•  330
    Shades and concepts
    Analysis 61 (3): 193-202. 2001.
    In this paper, we criticise the claim, made by J. McDowell and B. Brewer, that the contents of perceptual experience are purely conceptual
  •  237
    Margin for error and the transparency of knowledge
    with Paul Égré
    Synthese 166 (1): 1-20. 2009.
    In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely “that if one knows something, then one knows that one knows it”. Williamson’s argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them i…Read more
  •  226
    The Ontology of Perception: Bipolarity and Content
    Erkenntnis 48 (2-3): 153-169. 1998.
    The notion of perceptual content is commonly introduced in the analysis of perception. It stems from an analogy between perception and propositional attitudes. Both kinds of mental states, it is thought, have conditions of satisfaction. I try to show that on the most plausible account of perceptual content, it does not determine the conditions under which perceptual experience is veridical. Moreover, perceptual content must be bipolar, whereas perception as a mental state is not. This has profou…Read more
  •  141
    Seeing Absence or Absence of Seeing?
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1): 117-125. 2013.
    Imagine that in entering a café, you are struck by the absence of Pierre, with whom you have an appointment. Or imagine that you realize that your keys are missing because they are not hanging from the usual ring-holder. What is the nature of these absence experiences? In this article, we discuss a recent view defended by Farennikova (2012) according to which we literally perceive absences of things in much the same way as we perceive present things. We criticize and reject the perceptual interp…Read more
  •  136
    Our utterances are typically if not always "situated," in the sense that they are true or false relative to unarticulated parameters of the extra-linguistic context. The problem is to explain how these parameters are determined, given that nothing in the uttered sentences indicates them. It is tempting to claim that they must be determined at the level of thought or intention. However, as many philosophers have observed, thoughts themselves are no less situated than utterances. Unarticulated par…Read more
  •  123
    Disjunctivism, Hallucination and Metacognition
    WIREs Cognitive Science 3 533-543. 2012.
    Perceptual experiences have been construed either as representational mental states—Representationalism—or as direct mental relations to the external world—Disjunctivism. Both conceptions are critical reactions to the so-called ‘Argument from Hallucination’, according to which perceptions cannot be about the external world, since they are subjectively indiscriminable from other, hallucinatory experiences, which are about sense-data ormind-dependent entities. Representationalism agrees that perce…Read more
  •  116
    Feeling the Past: A Two-Tiered Account of Episodic Memory
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3): 413-426. 2014.
    Episodic memory involves the sense that it is “first-hand”, i.e., originates directly from one’s own past experience. An account of this phenomenological dimension is offered in terms of an affective experience or feeling specific to episodic memory. On the basis of recent empirical research in the domain of metamemory, it is claimed that a recollective experience involves two separate mental components: a first-order memory about the past along with a metacognitive, episodic feeling of knowing.…Read more
  •  108
    Felt Reality and the Opacity of Perception
    Topoi 36 (2): 299-309. 2017.
    We investigate the nature of the sense of presence that usually accompanies perceptual experience. We show that the notion of a sense of presence can be interpreted in two ways, corresponding to the sense that we are acquainted with an object, and the sense that the object is real. In this essay, we focus on the sense of reality. Drawing on several case studies such as derealization disorder, Parkinson’s disease and virtual reality, we argue that the sense of reality is two-way independent from …Read more
  •  106
    Too much ado about belief
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2): 185-200. 2007.
    Three commitments guide Dennett’s approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls ‘heterophenomenology.’ Third, a ‘doxological’ commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject’s beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/appearance distinc…Read more
  •  102
    Pictures in the Flesh Presence and Appearance in Pictorial Experience
    British Journal of Aesthetics 52 (4): 391-405. 2012.
    This essay explores the prospects of grounding an account of pictorial experience or ‘seeing-in’ on a theory of presence in ordinary perception. Even though worldly objects can be perceptually recognized in a picture, they do not feel present as when they are perceived face to face. I defend a dual view of perceptual phenomenology according to which the sense of presence is dissociated from the contents of perception. On the one hand, the sense of presence is best conceived as a non-sensory feel…Read more
  •  100
    Seeds of self-knowledge: noetic feelings and metacognition
    In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition, Oxford University Press. pp. 302--321. 2012.
  •  99
    Une théorie réflexive du souvenir épisodique
    Dialogue 36 (3): 527-554. 1997.
    Cet article porte sur une distinction familière entre deux formes de souvenirs: les souvenirs factuels ('Je me souviens que p', où 'p' est une proposition) et les souvenirs épisodiques ('Je me souviens de x', où x est une entité particulière). Les souvenirs épisodiques ont, contrairement aux souvenirs factuels, un rapport immédiat et interne à une expérience particulière que le sujet a eue dans le passé. Les souvenirs épisodique et factuel sont des souvenirs explicites au sens de la psychologie …Read more
  •  75
    Simulation and Knowledge of Action (edited book)
    John Benjamins. 2002.
