers of language have tended to focus on examples that are not politically significant in any way. We spend a lot of time analyzing natural kind terms: We think hard about “water” and “pain” and “arthritis.” But we don’t think much about the far more politically significant kind terms (natural or social—it's a matter for dispute) like “race,” “sex,” “gender,” “woman,” “man,” “gay,” and “straight.” In this essay, I will try to show, using the example of “woman,” that it's worth thinking a…Read more
  •  77
    What is Happening to Our Norms Against Racist Speech?
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 93 (1): 1-23. 2019.
    Until recently, the accepted wisdom in the US was that overt racism would doom a national political campaign. This led to the use of covert messaging strategies like dogwhistles. Recent political events have called this wisdom into question. In this paper, I explore what has happened in recent years to our norms against racist speech, and to the ways that they are applied. I describe several mechanisms that seem to have contributed to the changes that I outline.
  •  27
    Philosophy in Danger
    The Philosophers' Magazine 80 96-97. 2018.
  •  145
    The rise to power of Donald Trump has been shocking in many ways. One of these was that it disrupted the preexisting consensus that overt racism would be death to a national political campaign. In this paper, I argue that Trump made use of what I call “racial figleaves”—additional utterances that provide just enough cover to give reassurance to voters who are racially resentful but don’t wish to see themselves as racist. These figleaves also, I argue, play a key role in shifting our norms about …Read more
  •  38
    How Hate is Normalised
    The Philosophers' Magazine 76 16-17. 2017.
  •  41
    Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions
    Analysis 69 (1): 174-176. 2009.
    Philosophers of language have long recognized that in opaque contexts, such as those involving propositional attitude reports, substitution of co-referring names may not preserve truth value. For example, the name ‘Clark Kent’ cannot be substituted for ‘Superman’ in a context like:1. Lois believes that Superman can flywithout a change in truth value. In an earlier paper, Jennifer Saul demonstrated that substitution failure could also occur in ‘simple sentences’ where none of the ordinary opacity…Read more
  •  37
    Deniability and Fig Leaves
    The Philosophers' Magazine 75 16-19. 2016.
  •  171
    Simple sentences, substitutions, and mistaken evaluations
    Philosophical Studies 111 (1). 2002.
    Many competent speakers initially judge that (i) is true and (ii) isfalse, though they know that (iii) is true. (i) Superman leaps more tallbuildings than Clark Kent. (ii) Superman leaps more tall buildings thanSuperman. (iii) Superman is identical with Clark Kent. Semanticexplanations of these intuitions say that (i) and (ii) really can differin truth-value. Pragmatic explanations deny this, and say that theintuitions are due to misleading implicatures. This paper argues thatboth explanations a…Read more
  •  154
    Stop Thinking So Much About ‘Sexual Harassment’
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (3): 307-321. 2014.
    This article explores two related widespread mistakes in thinking about sexual harassment. One is a mistake made by philosophers doing philosophical work on the topic of sexual harassment: an excessive focus on attempting to define the term ‘sexual harassment’. This is a perfectly legitimate topic for discussion and indeed a necessary one, but its dominance of the literature has tended to prevent philosophers from adequately exploring other topics that are of at least equal importance, particula…Read more
  •  283
    Feminist philosophy of language
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
    Much of feminist philosophy of language so far can be described as critical—critical either of language itself or of philosophy of language, and calling for change on the basis of these criticisms. Those making these criticisms suggest that the changes are needed for the sake of feminist goals — either to better allow for feminist work to be done or, more frequently, to bring an end to certain key ways that women are disadvantaged. In this entry, I examine these criticisms. I also examine work b…Read more
  •  324
    [First Paragraph] Unlike so many other distinctions in philosophy, H P Grice's distinction between what is said and what is implicated has an immediate appeal: undergraduate students readily grasp that one who says 'someone shot my parents' has merely implicated rather than said that he was not the shooter [2]. It seems to capture things that we all really pay attention to in everyday conversation'this is why there are so many people whose entire sense of humour consists of deliberately ignoring…Read more
  •  122
    Did Clinton say something false?
    Analysis 60 (3): 255-257. 2000.
  •  120
    The Best of Intentions: Ignorance, Idiosyncrasy, and Belief Reporting
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (1). 1999.
    Context plays a crucial role in our propositional attitude reporting practices. A belief-reporting sentence which seems true in one context may seem false in another, as Kripke showed us in ‘A Puzzle About Belief.’ To put it a bit sloppily, may seem true when we are discussing Peter's beliefs regarding Paderewski-the-pianist and false when we are discussing his beliefs regarding Paderewski-the-statesman. Peter believes that Paderewski is a fine musician.A number of recent theorists have taken th…Read more
  •  303