Oxford University
Faculty of Philosophy
DPhil, 1995
St Andrews, FIfe, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
  • Anti-Individualism and Knowledge
    Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221): 677-679. 2005.
  • Lowe, EJ-Subjects of Experience
    Philosophical Books 39 56-57. 1998.
  •  159
    Contextualism about Evidential Support
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2): 329-354. 2016.
    In this paper, I examine a contextualist thesis that has been little discussed in comparison with contextualism about knowledge, namely contextualism about evidential support. This seems surprising since, prima facie, evidential support statements seem shifty in a way parallel to knowledge ascriptions. I examine but reject the suggestion that contrastivism about evidential support is motivated by arguments analogous to those used to motivate contrastivism about knowledge including sceptical clos…Read more
  •  29
    Words, Concepts and Epistemology
    In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions, Oxford University Press. pp. 31. 2012.
  •  191
    Assertion: New Philosophical Essays (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2011.
    Assertion is a fundamental feature of language. This volume will be the place to look for anyone interested in current work on the topic.
  •  10
    VI-Reliabilism, Knowledge, and Mental Content
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2): 115-135. 2000.
  •  378
    Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence
    Dialectica 65 (4): 493-516. 2011.
    What is the nature of the evidence provided by thought experiments in philosophy? For instance, what evidence is provided by the Gettier thought experiment against the JTB theory of knowledge? According to one view, it provides as evidence only a certain psychological proposition, e.g. that it seems to one that the subject in the Gettier case lacks knowledge. On an alternative, nonpsychological view, the Gettier thought experiment provides as evidence the nonpsychological proposition that the su…Read more
  •  286
    The knowledge Norm for assertion
    Philosophical Issues 18 (1): 89-103. 2008.
    No Abstract
  •  1
    Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge
    In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 767--780. 2009.
  • Davies and Wright have recently diagnosed the felt inadequacy of Moore’s response to the sceptic in terms of a failure of transmission of warrant. They argue that warrant fails to transmit across the following key inference: I have hands, if I have hands then I am not a BIV, so I am not a BIV, on the grounds that this inference cannot be used to rationally overcome doubt about its conclusion, and cannot strengthen one’s epistemic position with respect to the conclusion. Here, for the sake of arg…Read more
  •  254
    Knowledge and Assertion
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3): 549-566. 2010.
  •  306
    Infallibilism, evidence and pragmatics
    Analysis 73 (4): 626-635. 2013.
    According to one contemporary formulation of infallibilism, probability 1 infallibilism, if a subject knows that p, then the probability of p on her evidence is 1. To avoid an implausible scepticism about knowledge, probability 1 infallibilism needs to allow that, in a wide range of cases, a proposition can be evidence for itself. However, such infallibilism needs to explain why it is typically infelicitous to cite p as evidence for p itself. I argue that probability 1 infallibilism has no expla…Read more
  •  111
    Intuitions, evidence and hopefulness
    Synthese 190 (12): 2021-2046. 2013.
    Experimental philosophers have recently conducted surveys of folk judgements about a range of phenomena of interest to philosophy including knowledge, reference, and free will. Some experimental philosophers take these results to undermine the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence. I consider several different replies to the suggestion that these results undermine philosophical appeal to intuition, both piecemeal replies which raise concerns about particular surveys, and …Read more
  •  95
    Externalism and the Fregean tradition
    In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 431--458. 2003.
  •  170
    Critical reasoning, understanding and self-knowledge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3): 659-676. 2000.
    Following Burge, many anti-individualists suppose that a subject can possess a concept even if she incompletely understands it. While agreeing that this is possible, I argue that there is a limit on the extent to which a subject can incompletely understand the set of concepts she thinks with. This limit derives from our conception of our ability to reflectively evaluate our own thoughts or, as Burge puts it, our ability to engage in critical reasoning. The paper extends Burge’s own work on criti…Read more
  •  179
    Boghossian on externalism and privileged access
    Analysis 59 (1): 52-59. 1999.
    Boghossian has argued that Putnam's externalism is incompatible with privileged access, i.e., the claim that a subject can have nonempirical knowledge of her thought contents ('What the externalist can know a priori', PAS 1997). Boghossian's argument assumes that Oscar can know a priori that (1) 'water' aims to name a natural kind; and (2) 'water' expresses an atomic concept. However, I show that if Burge's externalism is correct, then these assumptions may well be false. This leaves Boghossian …Read more
  •  118
    Adapt or die: The death of invariantism&quest
    Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219): 263-285. 2005.
    Contextualists support their view by appeal to cases which show that whether an attribution of knowledge seems correct depends on attributor factors. Contextualists conclude that the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the attributor's context. Invariantists respond that these cases show only that the warranted assertability-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the attributor's context. I examine DeRose's recent argument against the possibility of such an invariantist …Read more
  •  201
    Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1): 123-157. 2012.
  •  29
    Assertion: An introduction and overview
    In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 1-17. 2011.
    We introduce the concept of assertion, survey existing views about it, and detail the contents of the remainder of the book
  •  9
    Anti-Individualism and Knowledge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2): 515-518. 2007.
  •  8
    Reasons, Justification, and Defeat (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2021.
    This volume is about the notion of 'defeat' in philosophy. The idea is that someone who has some knowledge, or a justified belief, can lose this knowledge or justified belief if they acquire a 'defeater' - evidence that undermines it. The contributors examine the role of defeat not just in epistemology but in practical reasoning and ethics.
  •  225
    In this paper, I defend McKinsey's argument (Analysis 1991) that Burge's antiindividualist position is incompatible with privileged access, viz. the claim that each subject can know his own thought contents just by reflection and without having undertaken an empirical investigation. I argue that Burge thinks that there are certain necessary conditions for a subject to have thoughts involving certain sorts of concepts; these conditions are appropriately different for thoughts involving natural ki…Read more