    CHAPTER Simulation theory and mental concepts Alvin I. Goldman Rutgers University. Folk psychology and the TT-ST debate The study of folk psychology, ...
  •  72
    Qui a peur des qualia corporels?
    Philosophiques 27 (1): 77-98. 2000.
    Qualia, conceived as intrinsic properties of experiences, are not always welcomed by materialists, who prefer to see them as intentional properties presented in our experience. I ask whether this form of reductionism applies to the qualia of bodily awareness. According to the standard materialist theory, the intentional object of pain experience, for instance, is a bodily damage. This theory, though, is unable to account for the phenomenal difference between feeling pain 'inside' and perceiving …Read more
  •  69
    IV—Aesthetic Experience as a Metacognitive Feeling? A Dual-Aspect View
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (1): 69-88. 2016.
  •  69
    It is widely assumed, both in philosophy and in the cognitive sciences, that perception essentially involves a relative or egocentric frame of reference. Levinson has explicitly challenged this assumption, arguing instead in favour of the 'neo-Whorfian' hypothesis that the frame of reference dominant in a given language infiltrates spatial representations in non-linguistic, and in particular perceptual, modalities. Our aim in this paper is to assess Levinson's neo-Whorfian hypothesis at the phil…Read more
  •  64
    Two ontologies of sound
    The Monist 90 (3): 391-402. 2007.
  •  54
    Knowledge, perception, and the art of camouflage
    Synthese 194 (5): 1531-1539. 2017.
    I present a novel argument against the epistemic conception of perception according to which perception either is a form of knowledge or puts the subject in a position to gain knowledge about what is perceived. ECP closes the gap between a perceptual experience that veridically presents a given state of affairs and an experience capable of yielding the knowledge that the state of affairs obtains. Against ECP, I describe a particular case of perceptual experience in which the following triad of c…Read more
  •  47
    Epistemic perspectives on imagination
    Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1 99-118. 2008.
  •  46
    Common Sense and Metaperception: A Practical Model
    Res Philosophica 91 (2): 241-259. 2014.
    Aristotle famously claimed that we perceive that we see or hear, and that this metaperception necessarily accompanies all conscious sensory experiences. In this essay I compare Aristotle’s account of metaperception with three main models of self-awareness to be found in the contemporary literature. The first model countenances introspection or inner sense as higher-order perception. The second model rejects introspection altogether, and maintains that judgments that we see or hear can be directl…Read more
  •  43
    The dynamics of deictic thoughts
    Philosophical Studies 82 (2). 1996.
    Defense of a non-psychological dynamics of demonstrative thoughts.
  •  35
    Situation theorists such as Jon Barwise, John Etchemendy, and John Perry have advanced the hypothesis that linguistic and mental representations are ‘situated' in the sense that they are true or false only relative to partial situations. François Recanati has done an important task in reviving and in many respects deepening situation theory. In this chapter, I explore some aspects of Recanati's own account. I focus on situated mental representations, and stress the connection between them and ad…Read more
  •  33
    Perceptual recognition and the feeling of presence
    In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World, Oxford University Press. pp. 33. 2010.
  •  33
    The discovery of mirror neurons has given rise to a number of interpretations of their functions together with speculations on their potential role in the evolution of specifically human capacities. Thus, mirror neurons have been thought to ground many aspects of human social cognition, including the capacity to engage in cooperative collective actions and to understand them. We propose an evaluation of this latter claim. On the one hand, we will argue that mirror neurons do not by themselves pr…Read more
  •  31
    The framework of perception
    In Annalisa Coliva, Volker Munz & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 347-356. 2015.
  •  29
    Perceptual hysteresis as a marker of perceptual inflexibility in schizophrenia
    with Jean-Rémy Martin, Guillaume Dezecache, Daniel Pressnitzer, Philippe Nuss, Nicolas Bruno, Elisabeth Pacherie, and Nicolas Franck
    Consciousness and Cognition 30 62-72. 2014.
  •  25
    The Problem of Context for Similarity: An Insight from Analogical Cognition
    with Pauline Armary and Emmanuel Sander
    Philosophies 3 (4): 39--0. 2018.
    Similarity is central for the definition of concepts in several theories in cognitive psychology. However, similarity encounters several problems which were emphasized by Goodman in 1972. At the end of his article, Goodman banishes similarity from any serious philosophical or scientific investigations. If Goodman is right, theories of concepts based on similarity encounter a huge problem and should be revised entirely. In this paper, we would like to analyze the notion of similarity with some in…Read more