Jeremy Shearmur

This paper argues that it is not reasonable for a critical rationalist to be a religious believer in the Abrahamic tradition. The argument is distinctive, in that it takes seriously the critical rationalist view that we should abandon ‘justificationist’ argument. What this means, is that the structure of argument then becomes a matter of offering theories as resolutions of problems, and then judging how they fare in the face of ongoing critical appraisal. The paper surveys issues in several areas, including God and what is good; homosexuality; mysticism; and messianic ideas. It argues that, unless the believer engages in intellectual retreat (something that is unacceptable for the critical rationalist), the problem-situation facing the believer appears to be so daunting that it would be unreasonable for them to hope that they can overcome it.

If unremunerated blood donors are willing to participate, and if the use of them is economical from the perspective of those collecting blood, I can see no objection to their use. But there seems to me no good reason, moral or practical, why they should be used. The system of paid plasmapheresis as it currently operates in the United States and in Canada would seem perfectly adequate, and while there may always be ways in which the safety and efficiency of supply could be increased, there seems no reason whatever to think that there would be an improvement if the current system changed so as to rely entirely on unpaid donors. Further, given the adequacy of paid plasmapheresis, I could see no problem if the collection of whole blood were to take place on a similar, fully-commercial, basis. Such a view is controversial. To argue for it, this paper offers just one strand in a complex argument: a critique of Richard Titmuss’s Gift Relationship, which holds an iconic position in the critical literature on the paid provision of blood. As I conclude: all told, there seems no good basis for rejecting supply of whole blood for money—let alone the supply of blood plasma

This paper discusses Agassi’s critique of Popper’s theory of the “empirical basis”. It argues that Popper’s theory should be interpreted with emphasis on its realism and anti-subjectivism, and as stressing a tentative inter-subjective consensus as to what is observed when tests are made. It agrees with Agassi’s critique of “sensationalism”, disagrees that there are residues of “sensationalism” in Popper’s approach, and argues that Popper’s view should be supplemented by a tentative realist metaphysics.

This paper discusses Agassi’s critique of Popper’s theory of the “empirical basis”. It argues that Popper’s theory should be interpreted with emphasis on its realism and anti-subjectivism, and as stressing a tentative inter-subjective consensus as to what is observed when tests are made. It agrees with Agassi’s critique of “sensationalism”, disagrees that there are residues of “sensationalism” in Popper’s approach, and argues that Popper’s view should be supplemented by a tentative realist metaphysics.

This paper discusses Agassi’s critique of Popper’s theory of the “empirical basis”. It argues that Popper’s theory should be interpreted with emphasis on its realism and anti-subjectivism, and as stressing a tentative inter-subjective consensus as to what is observed when tests are made. It agrees with Agassi’s critique of “sensationalism”, disagrees that there are residues of “sensationalism” in Popper’s approach, and argues that Popper’s view should be supplemented by a tentative realist metaphysics.

This paper discusses Agassi’s critique of Popper’s theory of the “empirical basis”. It argues that Popper’s theory should be interpreted with emphasis on its realism and anti-subjectivism, and as stressing a tentative inter-subjective consensus as to what is observed when tests are made. It agrees with Agassi’s critique of “sensationalism”, disagrees that there are residues of “sensationalism” in Popper’s approach, and argues that Popper’s view should be supplemented by a tentative realist metaphysics.

Popper was also a critic of the idea that it was possible – or necessary – to give a positive response to the problem of induction. He was also a critic of many probabilistic theories of induction. He suggested that instead of seeking for a positive way of resolving the problem of induction – or, more generally, of trying to justify our claims that our ideas were true – we should, instead be concerned to make our claims open to criticism. All this, and its strengths and weaknesses, have been much discussed. But it seems to me that not enough attention has been paid to what is distinctive about Popper’s work – and to the question of how it addresses our various problem-situations today.

Popper’s methodological individualism faces some problems. It is not clear if we should interpret it as Weberian or along the lines of rational choice theory. As contrasted with what was done in Ian C. Jarvie’s admirable The Revolution in Anthropology, the theory was not addressed to concrete problem situations in social theory and does not fit well with Popper’s early ideas about methodological rules or his later ideas about metaphysical research programs. Further, its defenders–including Jarvie–interpret it in ways that give it little content, or which, I think mistakenly, take its thrust to be moral. In reinterpreting this nonetheless important idea, I think that we should take our lead from Jarvie in The Revolution in Anthropology.

In this long-awaited volume, Jeremy Shearmur and Piers Norris Turner bring to light Popper's most important unpublished and uncollected writings from the time of The Open Society until his death in 1994. After The Open Society: Selected Social and Political Writings reveals the development of Popper's political and philosophical thought during and after the Second World War, from his early socialism through to the radical humanitarianism of The Open Society. The papers in this collection, many of which are available here for the first time, demonstrate the clarity and pertinence of Popper's thinking on such topics as religion, history, Plato and Aristotle, while revealing a lifetime of unwavering political commitment. After The Open Society illuminates the thought of one of the twentieth century's greatest philosophers and is essential reading for anyone interested in the recent course of philosophy, politics, history and society

If unremunerated blood donors are willing to participate, and if the use of them is economical from the perspective of those collecting blood, I can see no objection to their use. But there seems to me no good reason, moral or practical, why they should be used. The system of paid plasmapheresis as it currently operates in the United States and in Canada would seem perfectly adequate, and while there may always be ways in which the safety and efficiency of supply could be increased, there seems no reason whatever to think that there would be an improvement if the current system changed so as to rely entirely on unpaid donors. Further, given the adequacy of paid plasmapheresis, I could see no problem if the collection of whole blood were to take place on a similar, fully-commercial, basis. Such a view is controversial. To argue for it, this paper offers just one strand in a complex argument: a critique of Richard Titmuss’s Gift Relationship, which holds an iconic position in the critical literature on the paid provision of blood. As I conclude: all told, there seems no good basis for rejecting supply of whole blood for money—let alone the supply of blood plasma

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that socialism is over. Be that as it may, it is now widely accepted that socialism, understood as involving the social ownership of the means of production and the abolition of markets, faces real and perhaps insuperable difficulties. For without both markets and individual ownership, it is difficult to see how problems of individual motivation and information transmission are to be tackled—to say nothing of Ludwig von Mises's underlying concern with how to make economic decisions about the utilization of resources within an economy.